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Abstract 
The study aim was to determine effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
and its potential interaction with the EPA policies on EU/ACP countries. The research 
analysis focussed on welfare outcomes, changes in trade balance and output of 
bioethanol crops commodities due to these policies. Emphasis of our analysis was 
placed on sugar given the economic importance of this commodity to many ACP 
member states. Absence of an EU bioethanol partial equilbrium model means we 
had to design one from certain assumptions. One of the assumptions was that 
subsidies support EU bioethanol production such that just enough is produced to 
meet the 5.75% and 10% EC blend mandate requirements. For this reason, EU 
bioethanol production did not affect transport fuel demand and prices.  
Using the GTAP model, the study has found that the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy increases bioethanol crops commodities prices resulting in global welfare loss 
that is highest in the EU region. However, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
also increases bioethanol crops commodities production in ACP countries and 
promote ACP export of these commodities to the EU.  The EU is able to produce all 
bioethanol requirements from local sugar beet production. Increasing the amount of 
sugar beet in bioethanol production minimizes the effect on global food prices and 
offers greatest benefits to ACP countries through promotion of their sugar 
industries. Trade liberalising EPA policies result in welfare gain for regions engaged 
in them. However, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
EPA policies result in welfare loss, which is again highest in the EU. Combination of 
the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies also promotes ACP bioethanol crops 
production and export.  
Overall, the study has contributed to our understanding of biofuel policies and their 
potential global effects on food markets especially in ACP countries. 
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Chapter 1  
 
1.0 Introduction and Motivation 
Biofuel production has been gaining popularity around the world because of the 
unpredictable and sometimes high prices of fossil fuels, most notably the oil crisis of 
the 1970s. More recently, biofuels are being promoted due to global warming 
concerns and the need for cleaner energy. Nations the world over are eager to find 
alternative forms of energy in an attempt to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
which are costly and have negative environmental effects due to the emissions of 
Green House Gases (GHG) that have been identified as major contributors to global 
warming and climate change. Hardin (1968) equated environmental pollution to the 
tragedy of the commons where agents, in pursuit of their own individual interests, 
ultimately deplete a common limited resource with adverse long-term 
consequences. Global concerns about the increasing levels of pollution have 
therefore given rise to the idea of a carbon tax in an attempt to reduce GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere. 
Besides environmental protection, biofuels are also being promoted as an attempt 
to improve and diversify farm incomes. In such cases, their production is supported 
by various protective and market distorting policies. The European Union 
(composed of 27 member countries and referred to as the EU27), being a signatory 
to the Kyoto Protocol, has also put in place policies that are aimed at promoting 
production and use of biofuels in the region. 
An example of such policy intervention is the European Commission (EC) Directive 
on Biofuels passed in 2003, which forms the basis for the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate. This directive sets a reference value for national indicative targets at 2%, 
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calculated based on energy content, of all transport fuels in the EU region by 2005, 
increasing to 5.75% by 2010 and 10% by 2020.  
Biofuels primarily refer to bioethanol and biodiesel. The words bioethanol and 
ethanol will be used interchangeably. Biodiesel is produced mainly from vegetable 
and animal oils/fats by a process called transesterification while bioethanol is 
produced mainly from sugar crops (e.g. sugar cane and sugar beet) and grain crops 
(e.g. corn, wheat, barley and rye) by a process of fermentation. 
Bioethanol is produced more efficiently and cheaply from sugar cane. Since sugar is 
not a main food source for man or livestock as is corn, it is a better bioethanol 
source. Therefore, if well balanced, sugar could produce bioethanol without 
threatening food security. In this way, it is more sensible for the EU to use more 
sugar beet or sugar in the production of bioethanol so that the mandate does not 
have adverse effects on food markets and welfare. This is because the other 
bioethanol crops commodities like corn and wheat are more vital food sources with 
few substitutes.  
The global leaders in the production of bioethanol are the USA and Brazil, using 
corn and sugar cane respectively. Bioethanol in the EU27 is produced from a 
number of crops (referred to as bioethanol crops1) which differ from state to state 
but which are mainly wheat, corn, barley, rye and sugar beet.  
The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is therefore expected to affect the markets 
for EU27 bioethanol crops i.e. wheat, rye, sugar beet, corn and barley. Because 
bioethanol production from sugar beet competes with sugar production, the 
proposed EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is therefore expected to have an 
effect on the EU sugar market. Since the EU is a global player in sugar trade, a 
disturbance in its sugar market will be transmitted into the world sugar market. It is 
                                                          
1
 Bioethanol crops are equivalent to bioethanol crops commodities except for sugar cane and sugar 
beet where the bioethanol crop commodity in this case is sugar. 
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also expected that the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will result in increase in 
the prices of bioethanol crops commodities, worsen food security and decrease 
overall global welfare mainly because biethanol crops commodities are important 
food sources. 
It is therefore important to analyse the possible outcomes of such disturbances and 
to determine their implications for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
Policies that have a potential to affect food markets are interesting to ACP countries 
given the fact that most of them are still food insecure. Further, trade in sugar 
remains one of the key sources of revenue for many ACP countries and as such, 
trends and developments that affect global sugar markets are important for these 
countries. 
A number of ACP countries are trading in the EU and world market under various 
trade agreements. More recently, there has been the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) that have been proposed between the EU and ACP member 
states. The EPAs involve reciprocal liberalisation of trade between the EU27 and 
ACP countries. It is therefore important to analyse how the EC biofuel blend 
mandate policy will interact with such novel trade agreements that are being put in 
place that will form the framework for future bilateral trade between the EU and 
ACP.  
From these forewords, the aim of the research is therefore the following: 
 To develop a model for the EU27 bioethanol market and to determine 
equilibrium conditions arising from the proposed EC bioethanol blend 
mandate directive on transport fuel. 
 To determine using the GTAP model what effects the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy will have on bioethanol crop commodities markets and on 
global welfare. Special emphasis is given to its potential effect on the 
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EU/World sugar markets and therefore its implications on sugar production 
and trade in ACP countries.  
 To analyse the possible interaction outcomes between the EC bioethanol 
blend mandate policy and the EPA policies and implications of such 
interactions on bioethanol crops commodities markets especially sugar.  
 
The overall aim of our study therefore to contribute to our understanding of the 
EU bioethanol market and its international trade perspective especially on ACP 
countries. 
 
Why study the EU27 sugar and bioethanol markets? 
 A study of the EU27 sugar and bioethanol markets is important in that bioethanol 
and sugar compete directly for the same raw material i.e. sugar cane and sugar beet 
meaning their markets are directly linked. In this way, developments in the 
bioethanol markets will be transferred to the sugar market and vice versa. 
The EU sugar market is one of the most distorted in World Trade due to 
intervention policies that artificially increase prices. It is therefore interesting to find 
out the effect of the proposed EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on this market. 
It is expected that the mandate will increase the price of sugar due to increased 
demand for sugar beet with important implication for EU sugar policies and trade 
with ACP countries. 
The EU is a major importer of ACP sugar. For this reason, the study of biofuel or 
specifically, bioethanol and sugar market in the EU will shed some light on potential 
future trends and developments in ACP sugar industries. This is more so in the 
current new policy proposals like the EPA and EBAI policies between the EU and 
ACP/LDCs. Since the EU is a major global player in the sugar industry, any 
disturbance to its sugar market, as is expected from the bioethanol mandate, will 
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have spillover effects into the world sugar market that is also an important export 
destination for ACP sugar. 
The outcome of the study therefore will help inform ACP countries on their future 
production decisions. Since the EC bioethanol blend mandate is expected to 
increase global demand for sugar, more investment in the production of this 
commodity could be justified despite the recent developments of cuts in EU sugar 
prices, which negatively affect ACP revenues. 
This means a strong link between bioethnol and sugar market is predicted. Such link 
between commodities that compete for the same raw materials is not unique as 
has been the case in the USA where there has been an increase in corn price due to 
the production of transport bioethanol thus strengthening the relationship between 
agriculture and energy markets.2  
What is new about our approach in studying the EU bioethanol market under the 
mandate and our study contribution? 
Not many studies have been done on the EC biofuel/bioethanol blend mandate 
policy especially on its international trade effect. Most studies analyse the EC 
biofuel blend mandate policy using a general equilibrium approach and draw 
conclusion on the bigger picture of the possible effects of the EC biofuel policy. As 
such, they have limited use or applications to countries that are specifically 
interested in the EU/global market for a specific commodity, in this case sugar.   
 
For example, a study by Banse et al (2008) used a Computable General Equilibrium 
Model (CGE) with endogenous land supply and concluded that the EU biofuel blend 
mandate will result in increased demand for biofuel crops regionally and 
                                                          
2 Please see Andrade et al (2011), Monteiro et al (2009), Banse (2008), Hazell and Pachauri (2006) 
and Voyiatzis et al (2002). 
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internationally which will result in increased land use, an EU agricultural trade 
deficit and an increase in consumer prices for petrol. 
 
Birur et al (2007) also used CGE modelling and concluded that the EU biofuel 
mandate of 5.75% will result in a  ? ? ?A? ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶ ďŝŽĨƵĞůƐ ? ƐŚĂƌĞ ŽĨ ůŝƋƵŝĚ ĨƵĞů
consumption. Barka and Holst (2009), by holding EU27 agricultural production 
constant concluded that the EU has the potential to reduce oil imports between 6% 
and 28% by converting eligible agricultural crops into biofuels.  
 
This means that there is a paucity of studies that analyse the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy on a partial equilibrium approach. Further, studies on the EU 
biofuel market do not attempt to incorporate the potential interaction of the blend 
mandate policy with other future proposed trade policies like the EPA policies 
between the EU and ACP. The approach for most EU biofuel studies is therefore not 
specifically designed to draw policy conclusions more relevant to ACP countries. 
The study of the EC biofuel policy with special emphasis on sugar output and trade 
is important for ACP countries and especially for the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries that have developed sugar industries that form an 
important part of their economies.  
As mentioned before, the EU and world sugar markets are important trade markets 
for ACP countries and such trade in sugar sustains many of ACP economies. Table 
1.1 below shows the contribution of sugar to some ACP member states GDP in 
2003. 
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Table 1.1: Contribution of sugar to some ACP member states GDP in 2003 
Country 2003 Sugar Sugar as % of Sugar Sector 
Employment 
 Production 
(MT) 
Export 
(MT) 
GDP Total 
Agriculture 
 
Barbados 36 000 35 161 1.8 41.4 9 500 
Belize 111 109 100 462 9.5 61.9 10 600 
Congo 45 000 42 524 1.0 n/a 1 000 
ŽƚĞĚ ?/ǀŽƌĞ 145 000 31 518 0.9 3.3 5 000 
Fiji 330 356 273 756 8.1 93.0 101 600 
Guyana 302 000 261 207 15.8 30.0 33 100 
Jamaica 153 670 131 117 1.0 13.9 51 500 
Madagascar* 35 000 6 837 3.9 n/a 18 000 
Malawi* 257 000 118 059 4.9 n/a 21 800 
Mauritius* 537 723 517 506 8.0 70.0 51 600 
St Kitts and 
Nevis 
22 000 15 921 28.0 74.0 9 400 
Swaziland* 615 949 478 648 24.0 51.0 93 000 
Tanzania* 217 513 22 723 3.1 5.0 52 000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
66 914 54 202 0.6 27.8 41 400 
Zambia* 229 757 118 784 2.3 15.0 62 000 
Zimbabwe* 482 309 124 289 2.3 17.2 162 000 
Total 3 587 300 2 332 744   729 500 
Source: ACP Sugar group report (2005) 
*Refers to SADC member state 
 
As can be seen from the Table 1.1, in 2003 Swaziland sugar export accounted for 
about 78% of total sugar production and the sugar industry contributed 24% of 
^ǁĂǌŝůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ 'W ĂŶĚformed 51% of total agriculture production. In St Kitts and 
Nevis, sugar exports accounted for 72% of total sugar production. Sugar industries 
contributed 28% to their total GDP and formed 74% of total agricultural production. 
Further, according to the Swaziland Sugar Association annual report (2006/2007), 
27% of sugar sales were to preferential markets, mainly the EU and the USA, with 
the EU accounting for 85% of these sales. Sales to the world and regional markets 
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(excluding the US and EU market) contributed 22% of total sugar sales for that 
financial year. This means that sales to preferential and world market accounted for 
close to 50% of total sugar sales.3 
These figures show the significance of the sugar industry to some ACP member 
states and the importance of an analysis of the potential outcomes of factors that 
will affect the EU and the world sugar market, as the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy is envisaged to do. Changes in the EU27 sugar market will not only have 
effects on the prices and quantities of ACP sugar exports but also on production 
levels meaning that the effects will have more spillover consequences for example 
in terms of employment, land and water utilisation and the environment. It is 
therefore important to study the nature of the changes the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy might have in an objective way and to draw empirical conclusions.  
Analysis of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will contribute alternative ways 
of modelling the EU bioethanol supply by use of the Food and Agriculture Policy 
Research Institute (FAPRI) adapted model that has previously been used to study 
mainly the USA agricultural markets. EU bioethanol demand is modelled on the 
demand for transport fuel by the use of a binding blend mandate and tax rebate. 
For this reason, the EU bioethanol market is derived from the market for transport 
fuel. This approach helps set up a bioethanol market in the region, which is 
currently under-developed with no reliable data. In this way, an EU27 bioethanol 
model has been set up in line with that of the USA and Brazil, the leading global 
bioethanol producers.  
The supply for bioethanol in the region is derived under an assumption that the 
EU27 does not allow bioethanol imports. Bioethanol supply in the EU is therefore 
ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵ ‘ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ?ďŝŽĞƚŚĂŶŽůĐƌŽƉƐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ
some of these bioethanol crops will be diverted from production of bioethanol 
                                                          
3
 The percentages have been calculated from figures cited in the reference report 
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crops commodities to the production of bioethanol. This is a strong assumption but 
it will contribute in the analysis of the blend mandate on an upper bound 
benchmark. The EU27 bioethanol equilibrium conditions are determined which are 
then used in the GTAP model to study the global spillover effects of the mandate.  
The use of the GTAP model also facilitates thĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďůĞŶĚ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
interaction with other policies. This policy interaction approach to the analysis of 
the EC biofuel blend mandate policy has never been attempted before, with most 
existing studies focusing on the analysis of each of these policies in isolation. The 
outcomes of this study will therefore contribute to the existing knowledge on these 
policies and their effects on global food markets.  
This study will also contribute an initial phase for the analysis of the potential for 
ACP countries to produce and export bioethanol. This diversification to bioethanol 
production is especially important in the face of decreasing world sugar prices and 
increases in the prices of fossil fuels. In this way, ACP countries can also play an 
important role in endeavours to find alternative forms of energy given the fact that 
a number of ACP member states especially in the SADC region are low cost sugar 
producers.  
Method of Investigation 
The first step of the study is a preview of the EC biofuel blend mandate policy and 
the reasons behind it (i.e. climate change mitigation, uncertainty and high prices of 
fossil fuels and the goal of diversifying farm incomes). A literature review focusing 
on the EU27 and global bioethanol status is then undertaken. This includes a review 
of literature on bioethanol policies, production costs (which highlights regional 
production competitive advantages) and environmental and socio-economic 
implications of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy.  
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The global, USA and Brazilian bioethanol models are reviewed and discussed which 
then help establish an EU27 bioethanol model. The USA bioethanol model is linked 
to the corn market while the Brazilian one is linked to the sugar market. The EU27 
bioethanol model is therefore linked to markets for sugar beet (sugar), corn, wheat, 
rye and barley which are the crops mainly used to produce bioethanol in the EU 
region. A partial equilibrium model for the EU27 is then designed and equilibrium 
market clearing bioethanol quantities determined. 
The equilibrium quantity of bioethanol is then converted to equivalent quantities of 
bioethanol crops commodities using their bioethanol production efficiencies and 
shares in the EU bioethanol production process. These bioethanol crops 
commodities equivalents are then transmitted into the GTAP model as an artificial 
decrease in output of these commodities in the EU27 region. This artificial 
percentage decrease in bioethanol crops commodities output uses the 2004 EU27 
production level of these commodities. This is because the GTAP 7 database used in 
our study is based on 2004 international trade data.  
This decrease in EU bioethanol crops commodities output, which simulates the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy is analysed with emphasis given on its effects on 
ACP bioethanol crops commodities production and trade and on its global welfare 
outcomes. For this reason, EU agricultural policies that support crop production are 
also reviewed together with policies that promote sugar production in the region. 
Trade policies (historical and future) that form the trade framework between the 
EU27 and ACP countries are also reviewed. Again special emphasis is given to 
policies that have sustained the sugar industry in the  EU region including those 
that have facilitated sugar trade between the EU and ACP countries.  
Data needed 
 EU bioethanol production data (current) 
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 Bioethanol crops commodities production and prices data (wheat, rye, 
barley, sugar cane, sugar beet and corn) 
 The demand for transport fuel 
 Sugar production, imports and exports in the EU 
 EU/Global sugar prices and trends 
 GTAP data base  
Models to be used 
 A FAPRI adapted model to derive the EU27 bioethanol supply model 
 A transport fuel derived bioethanol demand model 
 GTAP model 
The FAPRI model was developed by the Food and Agriculture Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri-Colombia (MU). It is used in the study 
of supply and demand of major US agricultural commodities i.e. crops and livestock 
markets, input costs, retail prices, farm incomes and government costs. Its 
adaptation into the EU bioethanol partial equilibrium analysis is a new initiative. 
The bioethanol demand model is a derived demand from the EU27 demand for 
transport fuel. Key assumptions in this bioethanol demand derivation is that the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy is binding and that there is a full tax rebate for the 
bioethanol component of the blended fuel mixture. 
The GTAP is a CGE model that consists of multiple commodities and multiple 
regions. It is a standard modelling framework that employs simple but robust 
assumptions of constant return to scales and perfect competition to achieve 
Walrasian equilibrium. Given the fact that it comes with software to manipulate the 
ĚĂƚĂ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞůĞƌ ?Ɛ Ăŝŵ ĂŶĚ ǁith its multiregional and multi-commodity 
database, it is ideal to study policies that have international spillovers.   
A more detailed discussion of the models is provided in chapters 3 and 5 of the 
thesis. The flow diagram below is the schematic outline of our study. 
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Thesis Outline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy:  Its effect on ACP 
sugar trade and potential interaction with EPA policies.        
The EU27 Bioethanol Blend Mandate Policy:  Its Effect on ACP 
EU27 bioethanol market 
EU27 bioethanol demand 
 Derived demand from demand of 
motor gasoline and use of the EC 
blend mandate directive of 5.75% 
and 10%  
EU27 bioethanol supply 
 Supply of bioethanol 
from bioethanol crops is 
a derived supply 
estimated using the 
FAPRI model. Ethanol 
crops used are sugar 
beet,  barley, corn, rye 
and wheat 
Determine Dried Distillers Grain 
(DDG) production from grain 
bioethanol crops 
Use EU27 gasoline elasticity to 
transmit this % change in demand 
into the GTAP model (by changing 
tax on output to achieve the 
required % demand changes). 
Determine % change in gasoline 
demand due to the effect of the 
mandate (use 2004 gasoline 
demand as base data) 
Determine quantity of gasoline 
demand in the EU27 due to 
mandate and bioethanol 
equilibrium conditions 
Enter the GTAP 
through animal feed 
market 
? 
Determine equilibrium price (P) and 
quantity (Q) of bioethanol due to the 
blend mandate at 5.75 and 10% 
*Quantity of bioethanol crops produced in the EU27  less quantity 
ĚŝǀĞƌƚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞďŝŽĞƚŚĂŶŽůĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞA?  ‘EĞǁ ?Y
of bioethanol crops produced by the EU27 {*use 2004 data as base 
data} 
Use bioethanol crops elasticities to transmit this new Q into the 
GTAP model, transmitted as an artificial % reduction in 
production due to the decrease demand (this is done by 
changing tax on output commodity by commodity) 
Determine the global effects of this artificial reduction in bioethanol 
crop production in the EU27 (with emphasis on sugar production) 
and % changes in gasoline demand (and DDG use in livestock 
production) 
Make analyses and conclusions based on output changes of 
bioethanol crops commodities especially sugar in ACP/Sub-
Saharan Countries, overall welfare effects and price and trade 
balance changes.  
?- This route 
was not 
modelled into 
Undertake this simulation in an environment of other policies like the EPA 
to see how these future policy initiatives are likely to interact with the EC 
blend mandate policy and make conclusions on their possible outcomes 
to ACP/ Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
Determine quantity of bioethanol crops 
required to produce the demanded 
bioethanol by use of crop shares (derived 
from literature) and their bioethanol 
production efficiency.  
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The diagram above is a visual flowchart for our study and shows the connection 
between the EU bioethanol market, the EU transport sector and the markets for 
bioethanol crops commodities. It highlights the sequences that the study will follow 
in consideration that all the sections are linked.  
The thesis is therefore organised as follows; 
Chapter 2 is the review of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy as well as a 
literature review on the global and EU27 bioethanol production status and policies 
that support bioethanol production and trade in the EU. Special emphasis is given 
to Brazilian bioethanol production status given that it is the lowest cost bioethanol 
producer. Further, since ACP countries produce sugar from sugar cane the Brazilian 
bioethanol industry, which is sugar cane based, is of interest to these countries. The 
chapter also reviews the literature that has been done on the possible effects of the 
EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on food markets, the environment and its 
overall socio-economic impact in order to highlight the gaps that our study wishes 
to investigate. 
Chapter 3 reviews the global, USA and Brazilian bioethanol models and from these 
models an EU27 bioethanol partial equilibrium model is designed. The EU model is 
based on the link between the bioethanol market and other sectors. The EU27 
bioethanol demand is derived from the demand for gasoline while its supply is 
adapted from the FAPRI model that links bioethanol supply to that of bioethanol 
crops commodities. Equilibrium conditions of the EU27 bioethanol market are 
determined and their implications on the EU transport sector analysed.  
Chapter 4 is a review of the global, EU and ACP sugar markets status. The chapter 
also investigates policies that sustain trade between the EU and ACP countries. 
Since the EU bioethanol market is directly linked to that of agricultural 
commodities, the policies that sustain agriculture in the EU are reviewed, which 
include the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and specifically the Common Market 
Ch.1 - Introduction and Motivation 
 
1-14 
 
Organisation (CMO) that sustains sugar production in the EU region. Reforms in the 
EU sugar market, which have important implications for ACP countries, are also 
discussed including future policies that have a potential to affect EU/ACP sugar 
industries.  
Chapter 5 is an overview of CGE modelling techniques and their use in welfare 
analysis. It also offers a theoretical background of the GTAP model and highlights its 
usefulness in the analysis of policies that have multimarket and multinational 
linkages, as is the case with the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy.  
Chapter 6 presents the empirical analysis of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy on ACP countries using the GTAP model. Empirical results are presented and 
conclusions drawn from the findings in terms of the global welfare effects of the 
mandate and its implication on bioethanol crops commodities production and trade 
between the EU and ACP countries with special emphasis on sugar. 
Chapter 7 is the simulation of the EPA policies on their own using the GTAP model 
and their simulation in combination with the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
on ACP countries. Conclusions are drawn from the empirical results of the effects of 
these policies and their interaction. Again, special focus is given on the welfare 
outcomes and changes in sugar output and trade between the EU and ACP 
countries because of these policies.  
 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the key results of the policies under analysis for the 
EU and ACP regions. The chapter also compares our results with those from 
previous studies, points out the limitations of our analysis approach and suggests 
extensions for future research.   
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Chapter 2  
 
 Literature review on biofuel and bioethanol 
2.0 Introduction 
In this Chapter, we will discuss the background of biofuel production and reasons 
for their promotion around the world. Global production of biofuels and their 
international trade status will be reviewed including the various policies that 
support their production more especially in Brazil and USA. The focus of this study is 
on bioethanol as opposed to biodiesel because of the direct link between 
bioethanol production and bioethanol crops commodities markets. For this reason, 
bioethanol will be discussed in more details.  
Brazil and USA are the two main leaders in transport bioethanol production with 
well developed bioethanol markets. These countries bioethanol programmes 
therefore warrant reviewing. The Brazilian bioethanol industry, which is sugar 
based, will be reviewed in detail because of its direct relevance to ACP countries 
which are major sugar cane producers and sugar traders. This chapter will also 
review biofuels production processes since these processes, especially that for 
bioethanol help show the links between biofuels and food production chains. The 
controversies surrounding the production of biofuels will also be discussed 
especially their effects on food production and food prices. 
Since one of the reasons cited for promotion of biofuel as a transport fuel is the 
reduction of environmental pollution due to green house gases (GHG), the 
interaction between biofuel production, biofuel use and the environment will also 
be discussed. This is more so because various studies, mostly using life-cycle 
assessment models, have questioned the environmental benefits of biofuels.  
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Since the focus of our study is on EU27 bioethanol production, the reasons for 
promotion of biofuels in the EU will be reviewed including biofuel production 
strategies and status in the region. We will then review the various studies that 
have been done on the EU27 bioethanol market in order to show the literature gaps 
which our study aim to address. The bioethanol market in the EU is generally still 
under-developed and studies on the economics of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate are scant. The potential full impact of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy on bioethanol crops commodities markets remains largely unknown.  
In this light therefore, the chapter is structured as follows; in section 2.1 the 
definition of biofuels is given which will be applicable throughout the thesis. Section 
2.2 gives a discussion of reasons behind biofuel production and the controversies 
surrounding their promotion. The global bioethanol status is reviewed in section 2.3 
while section 2.4 gives an overview of bioethanol as an internationally tradable 
commodity. Section 2.5 discusses the EU biofuel promotion strategy and section 2.6 
gives the EU bioethanol production and trade status. In section 2.7 we review 
studies that have been done on the EU bioethanol programme as guided by the EC 
bioethanol blend madate policy and section 2.8 is the conclusion. 
2.1 What are biofuels? 
The term biofuel is referred to as liquid or gaseous fuels for the transport sector 
that are predominantly produced from biomass (Demirbas, 2008). Biofuels are 
basically divided into two namely bioethanol and biodiesel. Bioethanol is an alcohol 
obtained by fermenting sugar containing organic materials like sugar cane, sugar 
beet and most grain crops like corn, wheat barley and rye. This is what is referred to 
as the primary bioethanol production process and is the bioethanol source that is of 
importance in this study since it impacts directly on bioethanol crops commodities 
markets. 
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Bioethanol can also be produced from lignocellulosic biomass. The conversion 
includes two processes: hydrolysis of cellulose in the lignocellulosic materials to 
fermentable reducing sugars, and fermentation of the sugars to bioethanol by help 
of enzymes (Sun and Cheng, 2001). However, this bioethanol production pathway 
which is commonly referred to as second generation bioethanol is difficult and still 
under active research globally. As Balat (2010) noted, bioconversion of 
lignocellulose to bioethanol is difficult due to: (1) the resistant nature of biomass to 
breakdown; (2) the variety of sugars which are released when the hemicellulose 
and cellulose polymers are broken and the need to find or genetically engineer 
organisms to efficiently ferment these sugars; and (3) costs for collection and 
storage of low density lignocellosic materials. This bioethanol production process 
will not be considered in this research because it is still in its infancy and does not 
have a direct impact on bioethanol crops commodities production and trade, which 
is the main focus of our study. 
 
Biodiesel is basically an alkyl ester obtained from oil plants like sunflower, palm, 
rapeseed and soybeans by a process of transesterification. The basic production 
process of biodiesel is shown in Figure 2-1; 
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Figure 2-1: Basic schematic view of biodiesel production process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Marchetti et al (2005) 
 
As can be seen from the chemical production of biodiesel the only inputs of 
agricultural value are the vegetable oils which are not an important direct food 
source like corn or wheat. This means that biodiesel production competes with food 
production indirectly through competition for agricultural inputs like water, land 
and labour.  
 
Global production of biofuels amounted to 62 billion litres (or 36 million tonnes of 
oil equivalent (Mtoe)) in 2007, which is equal to 1.8% of total global transport fuel 
consumption in energy terms with Brazil and the United States together accounting 
for almost three quarters of global biofuels supply (Ajanovic, 2010). As has been 
noted by Bomb (2006) and Bozbas (2005) the EU mainly produces biodiesel with 
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little progress on bioethanol production. High production costs of EU produced 
biofuels due primarily to high priced internal biofuel crops relative to fossil fuels are 
the main impediment to market based expansion of EU biofuel programmes, 
particularly for bioethanol.  
 
According to an EC report (2006), domestically manufactured biodiesel becomes 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂƚĐƌƵĚĞŽŝůƉƌŝĐĞƐŽĨĂďŽƵƚ  ? ? ?ĂďĂƌƌĞů ?ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ bioethanol becomes 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂƚĐƌƵĚĞŽŝůƉƌŝĐĞƐŽĨ ? ? ?ĂďĂƌƌĞů ?This means that biodiesel production is 
less expensive than that of bioethanol which could be the reason why biodiesel 
production is higher in the EU region. In the next section we discuss the reasons for 
the promotion of biofuels around the globe and the controversies surrounding their 
production. 
 
2.2 Reasons and controversies surrounding biofuels production   
 
As mentioned before, the unpredictability and volatility of fossil fuel or specifically 
oil prices is one of the important drivers that promote biofuels. An example of such 
unpredictability and volatility is that in June 2008 the oil price reached a high of 
US$147/barrel but by December of the same year the price had dropped to 
$45/barrel. A UN report (2009) observed that prices were likely to remain at that 
level or decline even further due to the financial crisis and recession that depressed 
oil demand. However, by March 2011 the oil price was hovering around 
US$110/barrel on concerns of political upheavals in Arab member states despite 
the fact that the global recession was not completely over. This is an indicator that 
the prices of oil will remain unpredictable and that economic activity is not their 
sole driver. Demand for oil drives the demand for gasoline. For example, if crude oil 
represents half the cost of retail gasoline, a 10% increase in the price of crude 
would translate into a 5% increase in the price of gasoline, and the demand 
elasticities for crude oil would be about half those for gasoline (Hamilton, 2008). 
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Another important reason for the promotion of biofuels is in an attempt to fight 
global warming. The transport sector has been identified as one important 
contributor to GHG emission.   
Figure 2-2 shows global fossŝůĨƵĞůƐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽK2 emission in 2006. 
Figure 2-2: 2006 world CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion  
  
Source: OECD report (2010) 
The global CO2 contribution of transport fossil fuels according to an OECD report 
(2010) was 24% in 2006.  
The European Climate Change Programme (ECCP-2007) reported that the EU 
transport sector was responsible for up to 21% of total EU GHG emission in 2006. 
The EEA (2006) also noted that the share of transport in total EU25 GHG emission 
rose from 17% in 1990 to 24% in 2004. Further, according to Hammond et al. 
(2007), the UK transport sector has the fastest rate of growth in terms of primary 
(and end-use) energy consumption, and is currently responsible for 30% of UK CO2 
emission. These figures justify the need for renewable forms of energy in the 
transport sector, thus the promotion of transport biofuels. Fontaras and Samaras, 
Manufacturing, 
19% 
Other Sectors, 
12% 
Transport, 24% 
Energy, 45% 
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(2007) noted that the contribution of the road transport sector to EU GHG emission 
has resulted in the drive to reduce CO2 emission and fuel consumption from this 
sector to be an important strategy for the EU to mitigate against climate change. 
 
One important global attempt to reduce GHG emission was the signing of the Kyoto 
protocol in 1997. Under this protocol industrialized nations committed themselves 
to reducing their GHG emission by 5.2% below 1990 levels for the years 2008 W2012. 
GHG under the Kyoto protocol refer to carbondioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous 
Oxide (N2O), Perflurocarbons (PFCs), Hydroflurocarbons (HFCs) and Sulphur 
Hexaflouride (SF6). GHG are measured in CO2 equivalent and the carbon footprint 
refers to their total amount emitted into the atmosphere by individuals. This 
definition therefore result in climate change discussions centrering around carbon 
thus giving rise to terms like carbon policies, carbon tax and carbon trading.4  
 
In an attempt to meet targets of the Kyoto protocol commitments, three 
mechanisms were proposed and these are the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and the International Emissions Trading System 
(ETS). These mechanisms aim to maximise the cost-effectiveness of climate change 
mitigation by allowing parties to pursue opportunities to cut emissions, or enhance 
carbon sinks, more cheaply abroad than at home (Corregidor Sanz et al, 2005). 
The EU was one of the forerunners to embrace the Kyoto Protocol and committed 
to reducing GHG emissions by 8% below its 1990 level in the period 2008 W2012. 
Also in 2005, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), a carbon trading scheme 
for GHG was launched within the EU (Wei and Zhang, 2010). However, this carbon 
trading scheme, which is aimed at reducing industrial pollution will only include 
                                                          
4
 CO2 equivalents is a metric measure used to compare the emissions from various GHG based upon 
their global warming potential (GWP). Carbon dioxide equivalents are commonly expressed as 
"million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (MMTCO2 Eq)." The carbon dioxide equivalent for 
a gas is derived by multiplying the tons of the gas by the associated GWP. MMTCO2 Eq = (million 
metric tons of a gas) * (GWP of the gas)  W(http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html) 
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aviation from 2012.5 The exclusion of the transport sector is despite the findings 
that it is a major contributor to CO2 emission. Li (2009) identified three mechanisms 
in which the EU is attempting to reduce GHG emission from the transport sector 
and these are: (1) commitment of European car producers in 2008 to manufacture 
cars that do not exceed CO2 emission of 140g /Km (2) encouraging consumers to 
choose the most fuel efficient cars and (3) fiscal support that requires member 
states levying car registration taxes and or circulation taxes to relate at least 50% of 
the taxes to the level of a vehicle CO2 emission. The biofuel blend mandate 
proposed by the EC is therefore yet another method of  mitigating against the 
contribution of transport fuels to GHG emission.  
 
Because its primary feedstock is a vegetable oil or animal fat, biodiesel is generally 
considered to be renewable and since the carbon in the oil or fat originate mostly 
from CO2 in the air, biodiesel is considered to contribute much less to global 
warming than fossil fuels (Van Gerpen, 2004). Bioethanol, since it is produced from 
renewable feedstock is also considered a renewable fuel. Bioethanol usually forms 
10% (E10) of the blend fuel mixture or up to 85% (E85) as is used in flexi fuel 
vehicles (FFV) that can use both ethanol and gasoline as fuel. Despite its lower 
energy content than traditional fossil fuels (bioethanol contains 68% of the energy 
in a litre of petrol) bioethanol improves the fuel combustion in vehicles, thereby 
reducing the emission of carbon monoxide, unburned hydrocarbons and 
carcinogens (Nigam and Singh, 2010). Whitten (2004) reported a reduction in CO2 
emission by up to 30 % when using 10% bioethanol blended with petrol due to the 
higher oxygen content of bioethanol of about 35%w/w. Moreover, the higher 
octane number (a measure of fuel tendency to burn more efficiently) of bioethanol 
has been cited as one further advantage of its use as a transport fuel (Balat and 
Balat, 2008; Dodic´ et al, 2009; Costa and Sodré, 2010). 
                                                          
5
 Under the EU aviation emissions policy, which will take effect on January 1, 2012, airlines that land 
in or take off from the EU will be required to buy carbon credits under the EU ETS (Ireland, 2011) 
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Wang et al (1999) analysed the GHG emission reduction outcomes for various 
blended fuels from corn based bioethanol in the USA. Their analysis was on per 
vehicle mile travelled using various blended fuels, with the result based on 
petroleum use, energy use and emissions associated with bioethanol production. 
Their study reported the following outcomes; 
Use of E10 (10% ethanol and 90% gasoline by volume) achieves: 
 ? ?A?ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƉĞƚƌŽůĞƵŵƵse, 
 ? ?A?ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ','ĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ 
 ? ?A?ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶĨŽƐƐŝůĞŶĞƌŐǇƵƐĞ ? 
Use of E85 (85% ethanol and 15% gasoline by volume) achieves: 
 ? ? ? W75% reduction in petroleum use, 
 ? ? ? W19% reduction in GHG emissions, and 
 ? ? ? W35% reduction in fossil energy use. 
Use of E95 (95% ethanol and 5% gasoline by volume) achieves: 
 ? ? ? W88% reduction in petroleum use, 
 ? ? ? W25% reduction in GHG emissions, and 
 ? ? ? W44% reduction in fossil energy use. 
A study by BIO Intelligence Service (2010) in France concluded that without 
considering land-use changes, biofuels display positive balances in relation to fossil 
fuels, with reductions from 24 to 91% of GHG emission level. For bioethanol 
ppathways, the reductions observed are more important for biofuels from sugar 
plants than from cereals, with this difference explained by the high yields per 
hectare of the former. 
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Generally therefore, the higher the blend mandate percentage the greater the GHG 
emission reduction. GHG emission reduction also depends on the feedstock used to 
produce bioethanol and the region where the bioethanol is produced. This supports 
the observation that different regions have different opportunity costs for the 
bioethanol production. Table 2.1 below summarises bioethanol GHG emissions 
savings for different feedstocks and different regions compared to conventional 
hydrocarbons. 
 
Table 2.1: Change in Life-Cycle GHG emissions per kilometre travelled by replacing 
gasoline with bioethanol in conventional spark-ignition vehicles 
Feedstock Location Change Source 
Wheat UK AL47% Armstrong and 
others,  2002 
Sugar beet North France AL ? ?A?Ă ?AL ? ?A?ďArmstrong and 
others, 2002 
Maize, E90 USA, 2015 10% Delucchi, 2003 
Maize, E10 USA -1% Wang, Saricks, and 
Santini, 1999 
Maize, E85 USA -14% to -19% Wang, Saricks, and 
Santini, 1999 
Cellulose, E85 USA,2005 -68% to -102% Wang, Saricks, and 
Santini, 1999 
Molasses, E85 Australia AL ? ?A? ?AL ? ?A?ĚBeer and others, 
2001 
Wood waste, E85 Australia -81% Beer and others, 
2001 
Molasses, E10 Australia 1%; 3%d Beer and others, 
2001 
Sugar, hydrous 
ethanol 
Brazil AL ? ?A? ?AL ? ?A?ĞMacedo and 
others, 2004 
Sugar, anhydrous 
ethanol 
Brazil AL ? ?A? ?AL ? ?A?ĞMacedo and 
others, 2004 
Source: Kojima  et al, 2007 
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Table 2.1 shows that generally E85 has more environmental benefits that E10 and 
that sugar cane bioethanol produced from Brazil has the highest benefit on the 
environment. 
 
However, contrasting outcomes on the benefits of using bioethanol as a fuel 
additive means that their promotion remains a controversial issue. Controversies 
surrounding biofuels production in general are mainly as a result of their 
competition with food production. They also have debatable GHG reduction 
benefits when full life-cycle assessment of their production and use is considered. 
First generation biofuel production therefore comes at a price. 
Firstly, their production competes with food production directly by diverting biofuel 
crops from the food chain to the transport sector. They also compete with food 
production for land, labour, water and other agricultural inputs making their 
promotion controversial especially in a world where food shortages still persist in 
some regions.  
Figure 2-3 is a summary of a typical first generation biofuel production cycle. 
 
Figure 2-3: The biofuel production cycle 
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In the diagram above: 
A= Biofuel equivalent for energy inputs used in agricultural production  
B= Biofuel equivalent for energy inputs of other residues used in the conversion 
process 
C= Gross Biofuel Production 
D= Biomass processed for fuel production (= Quantity x Energy Content per 
Biomass) 
E= Net Biofuel output (and by-products) accessible to society (E= C-B-A-G) 
F= Biofuel equivalent for energy inputs used in harvesting and processing residues 
G= Energy inputs from residues (= I x heat contents of residues) 
H= Crop residue 
I= Harvested crop residues used as energy source in the conversion process 
Source: adapted from Giampietro et al (1997) 
 
As Figure 2-3 shows, the limiting factors in the production of biofuels are the 
primary inputs in agricultural production mainly land, water and labour. The 
diagram also show that the amount of biofuel produced for a given production 
cycle depend on the energy content of the biomass used. This means that different 
agricultural crops have different biofuel production efficiencies. Biofuel production 
produces other useful by-products, for example, Dried Distillers Grain (DDG) that is 
a by-product of bioethanol production from grain crops. DDG is normally used as an 
animal feed. Biofuel promotion and production has to be done in consideration of 
the inputs limiting factors and making sure that they are produced with minimal 
opportunity cost to society. 
 
In this way, biofuel production should be well investigated in cognizance of the fact 
that it must not cause environmental degradation and compete with food crops 
thus threatening food security. Their production therefore needs to be undertaken 
with careful consideration of aspects like pollution, biodiversity loss and soil 
degradation, competition for water and other socio-economic dynamics like labour 
supply and land availability.  
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Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the energy contents and the land and water requirements 
for biofuel production under different environmental conditions. 
  
Table 2.2: Typical biofuel production systems from agricultural crops 
Indicators of 
performance 
Biodiesel Ethanol in 
temperate areas 
Ethanol in sub-
tropical areas 
Gross energy yield 
(GJ/Ha/Yr) 
20-40 40-80 80-130 
Net energy yield 
(GJ/Ha/Yr) 
<0-10 <0-30 50-70 
Water 
requirements 
(t/Ha/Yr) 
4000-7000 4000-8000 10 000-15 000 
Best performing 
system 
Oilseed rape Corn-sorghum Sugar cane 
Land requirement 
(ha/net GJ 
0.1 0.033 0.02-0.014 
Water 
requirements (t/net 
GJ 
500 170 200 
Labour 
requirements 
(h/net GJ) 
4 1 4 
Source: Giampietro et al (1997) 
 
Table 2.2 shows that biofuel productivity varies from region to region. For example, 
it is seen that bioethanol production in sub tropical areas is more efficient that in 
tropical areas even though it requires more water. However, the choice of which 
crop or feedstock to use to produce biofuels depends on their relative cost, which 
also varies from region to region. 
Table 2.3 shows the land and water requirement of biofuels in selected countries as 
a function of their endowment for these factors of production in selected countries.  
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Table 2.3: Land and water demand in large-scale biofuel production compared to 
availability (expressed on a per capita basis) 
 
Country Commercial 
energy 
consumption 
(GJ/yr) 
Arable 
land 
availabl
e (ha) 
Fresh 
water 
withdrawal 
(t/yr) 
Land 
demand 
for 
biofuels 
(ha) 
Water 
demand 
for 
biofuels 
(t/yr) 
Total 
arable 
land 
demand 
supply 
ratio 
Biofuel 
demand/Current 
withdrawal ratio 
Burundi 8 0.2 20 0.16 1600 1.8 80 
Egypt 21 0.05 1028 0.42 4200 9.4 4 
Ghana 6 0.08 35 0.12 1200 2.5 34 
Uganda 8 0.28 20 0.16 1600 1.4 80 
Zimbabwe 31 0.29 136 0.62 6200 2.9 46 
Argentina 66 0.81 1042 1.32 13200 2.1 13 
Brazil 49 0.4 245 0.98 9800 3.0 40 
Canada 437 1.75 1688 14.42 74300 8.7 44 
Costa Rica 35 0.1 780 0.7 7000 8.0 9 
Mexico 54 0.27 921 1.78 9200 7.6 10 
USA 325 0.76 1868 10.72 55200 14.6 30 
Bangladesh 3 0.08 212 0.06 600 1.8 3 
China 25 0.08 462 0.5 5000 7.2 11 
India 12 0.2 612 0.24 24000 2.2 4 
Japan 134 0.03 732 4.42 22800 148.3 31 
France 163 0.32 778 5.38 27700 17.6 36 
Italy 113 0.16 996 3.73 19200 24.3 19 
Netherlands 202 0.06 994 6.66 34300 112.0 34 
Spain 87 0.52 1188 2.87 14800 6.5 12 
United 
Kingdom 
155 0.12 253 5.11 26300 43.6 104 
Australia 216 2.9 1306 3.02 43200 11.5 33 
Source: Giampietro et al (1997) 
 
Table 2.3 shows that the greatest challenge for African countries to produce 
biofuels is the availability of water and technology since the region is subject to 
droughts and poor agricultural production technology. In most of the African region 
there is increasing need for irrigation due to decreasing water availability from the 
desertification effects of global warming. Indeed the desertification effect of global 
warming has also been noted by Stringer et al (2009) who argued that given the 
increases in extreme weather events projected to affect the Southern Africa region, 
it was essential to assess how household and community-level adaptations have 
been helped or hindered by institutional structures and national policy instruments. 
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Land availability for biofuel production is a global problem but it is more of a 
concern in Europe as the total arable land to supply ratio shows for selected 
European countries.  
 
Various studies have been undertaken on the controversy surrounding the effects 
of biofuels production on food production and therefore on food prices. A World 
Bank report (2008) noted that the price of corn rose by 23% in 2006 and by 60% in 
2007/08 due to the bioethanol production programme in the USA. There has been 
other studies as well that have linked increase biofuel production especially 
bioethanol to increased food prices (Perini, 2008; Von Braun, 2008; Alexandratos, 
2008; Gecan, 2009; Amani and Chad, 2007). These studies mostly analyse the effect 
of the USA bioethanol production programme from corn and conclude that increase 
bioethanol production is responsible for the upward pressure on global food prices 
especially the sharp increase observed in 2008. Michell (2008) identified the USA 
and EU27 bioethanol production as the cause of rising food prices. 
 
However, other studies have found no link between biofuel production and food 
prices and some studies have only found beneficial outcomes from biofuel 
programmes. Nogueira (2009) and Mueller et al (2011) concluded that the sharp 
increase in food prices of 2008 was due mostly to increase in price of oil rather that 
the biofuel programme. Ajanovic (2010) analysed the relationship between 
quantities produced, costs of production and resulting market prices of food and 
biofuels in the USA and EU. The study concluded that there is no link between 
increased biofuel production and food prices. Ewing and Msangi (2006) analysed 
the tradeoff in welfare and food security of biofuel production and concluded that if 
well balanced, biofuel production can be welfare enhancing. Baka and Holst (2008) 
analysed the EU biofuel production in the context of WTO trade agreements and 
concluded that biofuel production in the EU can overcome the current impasse in 
global trade negotiations.  
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Still other controversies on the role that biofuels play in reducing GHG emissions 
and their overall environmental benefits have come up especially in the area of life 
cycle analysis which has been extensively studied. Life-cycle assessment approach is 
defined as a methodology for the comprehensive assessment of the impact that a 
product has on the environment throughout its life-cycle on Ă  ‘ ‘ĨƌŽŵ cradle to 
ŐƌĂǀĞ ? ? ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ  ?/^K  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?Life-cycle assessment outcomes of the 
environmental benefits of biofuels vary widely mainly depending on the feedstock 
analysed, location of the study, method of analysis used and the parameters 
analysed.  
 
In his study on the use of bioethanol as E10 and E85 blend, Niven (2004) concluded 
that E10 is of debatable air pollution merit, offers little advantage in terms of GHG 
emissions, energy efficiency or environmental sustainability; and will significantly 
increase both the risk and severity of soil and groundwater contamination. He 
further concluded that E85 offers significant GHG benefits but will however produce 
significant air pollution and involve substantial risks to biodiversity with largely 
unknown overall sustainability. Puppan (2002) on the other hand analysed the 
benefits of using E5 produced from sugar beet, winter wheat and potatoes in 
Germany. The study concluded that E5 fuel has lower impacts on depletion of 
abiotic resources and climate change, but higher impacts on stratospheric ozone 
depletion with acidification and human toxicity impacts remaining unchanged. 
 
The adverse effect of biofuel production on the environment has also been 
attributed to N2O emission from the biofuel production process (Crutzen et al, 
2007; Kaltschmitt, Reinhardt & Steltzer, 1997 and Hu et al, 2004). Kadam (2002) 
analysed bioethanol production from bagasse in India and concluded that there was 
no significant benefits in diverting excess bagasse to bioethanol production as 
opposed to the open-field burning.  
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These studies generally show that there are many approaches to life-cycle 
assessment of biofuels and they all result in contrasting outcomes on the 
environmental benefits of biofuel. Besides GHG emissions biofuels have also been 
identified as having other adverse environmental effects. For example, Giampietro 
et al (1997) mentioned that the distillery waste, which is the principal component of 
effluent from an ethanol plant, has a biological oxygen demand, a standard 
measure of pollution after 5 days, of 1000-78000mg/l which poses a waste disposal 
problem.  
 
Despite the controversies surrounding biofuels, their production is still promoted 
around the world by various biofuel programmes and policies. Because of the scope 
of our study, the remaining sections of this chapter will discuss mostly bioethanol as 
opposed to biodiesel. In the next section we review the global, USA and Brazilian 
bioethanol production status. 
 
2.3 Global, USA and Brazilian bioethanol status 
 
The two main leaders in global bioethanol production are USA and Brazil. Brazilian 
bioethanol is produced from sugar cane while USA bioethanol is produced from 
corn. Brazil is the lowest cost producer while the USA is the global leader whose 
bioethanol programme is supported by a number of policies that protect the local 
market from international competition e.g. the US Energy Bill of 2005 discussed 
later in this section. The global distribution of bioethanol production shares are 
shown in Figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-4: Global bioethanol production shares 
 
 
 Source: by author with data from Elobeid et al (2008) 
 
Brazil is one of the countries that initiated bioethanol production under a national 
alcohol programme  ?WƌŽĂůĐŽŚŽů )ǁŚŝĐŚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŽŝůƐŚ ĐŬŝŶĂŶ
attempt to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. It is also one of the leaders in the 
promotion and sale of FFVs that can run on ethanol, gasoline or a combination of 
the two. The Brazilian bioethanol production programme was initially supported by 
policies that promoted production but in recent years the bioethanol market in 
Brazil is only controlled by setting a mandatory blending ratio by government 
depending on the prices of sugar, fuel and bioethanol in the global market. 
 
The blend ratio set by government has a significant impact on the global sugar and 
bioethanol markets. Koizumi and Yanagishima (2005) examined the impact in 2010 
on the world sugar and bioethanol marŬĞƚƐƉŽƐĞĚďǇƌĂǌŝů ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ blending of 
8% bioethanol in gasoline fuel beginning in 2006 with the following results; world 
bioethanol prices rise by 0.9 percent and sugar prices rise by 3.5 percent. In Brazil, 
bioethanol consumption increases by 16 percent, bioethanol exports fall by 3 
percent, sugar exports fall by 2.9 percent, local bioethanol prices rise by 4.7 
percent, and local sugar prices rise by 5.5 percent. These results highlight the link 
ROW:30.09% 
Brazil: 34.79% 
USA: 35.12% 
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between bioethanol policies, energy and food markets mainly the markets for 
bioethanol crops commodities. They also highlight the fact that local bioethanol 
programmes of large countries or regions have potential global spillover effects.  
 
Bioethanol in the USA is produced mainly from corn and the increased diversion of 
corn to bioethanol production has been identified as a contributing factor to the 
global rise in food prices. This is because corn is used as a staple food in many 
developing countries especially in Africa and is also used as an animal feed. 
Diverting corn from the food chain to the production of bioethanol is therefore 
expected to have significant repercussions on global food supply. However, the by-
product of bioethanol production from corn called Dry Distillers Grain (DDG) is used 
as an animal feed. This by-product therefore is expected to have an effect of 
cushioning the prices of food of animal origin to some extent.  
 
Recent USA production of bioethanol has been promoted by the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 which mandated that renewable fuel use in gasoline (with credits for 
biodiesel) reach 7.5 billion gallons by 2012, with gains in later years in line with 
growth in the volume of gasoline sold or introduced into commerce (USDA, 2007). 
In addition, bioethanol demand has been stimulated by the phasing-out of methyl 
tetrabutyl ether (MTBE) as octane enhancer in fuel engines due to its negative 
environmental effects and also due to the growing concern with recent oil prices 
and external dependency (Rosillo-Calle and Walter, 2006). 
 
Historical bioethanol promotion in the USA was based on ethanol-related federal 
government programmes which began with the Energy Tax Act of 1978 establishing 
an excise tax credit of $0.40 per gallon of bioethanol used as motor fuel, at blends 
of up to 10% with gasoline. The level of the excise tax credit was subsequently 
raised in increments, reaching its highest level at $0.60 per gallon by 1984. Various 
decreases from that level began in 1990, with the incentive settling at $0.51 per 
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gallon in 2005. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 guarantees this level 
through 2010, and additionally removes the restriction that the credit apply to 
motor fuels blends with a maximum of 10% ethanol (Collins and Duffield, 2005; IEA, 
2006). 
 
For completion, the Brazilian bioethanol industry merits deeper review. Since the 
focus of our study is to analyze the effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy on bioethanol crops commodities markets with special emphasis to sugar 
trade, a closer look at the Brazilian bioethanol industry, which is sugar cane based is 
warranted to offer some motivation on the role of sugar in the production of 
bioethanol. The Brazilian bioethanol situation also offers a good reference point for 
ACP countries that are interested in diversifying their sugar industries to producing 
bioethanol for domestic use and for trade purposes. This diversification could be a 
justified option for ACP countries given the potential bioethanol market that could 
be created by a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate in the EU27 region and the 
recent changes in the sugar industry which aim to cut sugar prices in the EU region. 
The sugar regime and its support policies for the EU will be reviewed in detail in 
chapter 4 since they form an important aspect of this research. 
 
2.3.1 A closer look at the Brazilian bioethanol industry 
 
As the lowest cost producer of bioethanol, the second largest producer and 
consumer, one of the first countries to promote the use of FFVs and also the largest 
producer of sugar cane, the Brazilian bioethanol industry offers an interesting case 
study. The Brazilian bioethanol industry therefore offers a good reference point 
when studying bioethanol markets elsewhere especially if these markets have an 
impact on trade in sugar. Compared to most ACP regions, Brazil is a lower cost sugar 
cane and sugar producer. In Brazil, production of sugar for food and fuel does not 
compete for land as sugar cane plantation occupies only 10% of the total cultivated 
land and only 1% of total land available for agriculture (Goldemberg, 2007). Low 
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cost sugar cane production is also a reason why Brazil is amongst the global leaders 
in bioethanol production. 
In contrast to most ACP regions, there are several reason that make Brazil a better 
sugar cane and bioethanol producer.   
 Cane cultivation in Brazil, which is water intensive depends on rain rather 
than on irrigation as is the case in most other cane producing regions like 
most ACP member states especially in the Sub Saharan African region. Most 
African regions are subject to drought spells and desertification, which is a 
phenomenon that is getting worse due to climate change from global 
warming. This exerts pressure on water availability for agricultural activity 
and greater demand for irrigation water. 
 There is plenty of land in Brazil such that sugar cane does not have to 
compete with other crops for land. In contrast, land is in short supply in 
most ACP region since there is competition between crop production and 
livestock production. Increased urbanization of traditional rural regions in 
some parts of Africa is also putting strain on the amount of land available for 
sugar cane and other crop production. 
 Brazil has invested significantly in research and commercial cultivation e.g. 
by use of a number of cane varieties that are resistant to diseases. Lack of 
investment opportunities in most of Africa and poor technology means the 
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ƐƵŐĂƌ ĐĂŶĞ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĐƌŽƉƐ ŝƐ
compromised. 
 Most distilleries in Brazil belong to sugar mill/ distillery complexes, capable 
of changing the production of sugar-to-ethanol ratio. This capability enables 
plant owners to take advantage of fluctuations in the relative prices of sugar 
and ethanol, as well as benefit from the higher price that can be obtained by 
converting molasses into bioethanol. Not much investment in bioethanol 
plants has been made in Africa making the region less capable of switching 
to bioethanol production in times of unfavourable world sugar prices. 
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 FFVs, introduced in March 2003 and capable of running on any mixture of 
anhydrous ethanol and gasohol, have further increased the attractiveness of 
building hybrid sugar-ethanol complexes and allayed consumer fears about 
the consequences of potential bioethanol shortages in Brazil. There are no 
FFVs in most parts of the world especially in Africa and  most of the 
bioethanol produced there is for export purposes rather than for local 
consumption and this trend might not change in the near future. 
 
Since 1975 bioethanol has displaced more than 280 billion litre of gasoline and 
saved more than US$65 billion in the cost of oil imports (Moreira, 2006). The 
Brazilian sugar cane market in 2006 was divided as shown in Figure 2-5 below: 
 
Figure 2-5: Use of sugar cane and bioethanol in Brazil in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Valdes (2011) 
The above flow chart shows that the bulk of sugar cane produced in Brazil now goes 
into the production of bioethanol and most of the bioethanol producted in Brazil is 
basically used as transport fuel.  
Table 2.4 below summarizes the sugar and bioethanol production statistics in 
recent years. 
 
Sugar Cane Production 
Sugar (45%) Bioethanol (55%) 
Domestic Market (87%) Exports (13%) 
Fuel Use (96%) Other Uses (4%) 
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Table 2.4: Recent statistics of Brazilian sugar and bioethanol production 
Crop year 2000-
2001 
2002-
2003 
2004-
2005 
2005-2006 2007-2008 
Sugarcane 
production 
(million t)           
326.1 364.4 416.3 457.9 483.8 
Harvest area 
(million ha)            
4.8 5.1 5.6 6.2 6.5 
Productivity (t 
ha-1) 
67.9 71.3 73.9 74.0 74.4 
Sugar 
production 
(million t)              
16.0 22.4 26.6 26.7 29.2 
Alcohol 
production 
(billion L)               
10.5 12.5 15.2 17.2 18.8 
Source: UNICA (2007) 
 
Low cost of producing sugar cane in Brazil means ACP countries cannot compete 
with that country in sugar or bioethanol production. This makes bilateral policies 
between the EU and ACP countries that favour ACP export to EU markets key to 
continued competitiveness of ACP sugar. This justifies the analysis of policies that 
form the framework of bilateral trade between EU and ACP countries in any study 
that has trade implications in sugar between the two regions. In the absence of 
these trade policies, the sugar industries in ACP countries will most likely collapse 
with detrimental effects to some of these ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? economies. This is one reason 
why it is important to analysise the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy together 
with the EPA policies since these are future policies that will form the trade 
framework between the EU and ACP countries. 
 
2.4 Bioethanol and international trade 
 
International trade in bioethanol or biofuels in general is under the observation of 
International Energy Agency Bioenergy Task 40 working group whose members are 
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Netherlands (task leader), Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, European Commission, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, UK and USA.  
 
The IEA Bioenergy Task 40 was established under the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) Bioenergy Implementing Agreement in December 2003.  The Task 40 team has 
reported that global biofuel trade is still not significant mostly because many 
nations are still not producing or using it in their transport sector to any significant 
level except in the USA and Brazil. 
 
Junginger (2006) noted that due to the small volumes, biofuel trade is still basically 
100% bilateral and identified technical, economic, logistic, social, ecological and 
international barriers as a hindrance to promotion of such trade. Some of the 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ďĂƌƌƌŝĞƌƐ ŶŽƚĞĚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ  ? ? ? ? ?ŵ2 charged in the EU for denatured 
ethanol of 80% and above. The USA applies an ad valorem duties of 2.5% for 
imports from Most Favoured Nations (MFN) and 20% from other countries. This 
means the USA international bioethanol trade arrangement violates WTO rules. 
Japan applies an ad valorem duty of 27% as a MFN status.  
 
Rosillo-Calle and Walter (2006) also observed that the international market in fuel 
ethanol is in its initial stage and its full development will require the diversification 
of production in terms of both feedstocks and number of producing countries. They 
further suggested that sustainable production of fuel ethanol should become a 
requirement for which certification seems to be a necessity, but should be defined 
to assure sustainability in a broad sense so that it does not impose additional 
barriers to trade and that policies should be defined to induce market 
competitiveness and sustainable development. 
 
A study by Kojima et al (2007) highlights the fact that support policies for biofuels 
like mandatory blending do not distort trade since they do not differentiate 
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between imported and locally produced biofuels. However, other policies like 
import tariffs and producer subsidies are market distorting since they have the 
effect of favoring local production at the expense of foreign production. The study 
further notes that fuel tax reductions do not discriminate between imported and 
domestic biofuels in compliance with WTO principles that prohibit adjusting 
internal taxes and other internal charges to afford protection to domestic products.  
 
However, in the case of bioethanol these tax reductions are often offset by nearly 
equivalent import tariffs to prevent foreign producers from sharing in the tax 
reductions provided to domestic consumers. It is well known that the use of tariff is 
a simple and straight forward way that countries use to protect their local markets 
and the protection of local biofuel markets is no exception.  
 
An ESMAP report (2005) noted that the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization 
will likely reduce bioethanol and biodiesel prices in countries with high protection 
such as the United States and EU and increase incomes of countries such as Brazil 
that export biofuels. This finding suggest that trade liberilization in biofuels will be 
welfare enhancing since countries that are high cost producers can import biofuels 
from those that are low cost producers. Such trade liberalisation policies can 
therefore favour bioethanol production in low cost sugar cane producers like many 
ACP countries. 
 
Overall, there is therefore still no significant international trade in bioethanol or 
biofuels in general. This further complicates attempts of analysing the global 
impacts that biofuels are having since there are no global market structures and 
trade data is scant and distorted. Since the focus of this thesis is on the EU27 
bioethanol blend mandate, we now turn our discussion to programmes and policies 
that support biofuel production in the EU. 
 
Ch.2 - Literature review on biofuel and bioethanol 
 
2-26 
 
2.5 The EU Strategy for promotion of biofuels 
 
As in other parts of the world, the main reason for the promotion of biofuels in the 
EU is mainly due to energy security concerns, reduction of GHG emissions and as a 
form of farm support. In this light, the EU has put in place a number of initiatives 
and support policies that aim to encourage the production and use of biofuels in 
the region. The most notable of these initiatives is the EC biofuel blend mandate 
directive, which we discuss next.  
2.5.1 EC Directive on Biofuels and EU biofuel uptake 
After the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, in 2003 the EC established a goal of 
deriving at least 2% of EU transportation fuel from biofuels by the end of 2005, then 
growing the biofuels share by 0.75% annually until December 31, 2010, where it 
would reach 5.75%. The EU goal of 2% by end of 2005 was not achieved with only 
1.4% achieved for transport fuel (Schnepf 2006). According to the EC (2007) the EU 
is committed to reduce its CO2 emission by increasing renewable energy use. It has 
set a target of 20% of renewable energy in total energy consumption with 10% of 
this being biofuels and this target is set for 2020. This target is for the entire EU 
with each member state allowed to increase their use of alternative energy 
resources at a rate consistent with their capabilities.  
The 2003 EC directive as outlined in a paper by Hingyi et al (2007) is as follows: 
 
Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 123, 
17/052003: The Directive on Biofuels set a reference value for the national 
indicative targets at 2%, calculated on the basis of energy content, of all fuels for 
transport purposes placed on their markets by 2005, while the market share of 
biofuels is set at 5.75% for 2010. In 2007 the European Commission recommends a 
minimum share of 10% for biofuels by 2020 in its schedule regarding renewable 
energy.  
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Although the above proposal was set as a target for EU biofuel use in the transport 
sector, it was not binding and countries are allowed to set their own targets. The EC 
biofuel directive was reviewed in April 2009 by the EU resulting in the enactment 
and adoption of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED). RED re-set a 10% target for 
renewable energy in road transport fuels by 2020 and also established the 
environmental sustainability criteria.  
This criteria is that biofuels consumed in the EU have to comply with a minimum 
rate of direct GHG emission savings of 35% of 1990 emission levels in 2009 and 
rising over time to 50% in 2017. The criteria also set restrictions on the types of land 
that may be converted to production of biofuels feedstock crops (Al-Riffai et al., 
2010). This means that the EU27 commitment to blend biofuels with fossil fuel in 
the transport sector still remains alive. However, the blend targets set are still not 
binding and nations are required to set their own targets. Table 2.5 show some of 
the targets that have been set by various members of the EU27 for 2005 and 2010. 
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Table 2.5: Minimum incorporation % biofuel blend targets for EU Member States 
in place in 2005 and 2010 
Germany 2 6.25 
Belgium 2 4 
Luxembourg  0 2 
Denmark 0.1 5.75 
Spain 2 5.83 
France 2 7 
Greece  0.7 5.75 
Ireland  0.06 4 
Italy  1 3.5 
Netherlands 2 4 
Portugal  2 7 
UK  0.19 3.5 
Austria 2.5 5.75 
Finland  0.1 4 
Sweden  3 5.75 
Poland  0.5 5.75 
Hungary 0.6 5.75 
Czech Rep. 3.7  - 
Estonia  2  - 
Latvia 2  - 
Lithuania 2 5.75 
Slovenia  0.65 3 
Slovakia  2 5.75 
Cyprus  1 2.5 
Malta  0.3  - 
Romania -  - 
Bulgaria  - 5.75 
 Source: Strategic Grains (2010) 
As can be seen from Table 2.5 each member state is required to set their own 
percentage Biofuel blend targets guided by the EC blend directive but targets vary 
from nation to nation. It can be seen however that member states are revising up 
their blend mandate targets over time. Since the blend mandate is not binding and 
blending is not uniform across nations, there is still a gap in the literature as to the 
extent of the penetration and impact that biofuels are having on the transport 
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sector. This observation is also supported by Kutas (2007) who noted the difficulty 
of estimating the impact of the biofuel mandatory blend requirement in the EU27 
since member states have established different obligations that are effective at 
different periods. He further noted that no studies measuring the impact the blend 
requirements are having on prices have ever been undertaken.  
 
Since countries in the EU are required to set their own targets, a potential problem 
for the region will be coming up with ways of making the blend mandate binding. 
This problem is complicated by the fact that transport fuel was left out of the ETS 
for the EU meaning that no pollution tax or carbon trading is applicable to the EU 
transport sector so far. Lucia and Nilsson (2007) discussed the problems associated 
with implementation of the EC biofuel directive and concluded against a binding 
blending mandate and that countries should be allowed flexibility, stronger 
enforcement target measures being not conducive. However, allowing countries to 
set their own targets means there is a possibility that the blend mandates as 
enshrined in the directive will never be realised.  
 
Besides the enactment of the EC biofuel directive, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) has also been amended to promote biofuel production in the EU region. Since 
the CAP also supports production of bioethanol crops it is therefore also an 
important policy for the production of bioethanol in the EU. In the next section we 
review the CAP support for biofuel production in the EU. The CAP support for the 
production of bioethanol crops will be reviewed in Chapter 4. 
 
2.5.2 The CAP support for biofuels in the EU 
 
The CAP, which is a system of post world war II EU agricultural subsidies and 
programmes aimed at raising EU agricultural productivity has in place a number of 
policies that can be viewed as supporting the production of biofuels in the region. 
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For example, the CAP reform of 1992 introduced a compulsory  ‘ ‘ƐĞƚ-ĂƐŝĚĞ ? ? ůĂŶĚ 
policy where farmers are allowed to produce only non-food crops (including energy 
crops) on such  ‘ ‘ƐĞƚ-ĂƐŝĚĞ ? ?ůĂŶĚƐĂŶĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌŽŵĂ ‘ ‘ƐĞƚ-Ă ŝĚĞ ? ?ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂďŽƵƚ
 ? ? ?/ha. These set aside payments are in addition to other subsidies that exist in 
specific states. This means that the promotion of biofuel in the EU come at a huge 
cost. 
 
In addition, since 2003, farmers have been able to take advantage of a special aid of 
 ?45/ha if they produce crops intended for biofuel production on arable land. This 
aid is limited to 1.5 million ha for the whole of the EU (Bernard and Prieur, 2007). 
From this policy agricultural producers used more than 0.5 million hectares of the 
land eligible to receive this aid at a cost to the hďƵĚŐĞƚŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?
alone (Kutas et al, 2007). The pressure therefore that biofuel production exerts on 
the available land and the associated cost that comes with it means that for the EU 
to meet her biofuel demand under the blend mandates, production of biofuels will 
have to go beyond the set aside land. This means therefore that it will impact on 
the dynamics of other crops and livestock activities should the market remain 
protected from imports.  
 
On the promotion of biofuels in the EU, Schnepf (2006) noted that for the EU to 
action policies that promote more use of biofuels there has to be either major 
agricultural policies that are put in place to increase biofuel production. 
Alternatively, there must be increased research and investment in developing 
countries to promote biofuel production at lower costs which can then be exported 
to the EU market to meet demand.  
 
Increased production of biofuels in the EU, like in all the other regions, have all the 
associated problems of competing with food security endervours and doubtful 
environmental benefits. A study by Kuta et al (2007) found that while Biofuels do 
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displace some petroleum and fossil fuels, and reduce GHG emissions, the cost of 
obtaining a unit of CO2-equivalent reduction through biofuel subsidies is very high 
and estimated the subsidy cost per tonne of CO2-equivalent removed to be 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ?  ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ?  ? ? ? ĨŽƌbioethanol made from sugar beet. This therefore 
highlights the cost associated with the EU endervours to reduce GHG emissions. 
Following the global overview of bioethanol we now turn our focus to the 
bioethanol status in the EU27 in more detail since this is the focus region for our 
study. 
 
2.6 The EU27 bioethanol status and trade 
 
Bioethanol production in the EU started around 1996. The EU is now the third 
producer of fuel-bioethanol in the world after the USA and Brazil. Important EU 
bioethanol producers include France, Germany and Spain. First generation 
bioethanol in the region is mainly produced from wheat, barley, sugar beet, corn 
and rye.  
EU bioethanol production, although smaller, is increasing and was 0.5 billion litres 
in 2004, 0.9 billion litres in 2005, and 1.6 billion litres in 2006 (eBio, 2007). This 
support the observation in Table 2.6 of the previous section that most nations in 
the EU are going ahead with promoting bioethanol production and reviewing up 
their blend target commitments.  
The increased commitments to produce bioethanol in the EU27 is also shown by the 
number of bioethanol plants that were planned or under construction in 2007 as 
Table 2.6  shows. 
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Table 2.6: Estimation of year 2007 and future ethanol production capacity in EU27 
 
Country Plants in 
Operation 2007 
Estimated 
Production 
Capacity 
(tonnes) 
Plants planned or 
under construction 
Additional 
production 
capacity (tonnes) 
Total EU27 46 2,991,000 76 6,988,000 
EU15 
Austria 
  
1 173,000 
Belgium 1 80,000 3 383,000 
Denmark 
  
3 126,000 
Finland 
  
2 36,000 
France 15 999,000 5 683,000 
Germany 6 563,000 19 1,451,000 
Greece 
  
2 95,000 
Ireland 
    Italy 3 237,000 4 75,000 
Luxembourg 
    Portugal 
  
1 100,000 
Spain 4 437,000 4 425,000 
Sweden 3 120,000 1 122,000 
The 
Netherlands 1 28,000 1 158,000 
United 
Kingdom 
  
5 1,070,000 
Sub-Total 
EU15 33 2,464,000 51 4,897,000 
NEW MEMBER STATES (NMS) 
Bulgaria 2 108,000 5 220,000 
Cyprus 
    Czech 
Republic 2 84,000 7 352,000 
Estonia 
    Hungary 2 91,000 7 1,000,000 
Latvia 2 17,000 
  Lithuania 1 24,000 
  Malta 
    Poland 2 130,000 2 200,000 
Romania 1 14,000 2 160,000 
Slovakia 
  
1 109,000 
Slovenia 1 59,000 1 50,000 
Sub-total 
NMS 13 527,000 25 2,091,000 
Source: eBIO, 2006 
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The number of bioethanol plants planned or under construction means that 
bioethanol production in the region is at an upward trend as we will see later. This 
upward trend is despite the fact that blend mandate commitments are still not 
binding and the hindrances of high bioethanol production costs in the region. The 
data in table 2.6 therefore helps show the developments of the bioethanol industry 
in the EU region in recent years. More recent data on the EU bioethanol production 
and consumption is seen in section 2.6.1 below. 
 
The natural question then is how an increase in the production of bioethanol would 
affect the global food prices especially the prices of sugar since the production of 
biofuel or specifically bioethanol competes with food production directly. For 
example, bioethanol production from sugar beet could have the effect of increasing 
the prices of sugar and therefore discouraging the production of bioethanol in 
developing countries in favour of sugar production for export to the EU market. 
Increases in the price of sugar will lead to more production and thus increase supply 
and a concomitant decrease in price and a switch back to bioethanol production. 
This means that the prices of these competing products operate a feedback 
mechanism that determines production decisions as theory on prices, supply and 
demand dictates.  
 
Bioethanol production in the EU is supported by policies that are viewed as 
subsidizing production and various tariff lines that protect the local bioethanol 
industry from external competition. The estimated price support for bioethanol in 
the EU as measured by the  “ƉƌŝĐĞŐĂƉ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞhbioethanol prices and those 
that prevail in Brazil (taken as a reference for world bioethanol prices) is as shown 
in Table 2.7 as estimated by Kutas et al (2007). 
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Table 2.7: EU market price support for ethanol through border protection 
 
Year 2005 2006 
EU production of fuel 
ethanol (million litres) 
930 1,565 
EU ethanol imports for fuel 
use (million litres) 
250 230 
EU ethanol average price 
 ? ? ?ůŝƚƌĞ ) 
0.55 0.65 
Brazilian ethanol average 
ƉƌŝĐĞ ? ? ?ůŝƚƌĞ ) 
0.27 0.38 
Tansport and handling 
ĐŚĂƌŐĞƐ ?ƌĂǌŝůƚŽƚŚĞh ? ?
/ litre) 
0.08 0.08 
WƌŝĐĞŐĂƉ ? ? ?ůŝƚƌĞ ) 0.2 0.2 
DĂƌŬĞƚƉƌŝĐĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?
millions) 
184 306 
Source: Kutas  et al (2007) 
  
Table 2.7 shows that the EU is spending significant sums of money to support 
bioethanol production in the region and indeed opening up to trade can be 
beneficial  since it can allow the region to  import bioethanol from low cost 
producers like Brazil. The Table also shows that EU bioethanol production has been 
increasing from 930 million litres in 2005 to 1,565 million litres in 2006. It can be 
seen also that bioethanol price is relatively higher in the EU than in Brazil and that 
increased local production is associate with decrease in imports. 
 
High production cost poses the greatest challenge to increased production of 
bioethanol in the EU27. The cost of bioethanol production in the region from 
various feedstocks and comparison with fossil fuels production cost and Brazilian 
bioethanol production is shown in Table 2.8 and 2.9 below. 
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Table 2.8:  Cost of biofuels in the EU 
Biofuels ŽƐƚĂƚĨŝůůŝŶŐƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?2004/1000L  
 Feedstock Low Best Estimate High 
A. Cost of bioethanol production using current technology 
 Sugar Crops 875 1265 1855 
 Starch Crops 809 1173 1572 
 Lignocellulolitic 
Crops 
1148 1448 2435 
 Lignocellulotic 
Residues 
1052 1316 2232 
 Brazilian Sugar 
Cane 
117 294 351 
B. Cost of bioethanol production using future technology 
 Sugar Crpos 671 954 1432 
 Starch Crops 653 963 1287 
 Lignocellulolitic 
Crops 
699 884 1469 
 Lignocellulotic 
Residues 
638 802 1358 
 
 
Table 2.9: Cost comparison of biofuels with petroleum fossil fuels (valued at filling 
ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?> ? 
 
Feedstock Bioethanol Fossil Fuel Difference 
Sugar Crops 1265 366 899 
Starch Crops 1173 366 807 
Lignocellulolitic 
Crops 
1448 366 1082 
Lignocellulotic 
Residues 
1316 366 950 
Brazilian Sugar 
Cane 
294 366 -72 
Source: Ryan et al (2005) 
 
As shown in the Tables 2.8 and 2.9 above, the cost of biofuels production remains 
the major impediment in the EU with only Brazilian bioethanol breaking-even with 
the cost of fossil fuels. It can be seen also from the Tables that second generation 
bioethanol production, i.e. bioethanol production from cellulose is more expensive 
Ch.2 - Literature review on biofuel and bioethanol 
 
2-36 
 
that bioethanol production from bioethanol crops (i.e.first generation bioethanol). 
However, improvements in production technologies are expected to reduce 
production costs. 
 
As observed in the ESMAP report (2005), bioethanol economics should be more 
favourable in petroleum-importing, sugar-exporting, landlocked areas, or in any 
other situation where transportation costs for imports are high and there are 
indigenous sources of biofuel feedstock that can be grown at reasonable costs. 
Lignocellulotic bioethanol is still under research and is at its infancy although it 
offers hope in solving the environmental, food security and costs problems 
associated with production of bioethanol from primary bioethanol crops. Ryan et al 
(2005) argue that it is possible that bioethanol is competitive with fossil fuels once 
the external benefits to society are accounted for namely the CO2 emission, security 
of energy supply and rural development. Such benefits to society can come in the 
form of employment creation. The high prices of fossil fuels increases the 
competitiveness of biofuels but question still remain in that production of biofuels 
also requires an input of these high priced fossil fuels.  
 
Employment benefits of biofuel production has been noted by Whitely et al (2004) 
who put the number of jobs in rural areas that could be generated by achievement 
of the EU biofuels targets at 212, 000 and 354,000 in 2010 and 2020 respectively 
under current policies corresponding to about 1.5%-2.5% of the EU156 
unemployment in 2005 which was 14.7million (Eurostat, 2005). However, Ryan et al 
(2005) noted that it is not clear how rural employment generation can be translated 
to rural development and how many of these jobs would not be removed from food 
producing activities. These arguments highlight the fact that the promotion of 
                                                          
6 The EU15 is made of Germany, Greece, Sweden, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg,  Netherlands, Portuga, France, Denmark,  Italy and Spain  
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biofuels in the EU is also a drive to improve farm incomes, promote rural 
development and create employment.  
 
The EU is also involved in the international trade in biofuels. For example, the 
region imported nearly 825,000 gallons of bioethanol in 2004 (Schnep, 2006). About 
36% of this volume was imported as normal MFN trade and subject to import duties 
of  ?10.2/hectoliter ( ?0.39/gallon) on denatured alcohol (HS Code 220720) and 
 ?19.2/hectoliter ( ? ?.73/gallon) on undenatured alcohol (HS Code 220710). Brazil is 
the largest bioethanol exporter to the EU with all of its exports made as MFN. 
During the 2002-04 periods, 25% of EU bioethanol imports were from Brazil. During 
the same period about 64% of EU bioethanol imports entered under preferential 
trade arrangements including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the 
Cotonou Agreement and the Everything But Arms Initiative (EBAI). Pakistan, with a 
20% share of EU bioethanol imports, is the largest exporter under preferential trade 
arrangements. Other bioethanol exporting countries that benefit from EU trade 
preferences include Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Panama 
(unlimited duty-free access accorded under special drug diversion programme and 
GSP); Ukraine and South Africa (GSP); the Democratic Republic of Congo (EBAI); 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Cotonou); Egypt (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement); and 
Norway (special quota). The current bioethanol preferential trade agreements 
between the EU and various countries are shown in Table 2.10. 
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Table 2.10: Preferential agreements providing duty free and quota free access to 
the EU bioethanol market 
 
Preferential agreements Beneficiary countries 
Cotonou Agreement ACP countries: 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
the Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Republic of the Congo, Cook 
/ƐůĂŶĚƐ ? ƀƚĞ Ě ?/ǀŽŝƌĞ ? ƵďĂ ? jibouti, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, East 
Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, the Ghana, 
Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, 
Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
 
Everything but Arms Initiative 
 
LDCs: 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso,  Burundi, Benin, Bhutan, 
Cambodia (Kampuchea), Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros 
(excluding Mayotte), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, East 
Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Maldives, Malawi, Mozambique, 
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Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, 
São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia 
GSP + Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mongolia, Panama, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, South Africa and Venezuela 
 
Western Balkan Countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia 
Bilateral agreements Andorra, Croatia, Egypt, Jordan, 
Liechtenstein, San Marino, Switzerland 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
 
Source: Trade statistics and table adapted from Schnep (2006) 
 
These policies that support EU27 trade in bioethanol with other countries show the 
importance of analysing the EU bioethanol market effects in recognition of current 
and future trade policies that define EU trade with other regions like the ACP. It also 
means that analysis of a policy that has a potential global spillover outcome like the 
EC biofuel blend mandate cannot be divorced from policies that affect bioethanol 
crops production and trade since all these policies are interlinked. This is one 
justification of the need to review policies that support bioethanol crops production 
and trade in the EU, as will be reviewed in chapter 4 of this study.  
 
2.6.1 Recent EU27 fuel bioethanol production and consumption status 
 As mentioned before, bioethanol production in the EU27 started in earnest in 
1996. Figure 2-6 shows the recent developments in the production and 
consumption of biofuels in the EU27. 
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Figure 2-6: Average EU27 bioethanol consumption and production from year 2000 
to 2009 in thousands of barrels per day  
 
Source: Energy Information Administration  
 
As shown in the figure, the production and consumption of bioethanol in the EU27 
has been increasing in recent years. From year 2003, consumption surpassed 
production which means that the shortfall in demand had to be imported. The 
blend mandate was enacted in 2003 and this corresponds to the observed increase 
in bioethanol use as transport fuel from that year onwards. EU bioethanol demand 
has therefore been increasing despite the fact that the EC blend mandate directive 
is not binding. A binding blend mandate is expected to increase bioethanol demand 
even further. This increase in demand will have the effect of increasing bioethnol 
crop commodities prices with questionable sustainability outcomes given the fact 
that most of these bioethanol crops commodities are important food sources as has 
been observed earlier.  
 
Table 2.11 below shows the consumption (production) of bioethanol by country in 
the EU27 from year 2003 to 2009.  
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Table 2.11: EU fuel bioethanol consumption (production) from 2003 to 2009 in 
thousands of barrels per day 
 
Country/Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU-27 4.3(5.1) 13(9.1) 19.7 
(15.2) 
30.7(27.9) 40.9 
(30.9) 
61.4 
(46.9) 
77.1 
(62.01) 
 
Austria 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.7 (0) 1.8 
(1.5) 
2 (2) 
Belgium 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.4 
(0.4) 
1.2 
(2.5) 
Bulgaria 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Cyprus 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Czech 
Republic 
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0.3) 0 (0.6) 1.1 
(1.3) 
1.9 
(1.9) 
Denmark 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.1 (0) 0.2 (0) 0.2 (0) 0.1 (0) 
Estonia 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Finland 0.1 (0) 0.1 
(0.2) 
0 (0.1) 0 (0) 0.1 (0) 2.2 
(0.9) 
2.6 
(0.2) 
France 1.6 
(1.7) 
1.7 
(1.7) 
2.4 
(2.5) 
4.9 (5) 9 (10) 13.9 
(17) 
15.3 
(21.5) 
Germany 0 (0) 1.4 
(0.4) 
5.7 
(2.6) 
11.6 (7.8) 10 
(7.1) 
13 
(10) 
17 (13) 
Greece 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Hungary 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.1 
(0.6) 
0.4 0.6) 0.9 
(0.5) 
1.6 
(1.3) 
1.6 
(1.4) 
Ireland 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.1 (0)  0.6 
(0.2) 
0.8 
(0.2) 
Italy 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.2 
(0.1) 
0 (1.3) 0 (1) 2 (1) 4 (1) 
Latvia 0 (0) 0 (0.2) 0 (0.2) 0 (0.2) 0.1 
(0.3) 
0.1 
(0.3) 
0.1 
(0.3) 
Lithuania 0(0)  0 (0) 0 (0.1) 0.2 (0.1) 0.4 
(0.3) 
0.5 
(0.4) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
Luxembourg 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Malta 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Netherlands 0 (0) 0 (0.2) 0 (0.1) 0.7 (0.3) 3 (0.2) 3.6 
(0.2) 
4.9 
(0.2) 
Poland 0 (0) 0.8 
(0.8) 
1 (1.1) 1.8 (2.8) 2.3 
(2.7) 
4.3 (2) 5.1 
(2.9) 
Portugal 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Romania 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1.8 
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(0.1) 
Slovakia 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.9 
(0.5) 
1.1 
(1.6) 
1 (2) 
Slovenia 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.1 (0) 0.1 (0) 
Spain 0 (3.4) 4.5 
(4.4) 
3.9 
(5.2) 
3.9 (6.9) 4.3 
(6.2) 
4.1 
(5.9) 
5.2 (8) 
Sweden 2.6 (0) 4.5 
(1.2) 
4.9 
(2.6) 
5.5 (2.4) 6.2 
(1.6) 
7.3 
(1.7) 
6.5 (3) 
United 
Kingdom 
0 (0) 0 (0) 1.5 (0) 1.6 (0) 2.6 
(0.3) 
3.5 
(1.2) 
5.4 
(1.3) 
Source: Energy Information Administration-EIA (2011) 
 
Table 2.11 show that France, Germany and Spain are the top EU27 producers and 
consumers of bioethanol. It also shows that due to the unbinding nature of the EC 
blend mandate, EU countries differ in their consumption of bioethanol. In other EU 
member states bioethanol consumption or production is still very low or non 
existent. 
Figure 2-7 also highlights the varying share of bioethanol production and 
consumption in selected countries of the EU in the year 2009. 
Figure 2-7: Selected top EU27 member states bioethanol producers and 
consumers in 2009 (thousands of barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA (2011) 
Figure 2-7 shows that the main producers of bioethanol in the EU27 in 2009 were 
Germany, Spain and France with a combined production share of 69%. France has 
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been a major consumer of transport bioethanol in earlier years according to data 
from EIA although Germany has overtaken France from year 2005 onwards.  
 
As has been mentioned before the EU27 uses various crops to produce bioethanol 
but the crops used vary from country to country. The crop shares used for 
bioethanol production are also not constant and vary across time. The most 
important bioethanol crops used and their varying shares in 2006 and 2007 are 
shown in Figure 2-8: 
 
Figure 2-8: The estimated average share of bioethanol crops used in bioethanol 
production in the EU during the years 2006/2007  
 
 
Source: eBio and F.O Licht (2009) 
 
Figure 2-8 above shows that the main crops used for the production of bioethanol 
in the EU since 2007 have been increasingly wheat, sugar beet, corn, barley and rye 
and these are the crops or feedstocks that will be used in determining the supply 
curve of bioethanol in the EU27. The Figure also shows that the share of crops used 
to produce bioethanol increased from 2006 to 2007 with the exception of rye share. 
This means that bioethanol production is also having increasing impact on crop 
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production in the region. Table 2.12 also echoes the increasing and varying crop 
shares used in the production of bioethanol in the region from 2006 projected to 
2012. 
 
Table 2.12: EU bioethanol production from bioethanol crops from 2006 to 2012 
 Bioethanol 
production 
Feedstock 
production 
Bioethanol 
Production 
Feedstock 
Production 
 Million 
Litres 
Share Million tonnes Million 
Litres 
Share Million tonnes 
Total 1 560  Total For 
ethanol 
10 085  Total For 
ethanol 
Wheat 504 32.3% 109.3 1.4 4 034 40% 135.9 11.2 
Barley 440 28.2% 53.6 1.1 440 4% 46.1 1.1 
Corn 200 12.8% 44.6 0.5 1 291 13% 51.9 3.2 
Rye 200 12.8% 7.8 0.5 200 2% 9.1 0.5 
Beet 88 5.6% 141.7 0.8 3 864 38% 120.7 35.2 
Wine 128 8.3% - - 256 3% - - 
Sources: Jank et al (2007) 
 
Table 2.12 shows that sugar beet will become more important as a source of 
bioethanol in the EU27 with an increasing share from 5.6% in 2006 to about 38% by 
2012. This means that the EC bioethanol blend mandate is expected to have 
increasing significance for ACP countries that derive revenue from sugar trade to 
sustain their economies because of increase diversion of sugar beet from 
production of sugar to production of bioethanol. For completion of the review of 
biofuel situation in the EU27 we briefly discuss the biodiesel production status in 
the region. 
 
2.6.2 A brief overview of EU27 biodiesel production and consumption 
 
As mentioned earlier, biodiesel is the main biofuel produced in the EU27 with 
bioethanol production still at an infant stage. For this reason, not many studies 
have been focussed on the bioethanol aspect of the EU blend mandate despite the 
fact that bioethanol production has more impact on food market that biodiesel. 
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Figure 2-10 below shows the averageBiodiesel production and consumption in the 
EU27 from year 2000 to 2009 in thousands of barrels per day. 
 
Figure 2-9: Average EU27 biodiesel production and consumption from year 2000-
2009 in thousands of barrels per day  
 
 
Source: EIA (2011) 
Figure 2-9 shows that biodiesel production has been increasing and that from the 
year 2007 consumption started to outweigh production which means some of the 
biodiesel had to be imported. It also shows the increasing importance of biodiesel 
in the transport sector due to growing demand as nations increase their 
commitment to the blending targets they set. This has been the trend observed for 
bioethanol.   
 
Figure 2-10 and Figure 2-11 compares bioethanol and biodiesel production and 
consumption in the EU27 from year 2000 to 2009. 
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Figure 2-10: Average EU27 fuel biodiesel and bioethanol production for the year 
2000 -2009 in thousand of barrel per day 
 
 
Figure 2-11:  Average EU27 fuel biodiesel and bioethanol consumption in 
thousands of barrels per day  
 
 
 
 
Source: EIA (2011) 
 
Figures 2-10 and 2-11 above show a clear trend of the increasing importance of 
biofuels in the EU27. The production and consumption of biodiesel is much higher 
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than that of bioethanol with biodiesel accounting for around 73% of total biofuel 
production and consumption in 2009. One likely reason why biodiesel production is 
higher than that of bioethanol is that bioethanol production competes directly with 
important food crops commodities like wheat and corn while biodiesel, being 
produced from vegetable oil, does not have a direct effect of vital food 
commodities. 
Figure 2-12 below show selected top EU producers and consumers of biodiesel in 
2009. 
Figure 2-12: Selected top EU biodiesel producers and consumers in 2009 in 
thousand of barrel per day  
 
Source: EIA (2011) 
 
 
Figure 2-12 shows that France and Germany are top producers and consumers of 
biodiesel in the EU27.  
Following the overview of biofuels (mainly bioethanol) situation globally and in the 
EU27 we are now in a position to discuss the studies that have been undertaken on 
the EC biofuel policy. This is with the view of highlighting the gaps in the existing 
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literature on the economics of the EC biofuel policy which our study aims to 
address. 
 
2.7 Review of selected studies on EU bioethanol  
On the backdrop of our study objectives as outlined earlier, we therefore review 
the relevant literature especially on the economics of bioethanol blend mandate in 
the EU27 in order to show the relevance and contribution of our study to existing 
knowledge. A number of studies have been undertaken on bioethanol or biofuels in 
the EU but not all of them address the question of the blend mandate economics 
and its potential effects on ACP countries via bioethanol crops commodities 
markets. Many of these studies on biofuels markets use CGE modelling but have 
different objectives and conclusions. For example, Banse et al (2008) analyzed the 
impact of the EU biofuel policies on world agricultural and food markets and 
concluded that the EU biofuel directive will not be reached in 2010 and also that a 
mandatory blending enhanced demand for biofuel crops will have a strong impact 
on agriculture at European and global level.  
 
However, Banse et al (2008) only focused his study on EU15 member states and 
used the GTAP6-E, which is the GTAP model that disaggregates energy markets. He 
modelled the EU15 mandatory blending as a subsidy given to the petro-industry to 
reduce prices for biofuel inputs. In this way the study did not address the question 
of the possible partial equilibrium model the bioethanol market could take in the 
EU following a binding blend mandate and the significance of this bioethanol 
market on global bioethanol crops commodities. Also, according to our knowledge 
no study has extended the analysis of the EC biofuel policy ?Ɛ possible impact on 
specifically ACP sugar industries and on general welfare of these countries.  
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The problem of using GTAP 6 directly to study the EU27 bioethanol blend mandate 
is that in 2001, which is the base year for the GTAP 6 database there was little 
biofuel produced in the EU region. This means that its global impact analysis 
outcome when using this database is likely  be inaccurate. The short-coming of 
using the GTAP model directly in studying biofuels has also been noted by 
Kretschmer and Peterson (2009) in their study that surveyed CGE models 
integrating bioenergy. Our approach therefore is to design a unique EU27 
bioethanol partial equilibrium model and transfer its equilibrium outcomes into the 
GTAP model to analyse its potential global effects especially on ACP countries. 
 
Kretschmer, Narita and Peterson (2009) used a Dynamic Applied Regional Trade 
(DART) Model, which is a CGE model to analyze the economic effect of the EU 
biofuel target basing their approach on the EU emission targets. They concluded 
that the EU emission target leads to minor increases in biofuel production. They 
also noted that additional subsidies are necessary to reach the 10% biofuel target, 
which increases European agricultural prices by up to 7%.  As such, their study was 
not on the effect of the blend mandate and specifically on the economics of 
bioethanol blend mandate in the EU region. Ajanovic and Haas (2009) analysed the 
economic challenges of biofuels in the transport sector. Their study focus was on 
cost of producing biofuels in the EU. In this way, they used data on biofuels 
feedstock costs, gross conversion costs, distribution costs and subsidies to 
determine the future economic prospects of biofuel programmes in the EU. Key 
findings of their study was that problems of first generation biofuels production in 
the region are lack of available land for growing biofuel crops and that second 
generation biofuels will be cost effective around 2030 due to increases in prices of 
fossil gasoline and diesel.  
 
As has been discussed earlier, biofuel programmes in most regions are supported 
by policies that are meant to increase biofuel production and use in the transport 
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sector. Given this observation therefore, other studies on EU biofuels have focused 
on analysing support policies that promote biofuel use (Wiesenthal et al, 2008; 
Londo et al, 2010; Lucia and Nilsson, 2007). These studies are mostly discussion 
papers with no empirical analysis involved. They generally come into the consensus 
that for the EU to achieve its ambitious biofuel targets there has to be major policy 
changes that involve creating favourable economic or legal frameworks to 
accelerate biofuels market penetration.  
 
Other studies on EU biofuels have focused on specific countries on a case by case 
basis. In this way, these studies do not follow any specific or common modelling 
approach. Bomb et al (2007) basically reviewed the biofuel status in Germany and 
UK. They focus their discussion on the biofuel markets in the two countries based 
on institutional support and networks involved in biofuels. Hammond et al (2008) 
reviewed biofuel status in the UK transport sector. They discussed the policy 
support, land and GHG emission implications of the UK biofuel programmes. 
Silvestrini et al (2010) discussed the role of some European cities namely Berlin, 
Milan, London and Helsinki in achieving the EC biofuel targets. In this study the 
implementation of the EC Biofuels Directive and related voluntary measures at the 
local level was discussed. This study was also not empirical and was limited to the 
cities mentioned.  Kondili and Kaldellis (2006) discussed the biofuel status in Eastern 
Europe countries with an important conclusion that Eastern European countries are 
potential biofuel sources in the region due to their land endowment but noted that 
because of lack of technology biofuel production in these regions was still low.  
 
Skoulou et al (2010) studied the sustainable management of energy crops for 
integrated biofuels and green energy production in Greece. Their study focused on 
the biofuel production chemistry of rapeseed, soyabeans, sunflower and cotton. 
Key finding of this study was that proper use and integrated management of these 
energy crops and their residues could result in increase supply of domestic raw 
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material  for biodiesel industry and enhance the cohesion of agriculture, energy and 
environmental policies in Greece. Sobrino and Monroy (2009) made a critical 
analysis of the EC directive which regulates the use of biofuels in Spain. Their study 
was driven by the fact that European countries differed in their energy dependence, 
agricultural sector characteristics and industry profile. They argued that the EC 
directive on biofuels will therefore have diffferent impacts to individual EU member 
states. Using fossil fuel prices and bioethanol plant production efficiencies they 
concluded, by using Spain as an example, that it will be difficult for the EU biofuel 
programme to compete with fossil fuels.  
 
Gomez et al (2011) also analysed the Spanish biofuel programme but concentrated 
on the technical and cost aspects of Spanish biofuel production. In their analysis 
they used cost data for biofuel crops production including investment and transport 
cost. They concluded that feedstock cost account for 70-75% of production cost in 
biodiesel plant while it is 45-65% for a bioethanol plant. However, even though the 
cost of bioethanol crops is lower than that for biodiesel, bioethanol production is 
expected to have more significant impact on global food markets and welfare that 
biodiesel production.  
 
Bernard and Prieur (2007) studied the biofuel market and carbon modelling to 
analyse French biofuel policy. Their study analysed the French 2008, 2010 and 2012 
biofuel plan using tax exemption on fossil fuels and GHG emission savings. They also 
provided an economic marginal analysis and Life-Cycle Assessment using a coupling 
procedure between a partial agro-industrial equilibrium model and an oil refining 
model7. Their main conclusion was that biofuel competitiveness depends on crude 
oil prices and demand for petroleum products. Consequently, these parameters 
                                                          
7The agro-industrial model is a partial equilibrium model called OSCA5 LH µ(FRQRPLF 6XUSOXV 2SWLPLVDWLRQ RI
ELRIXHOV¶ ZKLFK ZDV developed by the Joint Research Unit in Public Economics, (INA-PG / INRA), Grignon. The 
French oil refining model is a mono-refinery optimization model based on Linear Programming 
Ch.2 - Literature review on biofuel and bioethanol 
 
2-52 
 
should be taken into account by authorities to modulate biofuel tax exemption 
optimization.  
 
As can be seen from these reviews, these studies use a wide range of modelling 
approaches to analyse EU biofuel programmes. Most of the analysis of EU biofuels 
is specific to certain regions only with different thematic approaches. In this way 
these studies do not address the empirical effects of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate and they are not focused on the EU27 member states as a whole. 
 
Still others studies on biofuels in the EU region have focused on biofuel production, 
land use and GHG emissions from a complete biofuel production cycle. These 
studies highlight the fact that one of the challenges that the EU faces in terms of its 
ability to produce biofuels is land availability. They also highlight the fact that the 
benefits of biofuels in as far as reduction of GHG emissions is concerned should 
consider CO2 emissions involved in the biofuel production cycle.  Such concerns 
have been highlighted earlier in the chapter and these studies provide further 
empirical evidence of their importance. Fischer et al (2010) studied the biofuel 
production potentials in Europe with focus on sustainable use of cultivated land and 
pastures. For this study they used  agricultural and forestry products trade balance 
database including production volumes and land use. Their database was country-
specific covering the period from 1980 to 2002.  Their main conclusion was that in 
the EU more than half of the biofuel feedstock potential is found in the EU128 and 
they also highlighted the importance of Eastern Europe in biofuel production 
especially that of Ukraine.  
 
Overmars et al (2011) analysed the indirect land use change (ILUC) on CO2 
emissions due to EU biofuel consumption. Their study therefore used various data 
                                                          
8
 The EU12 countries include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom 
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on land use, biofuel production, energy yield of biofuel crops and CO2 emissions 
from biofuel production cycles. Their main conclusion was that ILUC emissions 
alone could shift CO2 balance for biofuels from reductions to more emissions 
relative to fossil fuels. 
 
Bringezu et al (2009) analysed the global implications of biomass and biofuel use in 
Germany. For their study, they focused on recent trends and future scenarios for 
domestic and foreign agricultural land use and the resulting GHG emissions. Their 
study basically used data on land use and GHG emission mainly CO2 in Germany and 
globally with the main conclusion that an increase in the use of biomass, and in 
particular biofuels, in Germany would lead to an expansion of cropland 
requirements in tropical regions. They further concluded that the consumption of 
biodiesel would increase GHG emissions induced by land-use change in the next 
decades. 
 
Ozdemir et al (2009) analysed the land substitution effects of biofuel side products 
and implications on the land area requirement for EU 2020 biofuel targets. The 
study used various data on land use, biofuel production and energy yield of biofuel 
crops in the EU. The main conclusion was that the substitution of land area due to 
use of side products might ease the pressures on land area requirement 
considerably and should therefore not be neglected in assessing the impacts of 
biofuel provision worldwide. The studies on the relationship of biofuels to land use 
and GHG emissions are informative and provide insights into the wide scope of the 
biofuel literature. However, our study of biofuels will not consider their effects on 
land use since our analysis will involve bioĞƚŚĂŶŽů ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ?
bioethanol crop production in the EU by diverting some of these bioethanol crops 
to bioethanol production. 
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The review of the various literature on biofuels in the EU show that the area is well 
researched but still there is an obvious paucity of studies that specifically target the 
EC blend mandate economics in a holistic manner for the EU27 region. For example, 
there is no study that attempts to develop a partial equilibrium model of the EU27 
bioethanol market from the blend mandate where the partial equilibrium EU27 
bioethanol model could be  considered an ex ante model to be transmitted into a 
more global model ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ impact.  
 
Analysis of the economics of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is important 
given the direct impact bioethanol has on food markets as opposed to biodiesel. 
Such an analysis, important as it is especially for ACP trade and development, is still 
under researched. As observed in the paper by Banse et al (2008), the economic 
literature on the impact of biofuels on agricultural markets is still scarce as the 
boom in biofuels is recent. Because of this he further noted that data availability 
remains the major impediment in the study of biofuels especially in the EU27. 
 
The problems of data availability on biofuels in the EU27 is made worse by the 
controversies surrounding the perceived benefits of these biofuels in terms of their 
role in reducing GHG emission, the adverse effects they might have on the 
environment and being seen as competing with food production in the world that is 
still not food secure. These controversies hinder further biofuel production 
programmes in the EU region meaning data on this commodity remains scant still. 
Their increased production as per blend mandate commitments or targets is losing 
its impetus despite the fact that the problems associated with fossil fuels still 
persist.  
 
From the review of these studies, certain questions still remain on the EC biofuel 
policies. For example, it is still unknown what the full impact of the EC biofuel blend 
mandate policy will be in the EU region on a partial equilibrium basis. Further it is 
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not known what determines the price of transport bioethanol or biofuels in the 
region given the fact that the industry in still underdeveloped.  
 
Further, it is not known how the EC blend mandate will affect trade and welfare 
between ACP and EU27. This is more so because the EU27 is an important market 
for ACP countries especially for sugar. The biofuel studies for the EU region so far 
ĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞƐƉŝůůŽǀĞƌĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐďŝŽĨƵĞůprogrammes specifically 
on ACP countries. This is a concern because most ACP countries are at their 
developmental stages and are therefore more vulnerable to policies that have a 
potential to affect food production and trade in agricultural commodities. In this 
way, our study will develop and extend the EU bioethanol model to analyze its 
impact on these countries, many of which are mostly reliant on agricultural trade 
for their growth. 
 
Following these arguments, our approach to designing the EU27 bioethanol market 
will be on the assumption of a mandatory blend mandate that is binding for all 
EU27 member states with no bioethanol imports allowed. As such, the demand for 
bioethanol will be linked to the demand for gasoline. On the supply side there is still 
the problem of data since bioethanol production for transport fuel in the EU27 
started to be significant in year 1996. This therefore means that the bioethanol 
supply data is of short duration making its time series analysis a challenge. We will 
also make further assumption that all the bioethanol demanded by the blend 
mandate is produced from  ‘current ? ethanol crop production in the EU27 such that 
our analysis will have no bearing on land use as mentioned before. 
 
This approach is reasonable because it will illustrate the possible effects of the EC 
ďůĞŶĚ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ŽŶ Ă ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ  ‘ĂƐ-it-ŝƐ ? ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƚƵĚǇ ǁŝůů ŽĨĨĞƌ Ă
useful upper benchmark for future extensions of this kind of work. Our study will 
further determine the potential interaction effects between the EC bioethanol 
Ch.2 - Literature review on biofuel and bioethanol 
 
2-56 
 
blend mandate policy and the Economic Partnership Agreement  (EPA) policies 
between the EU and ACP countries. This extension of the analysis of the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy has never been attempted before. The EPA 
policies will be discussed in chapter 4 of our study. 
 
2.8 Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at the global biofuel status and the reasons for their 
promotion around the world. It has also reviewed selected regional policies that 
support biofuel production mainly in the USA, EU and Brazilian. These three regions 
are the main producers and consumers of first generation biofuels. Biofuel 
production has important opportunity cost implications. In this way, this chapter 
has also reviewed the studies that are for and against the promotion of biofuels and 
the controversies surrounding their production. Most of these controversies hinge 
on the competition for food production that biofuel production poses. Biofuels are 
identified as the cause of global increase in food prices since they compete directly 
with food production for agricultural resources in a world that is still not food 
secure. 
 
In this chapter, the EC biofuel directive, which forms the basis for our study, has 
also been reviewed together with other support policies that promote biofuel 
production in the EU region. Despite the EC biofuel blend mandate directive and 
other policies that promote biofuels in the EU, their production and use is still low 
compared to the USA and Brazil where the biofuel market, especially the market for 
bioethanol is well developed.  
 
The EC bioethanol blend mandate is expected to have an impact on these 
bioethanol crops commodities with important implications for ACP countries. The 
underdeveloped biofuel (especially bioethanol) industry in the EU poses a potential 
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problem in studies that aim to analyse the EU bioethanol market. This is mainly due 
to lack of data on biofuel use in the region and for the fact that there is no uniform 
blend mandate with individual countries setting their own targets.  
 
Various studies on the EU biofuel (or more specifically bioethanol) blend mandate 
policy have also been reviewed. The finding has been that there has so far been no 
study that is specifically directed at analysing the effect of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate in the EU on a partial equilibrium approach.  This makes the economics of 
the blend mandate an under-researched area in the region. This is despite the 
potential implications that the biofuel directive, especially the bioethanol sector will 
have on bioethanol crops commodities markets in the EU27 and globally.  
 
In the next chapter, we review the various bioethanol models mainly those 
developed for Brazil and USA bioethanol markets. These models are then adapted 
to design the EU bioethanol market model i.e. an EU bioethanol supply and demand 
models that will subsequently be transferred into the GTAP model.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Bioethanol models review, design and analysis of EU27 bioethanol model 
 
3.0 Introduction and motivation 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review bioethanol models and then design and 
analyse a model for the EU27 bioethanol market under a binding blend mandate. 
Various models have been proposed to study bioethanol markets especially for the 
USA and Brazil and these are based on the Food and Agriculture Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI) modelling approach. In these models, the bioethanol market is 
linked to those for bioethanol crops commodities, depending on which crop is used 
in the bioethanol production process. This link is because of the fact that bioethanol 
and bioethanol crops commodities are substitutes in productions and are therefore 
horizontally intergrated. For example, bioethanol production has a direct link to the 
sugar market in Brazil and corn market in the USA. This is because Brazil uses sugar 
cane to produce bioethanol while the USA uses corn. Since in the EU27 bioethanol 
is produced from a number of crops, bioethanol production in the region will have a 
direct impact on the respective bioethanol crops commodities. Because our study 
places emphasis on sugar markets, a global bioethanol-sugar model will be 
reviewed to get insights into the link between these two commodities. 
  
In this chapter therefore we will discuss the intuition behind various bioethanol 
models globally and specifically in the USA and Brazil to enable us to design an EU 
partial equilibrium bioethanol model. At present, there is no model that analyses 
the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on a partial equilibrium basis with the aim 
of drawing conclusions on its potential effect on bioethanol crop commodities 
sectors. Our analytical approach therefore and in particular the assumptions made 
in motivating our model offers an addition to our understanding of the economics 
of the EC biofuel blend mandate policy. It must be emphasized that the key to our 
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modelling approach are the assumptions made about the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate and the bioethanol production programme in the EU region. These 
assumptions makes our analysis unique and provide a upper bound bench mark for 
the possible impact of the EU bioethanol programme bioethanol crops commodities 
sectors. 
 
Studies on the EC biofuel policy were discussed in Chapter 2. Most of these studies 
use a general equilibrium approach as opposed to partial equilibrium analysis. For 
example, Gohin (2008) used a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach to 
analyse the impact of the European biofuel policy on the EU159 farm sectors. On 
the demand side they modelled the EC biofuel policy as increasing EU demand and 
therefore trade in biofuel crops commodities. On the supply side they assumed an 
increase in EU biofuel crops production using set aside land. Their main conclusion 
was that domestic EU bioethanol production will meet the regional demand while 
bioediesel demand will be met by a combination of domestic production and 
imports. 
 
However, partial equilibrium modelling is ideal in capturing the exact impact of the 
mandate on EU bioethanol crops commodities markets. Further, partial equilbrium 
modelling also requires minimal data inputs and this makes it suitable in the study 
of the EU biofuel market which is still underdeveloped with scant data.  
 
A binding blend mandate means bioethanol and gasoline are compliments and will 
be consumed in fixed proportions depending on the blend mandate percentage. For 
the blend mandate not to have an effect on transport fuel consumption, it will be 
                                                          
9
EU15 member states include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Sweden. Even 
fewer studies has analysed the EC blend mandate and biofuel market in all EU27 countries, which 
include the EU15 member states plus Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania 
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assumed that government subsidises bioethanol production such that just enough 
is produced to meet the blend mandate requirements.  
 
In the EU case therefore, gasoline and bioethanol are perfect complements because 
of lack of flexi-fuel vehicle that uses either bioethanol or gasoline. In this case, a 
government subsidy will be designed such that just enough bioethanol is produced 
to meet the blend mandate in place without the need to change the vehicle type. 
Subsidizing biofuel use is common practice around the globe. As noted by de Gorter 
ĂŶĚ :ƵƐƚ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ďůĞŶĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚĂǆ ĐƌĞĚŝƚƐ ĂŶĚ fuel tax exemptions constitute a 
consumption subsidy that raises the market price of biofuels and hence constitutes 
an unfair advantage over fuel (oil) production.  
 
Because of the binding blend mandate assumption, the demand for biothanol will 
depend on the demand drivers for gasoline. For this reason, an EU gasoline demand 
model will be designed and analysed apriori. From this gasoline demand model, the 
bioethanol demand will be adapted. The model analyses the effect of an EC 5.75% 
and 10% binding blend mandate, these blend percentages being the EC proposed 
transport fuel blend targets for 2010 and 2020 respectively. It is envisaged that the 
higher the blend mandate requirements the higher will be the equilibrium 
bioethanol quantities and therefore the larger will be the mandate impact on 
bioethanol crops commodities markets.  
 
Bioethanol supply is driven by the prices of bioethanol and bioethanol crops 
commodities. This is according to economic theoretical foundations in that 
bioethanol and bioethanol crop commodities are substitutes in production. 
Production behaviour will be driven by profit maximisation and therefore the prices 
of these competing commodities. Because sugar beet is one of the bioethanol crops 
in the EU27 the EU bioethanol supply will therefore be linked to the EU sugar 
market. Given the fact that the EU27 is an important global sugar producer and 
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trader the EU bioethanol market  will also have spill overs into the global sugar 
markets. The bioethanol supply market of the EU27 will also be linked to the 
markets for the other bioethanol crops i.e. barley, corn, wheat and rye. For 
example, in France in 2003, bioethanol production was from sugar beet with a 
share of 78%, wheat with a share of 15% and corn with a share of 7% (ONIOL, 
2004).  
 
The partial equilibrium model estimates obtained and the subsequent equilibrium 
conditions will be transferred into the GTAP model (which we discuss in chapter 5) 
to analyse the global spillovers of the mandate. The GTAP model is an example of a 
CGE model and will be discussed in details in chapter 5. The idea is that the EU 
equilibrium bioethanol quantities produced from the various bioethanol crops 
commodities will  ‘artificially ? ĚĞƉƌĞƐƐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? This  ‘artificial ? depression of 
bioethanol crops commodities output in the region is due to their divertion to 
bioethanol production. It is these artificial decreases in EU bioethanol crops 
commodities quantities that will be transfered into the GTAP model to simulate the 
global spillovers effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. To simulate and 
analyse the full impact of the mandate we assume that the EU produces all their 
bioethanol requirements within the region. The incorporation of the GTAP model to 
study the global impact of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will be 
undertaken in chapter 6.  
 
The rest of the chapter is therefore organised as follows; section 3.1 reviews global 
bioethanol models while section 3.2 discussed the FAPRI bioethanol model 
especially those of Brazil and the USA. Section 3.3 reviews an alternative FAPRI 
based bioethanol model again for the USA and Brazil. In section 3.4 we design and 
analyse the EU27 bioethanol demand model and presents its results. Section 3.5 
derives the bioethanol market clearing conditions under the assumption of a 
bioethanol production subsidy. Section 3.6 is the design and analysis of the EU 
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bioethanol supply model and presentation of its results. In section 3.7 we derive the 
subsidy level from the equilibrium bioethanol quantities and the discussion of the 
equilibrium results. Finally, section 3.8 is the conclusion and extension.  
 
3.1 Review of the global bioethanol models  
 
A more global bioethanol model has been proposed by Koizumi (2003) to study the 
global sugar-bioethanol market and the Brazilian bioethanol-sugar market. This 
model integrates agriculture, energy and the environment. In this model, the world 
sugar market consists of 14 major producing countries with 11 for the bioethanol 
market. The global sugar and bioethanol markets are linked together through the 
Brazilian markets for these two commodities. The proportion of sugar and 
bioethanol production is driven by exogenously determined domestic prices. Since 
sugar and bioethanol are substitutes in production, production decision is 
determined by their relative prices.  
 
National markets for these two commodities are defined by production, 
consumption, export, import and ending stocks values. The model therefore solves 
for a market clearing and trade-clearing price. Exogenously specified market 
intervention prices determine national market supply-demand and trade balance 
differences. As this model is global, it also integrates EU sugar production and trade 
programmes, which include production quotas, intervention prices, export 
subsidies and preferential treatments. Bioethanol consumption is specified as the 
sum of transport use and other uses. Transportation use is defined as a function of 
bioethanol and gasoline prices, which is further explained by the exogenously 
provided crude oil price and the number of vehicles.  
 
In this model production of bioethanol is a function of the area harvested for sugar 
cane or sugar beet and their bioethanol production efficiency. When the price of 
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sugar is high, the share of sugar cane/sugar beet for bioethanol production goes 
down and vice versa. Therefore, the relative prices of these competing 
commodities, i.e. sugar and bioethanol are the main drivers of production decisions 
on the supply side.  
 
Bioethanol demand is modelled as consumption demand and is a function of 
domestic price of commodities and income at a given time period. The model then 
derives exports and imports as functions of production and consumption. It then 
solves for marketing clearing conditions when exports equate to imports. To show 
how the Koizumi model is structured we first define its key variables as follows; 
Ah = area harvested, 
Q = production quota 
Y = yield 
G = exogenous growth rate 
QP = production 
ER = extraction rate 
SUAL = sugarcane allocation ratio for sugar production 
QC = consumption 
PQC = per capita consumption 
EX = export 
IM = import 
SS = ending stocks 
I = per capita income 
POP = population 
DP = domestic price 
PP = producer price 
MP = import price 
WP = world price 
 
The indexes used with the variables are defines as follows; 
 
i = all commodities 
is = sugar 
isc = sugarcane 
isb = sugar beet 
ie = bioethanol 
ia = alternative commodities 
im = input for bioethanol production 
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r = countries/ country groups 
t = time 
 
Using the variables above the model then defines production, consumption, import 
and export of bioethanol to derive the market clearing conditions as discussed next. 
 
Production of sugar cane is determined by the area harvested as shown in equation 
3.1 below; 
 
ȴAhis,t = f (ȴPPis,t-1, ȴPPia,t-1,ȴQis,t-1 )  
(3.1) 
 
The above equations means that on the productions side, the change in area 
ŚĂƌǀĞƐƚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƐƵŐĂƌ  ?ȴŚis,t) is a function of change in its lagged price  ?ȴWWis,t-1) 
versus the change in lagged price of alternative commodities including bioethanol 
 ?ȴWWia,t-1) ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ůĂŐŐĞĚĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶƐƵŐĂƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƋƵŽƚĂ  ?ȴYis,t-1) at any time t. 
The equation means that there would be a negative relationship between the area 
harvested for sugar cane and the price of alternative commodities, specifically 
bioethanol. 
The quantity of sugar produced (QPis,t) is a function of the area harvested for sugar 
cane/beet (AHisc,t/ AHisb,t) multiplied by the sugar cane/beet yield (Yisc,t/ Yisb,t), the 
sugarcane allocation ratio for sugar production (SUALt) and the extraction rate for 
sugar cane/sugar beet (ERisc,t/ ERisb,t) at time t. These relationships are shown in 
equation 3.2 below; 
 
QPis, t = AHisc,t*Yisc,t * SUALt * ERisc,t +AHisb, t *Yisb,t * ERisb,t 
 
(3.2) 
 
Equation 3.2 therefore shows that the production efficiency of a source crop for a 
given commodity is important in determining the final yield for that commodity. 
The sugarcane allocation ratio for sugar production (SUALt) is a function of the ratio 
of the changes in the domestic price of sugar (DPis) versus that of bioethanol (DPie) 
as shown in equation 3.3. 
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SUALt = f((DPis,t /DPis,t 0 )/(DPie,t /DPie,t 0 )) 
(3.3) 
 
The production decisions between sugar and bioethanol and thus the sugarcane 
allocation ratio for sugar production are with reference to the Brazilian sugar-
bioethanol market as shown in equation 3.4. The change in the quantity of 
bioĞƚŚĂŶŽůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ȴYWie,t) is a function of the change in its price  ?ȴWWie,t), the 
change in its ĞǆŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ƌĂƚĞ  ?ȴ'ie,t) and change in prices of inputs for 
bioethanol ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ȴWWim,t) at time t. 
 
ȴQPie,t = f (ȴPPie,t ,ȴPPim,t ,ȴGie,t ) 
  (3.4) 
 
Bioethanol production will be positively related to its own price and negatively 
related to the prices of inputs. Consumption of commodity i at any given time t 
(QCi,t) is a function of its price (PQCi,t) and the population (POPr,t) in a given region r 
at time t as shown in equation 3.5 below. 
 
QCi,t = PQCi,t * POPr,t 
(3.5) 
 
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŐŝǀĞŶĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚǇ ?ȴWYi,t) is a 
function of change ŝŶ ŝƚƐƉƌŝĐĞ  ?ȴWi,t )ǀĞƌƐƵƐĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚŝĞƐ  ?ȴWia,t) and 
ĂůƐŽĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŝŶĐŽŵĞ ?ȴ/r,t) in a given region or country r at any given 
time t. 
 
ȴPQCi,t = f (ȴDPi,t , ȴDPia,t,ȴIr,t ) 
(3.6) 
 
Consumption of a given commodity generally increases with increase in income if 
that commodity is a normal good. It decreases with an increase in its own price and 
a decrease in prices of alternative commodities. Since transport fuel is a normal 
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good, consumption of transport bioethanol will be positively related to income and 
negatively related to its own price. However, increase in bioethanol price will also 
increase its supply but this supply increase will depend on the relative price changes 
of bioethanol versus sugar. These dynamics show the possible complex relationship 
between the transport sector and agricultural markets as a result of biofuel 
production programmes. 
 
Export for commodity i  ?ȴyi,t) is a function of the change in world market price for 
ƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞŶĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚǇ ?ȴtWi,t )ǀĞƌƐƵƐƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŝƚƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŝĐĞ ?ȴWi,t) at any 
given time t as shown in equation 3.7.  
 
ȴEXi,t = f (ȴWPi,t , ȴDPi,t ) or EXi,t = QPi,t +IMi,t - QCi,t -(SSi,t - SSi,t-1) 
(3.7) 
 
ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚƐ  ?ȴ/Di,t) on the other hand is a function of change in the import 
price for commodity i  ?ȴDWi,t )ǀĞƌƐƵƐ ƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ ŝƚƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŝĐĞ  ?ȴWi,t) and 
ĂůƐŽĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŝŶĐŽŵĞ ?ȴ/r,t) for a given region or country r at any given 
time t. This relationship is shown in equation 3.8 below: 
 
ȴIMi,t = f (ȴMPi,t, ȴDPi,t, ȴIr,t ) or IMt,s = EXs +QCts + (SSst - SSst-1 )- QPst 
(3.8) 
 
Increase in world prices of a given commodity relative to local prices will generally 
promote export of that commodity. It is expected therefore that increase in blend 
mandate commitments of nations will increase global demand for bioethanol. This 
will increase bioethanol exports from efficient producers like Brazil to high cost 
producers like the EU region.  
 
The ending stock for a commodity i (SSi,t) is shown in equation 3.9. It is a function of 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ  ?ȴYWi,t) or domestic ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ  ?ȴYi,t) and 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŝĐĞ ?ȴWi,t) at time t. 
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SSi,t = f (ȴQPi,t , ȴDPi,t ) or SSi,t = f (ȴQCi,t, ȴDPi,t) 
(3.9) 
 
 
Following the motivation of the relationship between the variables, the model is 
then solved when exports equal imports for a given commodity i at a given time t 
for a given country or region r,  i.e. 
 
ɇ EX i,r,t = ɇ IM i,r,t 
(3.10)                            
 
The usefulness of this model is that it shows that production and consumption 
decisions in the bioethanol market are driven by the price of bioethanol relative to 
the prices of bioethanol crops commodities, which is only sugar in this case. Trade is 
a function of local production, consumption and the relative prices of international 
versus local commodities. The model therefore shows that bioethanol has a direct 
influence on sugar markets (both locally and internationally) and vice versa since 
these two commodities are substitutes in production.  
Another model that has been used to study bioethanol and its impact on other 
markets is the FAPRI model which we discuss next.  
 
3.2 The bioethanol FAPRI model  
 
This model was developed by the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI) at the University of Missouri-Colombia (MU). The model has therefore been 
named after the institute that developed it. The FAPRI model is a partial equilibrium 
model that is applied in supply and demand analysis of major US agricultural 
commodities. Its base data is derived from input costs, retail prices, farm incomes 
and government interventions. It also incorporates world trade models in 
agricultural commodities and estimates supply, demand, prices and trade flows for 
major international trading regions. The model is useful in the analysis of the effects 
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of market  ‘ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ? (e.g. policy interventions) on farm income and consumption. Its 
structure with reference to the USA bioethanol production programme is described 
in details in the FAPRI-MU Report #07-08 (2008). 
 
In this bioethanol FAPRI model, USA bioethanol supply is a function of its own price 
and the prices for bioethanol crops commodities. Bioethanol in the USA is produced 
from corn following two production lines which are the Dry and Wet milling 
production. Bioethanol production from corn (or any grain crop for that matter) 
results in a by-product called ĚŝƐƚŝůůĞƌ ?Ɛ grain, which can be wet or dried. The 
difference between wet and dry milling production cycle is the treatment of the 
grain in the initial stages of the bioethanol production process.  In wet milling the 
grain is soaked in water and diluted with acid to separate it into its components 
while in dry milling this process is skipped. Wet milling co-products include corn oil, 
corn gluten feed and corn gluten meal, all which are used as animal feed. This 
means that the bioethanol market also has a direct link to the livestock production 
market through this by-product. 
 
The characteristics of Wet Distillers Grain (WDGs) are different from those of DDGs 
in that the WDGs contains unfermented residues with up to 70% moisture while 
DDGs are more concentrated with less water content (about 10%). This means that 
DDG has a longer shelf life, which reduces its storage and transport costs. WDG has 
a short shelf life and is therefore not ideal for international trade purposes. It is the 
dry milling method that is adopted in the analysis of the bioethanol market since it 
is this method that produces DDG important for trade.  
 
The FAPRI bioethanol supply intuition is quite simple. Bioethanol production from 
corn is driven by the expected net revenue return per bushel. Bioethanol return 
from a bushel of corn is a function of its own price multiplied by the amount that 
can be produced from that given bushel less input costs. In this way, the revenue 
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returns also considers the bioethanol production efficiency of corn. Revenue 
returns also takes into account the by-products of bioethanol production process, in 
this case DDGs sold as animal feed. Bioethanol production costs are mainly the corn 
price and the other costs of corn conversion to bioethanol. Indeed, the cost of 
bioethanol crops are the biggest hindrance to EU bioethanol production 
programmes as noted in the previous chapter. This relationship means that high 
bioethanol prices encourage bioethanol production while high corn prices 
discourage it and this relationship is intuitively correct. 
 
Bioethanol demand varies depending on whether it used as a mandatory blended 
fuel or as a voluntary substitute, which can be at a 10% (E10) or 85% (E85) blend. 
Consumers therefore face different demand decisions depending on the bioethanol 
policy in place. If used as a mandatory fuel additive, bioethanol acts as a 
complement to gasoline and in this case consumer choice is limited. If used as E10 
or E85 it act as a substitute and consumers can choose between traditional gasoline 
and the blended hybrids. This means that in the first scenario of mandatory 
blending, a rise in the price of gasoline will result in decreased demand for 
bioethanol. In this case, bioethanol and gasoline prices are positively correlated.  
On the other hand, if bioethanol and gasoline are substitutes, a rise in the price of 
gasoline will result in an increase in demand for bioethanol as consumers switch to 
the cheaper alternative. In this case the demand for bioethanol will be negatively 
related to that of gasoline. 
 
In the mandatory use, the demand for bioethanol is simply the demand for gasoline 
multiplied by blend mandate percentage. In this case of mandatatory use, the 
elasticity of demand for bioethanol is the same as that for gasoline. For the 
purposes of the EU27 bioethanol market it is this mandatory use that will be 
adopted since our aim is to determine EU bioethanol demand under the 5.75% and 
10% mandatory blend mandate as proposed in the EC biofuel directive. 
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For completion and extensions the voluntary use of bioethanol is also discussed to 
show how it differs from the mandatory use. The voluntary use of bioethanol is 
disaggregated into E10 and E85, both based on market conditions. E10 blended 
fuels can be used in most vehicles while E85 can only be used in Flexi Fuel Vehicles 
(FFVs). The E10 blend demand is a function of gasoline demand and the blend 
percentage of 10%. However, since in voluntary use the blend mandate is not 
binding, demand for bioethanol will also be driven by the relative price of 
bioethanol to gasoline. Since bioethanol contains about 70% energy content as 
gasoline, the price of bioethanol becomes competitive with that of gasoline once 
the price ratio of bioethanol to gasoline is less than 0.7.  
 
In this case the market penetration for bioethanol is defined by a logit function with 
a maximum point where no bioethanol is sold once the price ratio of bioethanol to 
gasoline is above 70%. The overall bioethanol demand is therefore a product of the 
blend mandate percentage and the logit defined bioethanol market penetration. 
Assuming a binding blend mandate therefore ignores the bioethanol market 
penetration effect, which simplified the bioethanol demand function. The 
derivation of the E85 demand is similar to that for E10 with some differences 
however.  
 
Firstly, for adoption of E85, consumers must have a FFV. This means that the 
market penetration for E85 will be lower than that for E10 in that it will not only 
depend on the price ratio of bioethanol to gasoline but also on investment in FFVs. 
This means adoption of E10 will be quicker if bioethanol becomes cheaper after 
adjustment for the energy contents. Secondly, use of E85 (due to historical 
presence of FFVs) will start at a somewhat higher bioethanol- gasoline price that in 
the E10 case. This makes E85 bioethanol demand more complicated than that for 
the E10 demand. In the USA therefore there is a complex relationship between 
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bioethanol and gasoline demand depending on whether the blend mandate in place 
is binding or not, the blend mandate percentage and the presence of FFVs in the 
economy. For the EU27 we will simplify the bioethanol-gasoline demand 
relationship by assuming that there is a given binding blend mandate in place and 
that there are no FFVs in the region. 
 
The above model notwithstanding, in the next section we discuss an alternative 
bioethanol model, also based on FAPRI modelling approach. This model has again 
been developed for the USA and the Brazilian bioethanol market.  
 
3.3 Alternative FAPRI bioethanol models 
This alternative modelling approach, also based on the FAPRI model, was developed 
by Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) for the USA and Brazilian bioethanol programmes. It 
follows similar reasoning with the previous model in that bioethanol demand is a 
function motor gasoline demand and the blend mandate policy in place. Bioethanol 
supply, as in the previous model, is a function of its own price and that of 
bioethanol crops commodities. However, this model is also extended to include 
international trade in bioethanol.  
In this model, USA bioethanol demand is derived from a cost faced by fuel blenders. 
The cost of blending fuel is a function of the price of bioethanol, the population, the 
blend policy in place and the gasoline supply. The demand function for bioethanol 
per unit of gasoline is then derived by minimizing this cost function following the 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ŚĞƉƉĞƌĚ ?Ɛ >ĞŵŵĂ ?This derives the demand for bioethanol as 
driven by its own price (less the tax rebate), the population and the blend mandate 
in place. At equilibrium, gasoline supply is equal to gasoline demand. In this case, 
the demand for bioethanol at equilibrium is a function of the per unit gasoline 
bioethanol demand multiplied by the overall demand for gasoline. The demand for 
gasoline is in itself a function of its own price, the price of bioethanol, Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) and the population. The bioethanol demand model is such 
that it is assumed that complementarity between bioethanol and gasoline 
dominates. This complementarity assumption in the model therefore means that a 
binding blend mandate dominates.  
The complementarity assumption between bioethanol and gasoline is basically to 
recognise the fact that in the USA there are few FFVs and this is the case also for 
the EU region. The USA bioethanol market price is the prevailing market price of 
this commodity as determined by market forces of supply and demand. This is 
unlike the case in the EU region where bioethanol does not have a significant 
market share and recognised supply and demand drivers that determine its market 
price. The complementarity assumption between bioethanol and gasoline also 
means the price of bioethanol will increase with increase in demand for gasoline. As 
gasoline demand is positively related to GDP and population growth, this trend will 
also be followed by bioethanol.  
The USA bioethanol demand differs from that of Brazil mainly due to the presence 
of FFVs in the Brazilian market which relaxes the complementarity assumption 
between bioethanol and gasoline. The Brazilian bioethanol demand is also a 
function of its own price, the price of gasoline, GDP, the population and the blend 
mandate in place. However, in Brazil bioethanol demand is divided into hydrous 
and anhydrous components due to the presence of three kinds of cars namely 
alcohol cars, FFVs and gasohol vehicles10. These cars are identified due to their fuel 
requirements.  
Alcohol cars use hydrous bioethanol only, gasohol cars use a blend of anhydrous 
bioethanol with gasoline while FFVs use both hydrous and anhydrous bioethanol 
blended with gasoline. Total bioethanol demand in Brazil therefore is the sum of 
                                                          
10
 The distinction between Anhydrous and Hydrous bioethanol is basically due to the water content. 
Anhydrous bioethanol contains less the 1% water while hydrous bioethano contain 4-7% water. 
Conversion of hydrous bioethanol to anhydrous bioethanol is by distillation.     
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the three types of bioethanol demand. In the Brazilian case therefore bioethanol 
acts as a substitute and a complement depending on the dominant car type in the 
market. This means therefore that anhydrous bioethanol and gasoline demand are 
positively correlated while demand for hydrous bioethanol and gasoline have a 
negative correlation. This Brazilian situation shows the complex potential 
interaction between bioethanol and gasoline depending not only on the nature of 
the blend mandate (i.e. whether it is binding or not) but also on the vehicle type in 
the economy. 
In this alternative FAPRI bioethanol model, as in the previous FAPRI model, USA 
bioethanol supply is driven by profit maximisation of the firm. This profit 
maximisation is a function of the expected net revenue return from a bushel of corn 
converted into bioethanol and its by-products less the input cost, which are 
basically the corn prices and the price of natural gas used in bioethanol 
fermentation process. However, this alternative FAPRI bioethanol model, unlike the 
previous one, include the capacity utilisation of the firm during bioethanol 
production and the USA ending stocks. 
Brazilian bioethanol supply is also driven by profit maximisation of the firm that is 
determined by the area harvested for sugar cane. The area harvested for sugar cane 
is a function of the prices of sugar, bioethanol and soybeans, which is a competing 
crop. The share of sugar cane for bioethanol production therefore is a function of 
the relative prices of bioethanol and sugar as is the case in the previous model. A 
high price of bioethanol means less sugar cane is used for sugar production and vice 
versa. Because of competing crops, the area harvested for sugar cane is positively 
correlated to the prices of sugar and bioethanol. However, the relative prices of 
these two commodities determine which one dominates in production. Trade in 
bioethanol is also included in the model both for the USA and for Brazil. For the 
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USA, two trading regions are identified namely the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)11 
that benefits from a duty free bioethanol export to the USA and other regions that 
are subjected to a tariff rate quota. For the case of Brazil, bioethanol trade 
incorporates only exports given the fact that Brazil is a net bioethanol exporter. 
The usefulness of the models reviewed is that they show how the bioethanol 
market is linked to other commodities markets. In all these models bioethanol 
demand is linked to the demand for gasoline while bioethanol supply is linked to 
bioethanol crops commodities markets. Since the EU27 also uses corn and sugar 
beet to produce bioethanol, the EU27 bioethanol supply model will have some 
similarity to that for the USA and Brazil. Because of its multicommodity linkages it is 
therefore expected that the EU27 bioethanol supply or production programme will 
potentially have more impact on food markets than that of Brazilian or USA. 
Schematic details of all the possible inter-linkages between the bioethanol markets 
and other commodites markets for a global, Brazilian, USA and the EU27 bioethanol 
programmes are shown in Figures A3-1, A3-2, A3-3 and A3-4 respectively in the 
appendix. Because of the global linkages of the EU bioethanol crops commodities 
markets, a global CGE model like the GTAP is therefore ideal to analyse the global 
effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate.  
 
The USA FAPRI model reviewed in particular also considers the markets for grain 
crops bioethanol by-products like DDGs which is used as an animal feed as 
mentioned. In this way, the USA FAPRI model incorporates the livestock sector into 
the bioethanol market. However, the FAPRI ŵŽĚĞů ?s shortcoming is that it is better 
suited to analyzing a biofuel market where such a market already exists and exerts a 
significant influence on other related sectors. In this way, the model is appropriate 
                                                          
11
 The CBI countries include Jamaica, Costa Rica and El Salvador and they trade with the USA under 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBRA) where rules of origin apply in bioethanol export 
to the USA. The agreement is that if bioethanol is produced from at least 50% of crops grown in 
CBERA country then it enters the USA duty free. 
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for countries with well developed bioethanol markets like the USA and Brazil. This 
model will therefore have limitations for the case of EU where the bioethanol 
market is still in its infancy.  
However, the Brazilian and the USA bioethanol models and their empirical results 
provide good reference benchmark for an EU27 bioethanol model. They also offer 
good insights on the possible modelling techniques used to study bioethanol 
market but they have limited applicability to the EU27 where there are few FFVs. 
Further, the EC bioethanol blend mandate is not binding. The non-binding nature of 
the EC blend mandate, where nations choose their individual blend targets makes it 
difficult to analyse bioethanol penetration in all the EU member states. However, 
the design of the EU27 bioethanol model will be adapted from the FAPRI approach 
under certain assumptions which forms the key to the model we finally develop as 
mentioned in the introduction section to this chapter.  
 
3.4 The EU27 bioethanol demand model 
 
Following the review of the various bioethanol models in the last section mainly for 
Brazil and USA we are now in a position to design the EU27 bioethanol model that 
aim to analyze the effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate in the region. This EU 
model is guided by the schematic view of the possible bioethanol market structure 
in the region as outlined in the Figure A3-4 in the appendix section. First, we 
construct the EU27 bioethanol demand. 
The EU bioethanol market demand model can be designed from the flow chart 
outlined in figure 3-1:  
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Figure 3-1: EU 27 bioethanol demand model flow chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
 
As in the previous models reviewed, the demand for bioethanol in the EU27 is 
directly linked to the demand for transport fuel following a binding blend mandate 
assumption.  
From the flow diagram above it is apparent that the mandatory blend will increase 
the demand for bioethanol whilst decreasing that of gasoline by an amount 
equivalent to the blend mandate percentage in place.  
 
As noted earlier in the chapter, a binding blend mandate implies that the demand 
for bioethanol will be a derived demand from that of gasoline. To motivate the 
demand for bioethanol in the EU region therefore, a gasoline demand model is first 
developed and tested for consistency.  
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3.4.1 Gasoline demand  
 
Following Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) the initial demand for gasoline (in millions of 
gallons) without blend can be modelled as follows; 
 
                  
 (3.11) 
In equation 3.11 is the EU27 demand for gasoline, is the EU27 real GDP per 
capita,  is the real price of gasoline in the EU27 in constant (year 2000) Euros and 
 is the mean zero error term which is assumed to be normally distributed. 
 
This model is useful in that it relates gasoline demand to its own price and GDP per 
capita as intuition dictates. A structural form that is widely employed in analysing 
the demand for fuel is the double log functional form. The justification for using the 
double log functional form is that in this transformed model the coefficients are 
now interpreted directly as elasticities so they have direct economic application as 
opposed to the linear case where the coefficients on the dependent variables 
represent marginal values.12 Therefore using the double log linear long run 
transformation, equation 3.11 is transformed as shown in equation 3.12 below: 
 
                  
(3.12) 
Where again is the EU27 demand for gasoline at time t, is the EU27 real GDP 
per capita at time t,  is the real price of gasoline in the EU27 in constant (year 
2000) Euros at time t and is the mean zero error term which is assumed to be 
normally distributed. In equation 3.12 t indicates the annual average for the 
                                                          
12
The double log linear long run relationship between gasoline demand and GDP has been applied in 
several studies that analyze energy markets. Please see studies by Bentzen (1994), Ramanathan 
(1999), Cheung and Thomson (2004 and Polemis (2006) 
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variables from year 1984 to 2009, the time span for our data set. In the above 
equation, economic intuitions expects   to be negative while and  are 
expected to be positive. The model in equation 3.12 above will form the basis for 
the analysis of the transport bioethanol market in the EU27 but in order to use it is 
important to first test its structural specification. 
The average annual demand for gasoline in the EU27 from the years 1984 to 2009 is 
obtained from US Energy Information Administration (EIA). EU27 real GDP per 
capita data is obtained from International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic 
Data Base. The data used in this analysis dates back further that the formation of 
the EU27 region and is obtained by aggregating individual member countries data 
sets.  For the case of the fuel prices the average price at the pump inclusive of all 
taxes across all the EU member states is used and this data is obtained from 
Eurostat. A plot of gasoline demand and its price from 1984 to 2008 is shown in the 
Figure 3-2 below; 
Figure 3-2: A plot of the EU demand (thousands of barrels/day) and price of 
ŐĂƐŽůŝŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?> ?ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? 
 
Source: Data from EIA 
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Figure 3-2 above shows that the two variables are inversely related which is in 
accordance to intuition. The data also show that the price of gasoline has been 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ? ?ƐĂŶĚǁĂƐĂďŽǀĞ ? ? ?>ĂƌŽƵŶĚǇĞĂƌ ? ?  ? ?ĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌŐĂƐŽůŝŶĞ
has been relatively flat in the years from 1990 up to 2000. However, from year 2000 
onwards gasoline demand went down in response to a price increase around that 
same year. The distribution of the data shows that there are no outliers that could 
affect the robustness and validity of our results.  
For the analysis of the gasoline model we run the regression for the equations 
developed in equation 3.12 above. These static long run regression results for the 
EU27 annual gasoline demand are shown in Table 3.1 below:  
Table 3.1:  Regression results for a static long run EU27 gasoline demand:  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error     T statistic P>|t|      
LnY 0.302   0.053    5.651    0.000       
LnP -0.393    0.124 -3.173    0.004     
Constant 7.648    0.482     10.050    0.000      
N= 26 
R-Squared =0.634 
 
The results reported in Table 3.1 show that all the coefficients are significant and 
have the expected signs. The regression is also significant and explains 63% of the 
variation. 
The double log model shows that the price elasticity of demand for gasoline is -
0.393 when regressing gasoline demand against its own price and GDP per capita. 
This value is comparable to values obtained in most EU transport fuel demand 
studies which find long run price elasticities of demand ranging from -0.4 to -0.8 
(Godwin et al., 2004; Romero-Jordán et al., 2010; Dahl and Sterner, 1991). 
However, all these studies used income per capita instead of GDP per capita as is 
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the case in our model. They also studied total transport fuel demand, which 
includes gasoline and diesel instead of gasoline alone, as is the case in our study. 
However, the comparable elasticities means the data used for this study and the 
variables chosen are reliable. 
 
To further work with the model, it is important to test its structure. Formal model 
tests we use are the test for normality of the errors and the test for 
heteroskedasticity. Both graphical and numerical methods are used in testing for 
normality and heteroskedasticity. Graphical methods are useful in that they are 
easy to perform and give a visual picture of the test outcome, which can then be 
supported by the more formal numerical approach. In this way, the combination of 
graphical and numerical testing methods provides practical and robust test results. 
The graphical method employed for testing normality is the quantile-quantile (qq) 
plot and for the numerical method we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. 
The qq plot is a plot of a variable against the normal distribution plot. If the variable 
is normally distributed the two plots should match. The qq plot is easy to perform 
and interpret using most readily available statistical software and the results for our 
model are shown in Figure 3-3 below:   
Figure 3-3: A qq plot for double log model for gasoline demand in the EU27 
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The results from the qq plot of the residuals show that they are normally 
distributed since they trace the normal distribution line.  
 
The qq plot above provide evidence for normality of the residuals but a more 
objective numerical method for testing normality must also be performed. The K-S 
test is an example of such numerical method. The K-S method is a means of testing 
whether a set of observations are from a given continuous distribution and it is a 
powerful test for small samples (Lilliefors, 1967). As our sample data consist of only 
26 observations, this test is preferred.  
 
The null hypothesis being tested is that of normality of the residuals and a low p-
value corresponds to rejecting the null hypothesis. P-values are considered 
significant if they are larger than a critical value of 0.05. The results of the KS test 
are displayed Table 3.2 below: 
 
Table 3.2: K-S test for normality for gasoline demand in the EU27 
 
Variable Pr(Skewness)    Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)     Prob>chi2 
Residual 0.217          0.283             2.97        0.227 
 
 
The results show that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of normality at rejection 
region of ɲA? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐĂƌĞŶŽƌŵĂůůǇĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ?  
 
Testing for heteroskedasticity is another important element of analysing the 
structure and performance of a model for a given data set. Homoskedasticity is one 
of the basic assumptions of a standard OLS regression model and refers to the case 
where the variance in the error term is constant. A violation of this assumption 
results in heteroskedasticity meaning that the calculated estimates of the model are 
no longer valid. Homoskedasticiy is therefore an important characteristic of a 
correctly specified model. 
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To test for heteroskedasticity in our models we use the residuals plot which is an 
example of a graphical method and the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg (B-P/C-W) 
test which is an example of a numerical method. The B-P/C-W test is a widely used 
test for homoskedasticity which tests the null hypothesis that the fitted values have 
a constant variance against the alternative hypothesis of non constant variance or 
heteroskedasticity. A low p-ǀĂůƵĞďĞůŽǁĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůůĞǀĞů ?ĐŚŽƐĞŶƚŽďĞɲA? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐ
analysis) means rejecting the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity leading to the 
conclusion that heteroskedasticity is present in the regression model run. In the 
residuals plot the residuals are plotted against fitted values and a trend between 
the two planes is an indication of heteroskedasticity. The residual plot results for 
our model are shown Figure 3-4 below: 
Figure 3-4: A residual plot for EU27 gasoline demand 
 
 
 
The results above show no clear trend between the residuals and the fitted values 
and therefore we conclude that the double log model specification of EU27 gasoline 
demand result in errors that are homoskedastic.  
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The next step was to perform numerical test for heteroskedasticity using the B-P/C-
W test and the results supported homoskedasticity with a p-value of 0.9211, which 
is greater than a critical value of 0.05. The outcome above gives further evidence 
that the double log transformed model of EU27 gasoline demand result in 
homoskedastic variances.  
The important results of the model are summarised in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: OLS regression summary results for EU27 gasoline demand  
* -0.393 (0.004) 
R-Squared 0.634 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.602 
KS Test (p-value)# 0.227 
BP-CW Test (p-value)# 0.921 
*p-values in brackets 
#p-values for KS test with Ho: normality and BP-CW with Ho: homoskedasticity of 
residuals 
 
Although our data set is rather short with 26 observations, the model is also 
analysed using a time series approach to determine the long run relationship 
between the variables by the method of cointregration. Many studies have used 
cointergration methods to analyze the demand for gasoline in different regions 
(Bentzen, 1994; Ramanathan, 1991; Rao and Rao, 2009) but none have analysed the 
EU27 gasoline demand with the aim of deriving the demand for bioethanol. 
To test if the variables in the gasoline demand model we have specified have indeed 
a long run relationship we first test each one of them for unit root by use of the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
The ADF is basically running the regression specified below: 
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3.13 
Which is estimated as an AR(J) process. 
The hypothesis of the ADF test is as follows: 
Ho : =0 meaning has a unit root 
H1 :   T ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ is not unit root and either stationary or trend stationary. 
 
The ADF test shows that the price variable is unit root when a constant is included 
without a time trend. It is not unit root at all levels when a time trend is included 
and the results of the test are shown in the Table 3.4 below: 
 
Table 3.4: OLS unit root estimation for price variable 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error          T-Ratio[Prob] 
C                          -1.787                        1.117   -1.600[0.131]  
 LnP(1)                     0.258                           0.158 1.638[0.122] 
 DLnP(1)                   -0.488              0.320             -1.523[0.149]  
 DLnP(2)                   -0.654              0.327             -2.001[0.064]  
 DLnP(3) -0.271                            0.324             -0.836[0.416]  
 DLnP(4) -0.590                           0.283             -2.084[0.055]  
R-squared=0.321  : F-stat. = F(5,15) 1.418[0.274]:  S.E. of Regression = 0.066    
 
Sequential testing of the lags show that the fourth lag (k=4) is significant. At this 
point the ADF statistics is -2.084 and the critical value -2.630 and we therefore fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root and conclude that the logarithm of 
gasoline price in the EU27 is a unit root process. The unit root test for the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita shows that it is not unit root when a time trend is not 
included but there is evidence of unit root when the time trend is included and the 
results of the test are shown in the Table 3.5 below. 
 
 
Ch.3 - Bioethanol models review, design and analysis of EU27 
bioethanol model 
3-28 
 
Table 3.5: OLS unit root estimation for GDP variable 
 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error          T-Ratio[Prob] 
C                          5.827 1.842 3.164[0.007] 
T 0.031 0.010 2.998[0.010] 
 LnP(1)                     -0.629 0.200 -3.148[0.007] 
 DLnP(1)                   0.514 0.250 2.053[0.059] 
 DLnP(2)                   0.112 0.250 0.447[0.662] 
 DLnP(3) 0.031 0.206 0.150[0.883] 
 DLnP(4) 0.530 0.201 2.639[0.019] 
R-squared = 5.827 : F-stat. = F(6,14) 2.487[0.075]:  S.E. of Regression = 0.080    
 
In the results shown above, for k=4 the ADF statistics is -2.639 and the critical value 
-3.240. We therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Sequential 
testing of the logarithm of gasoline demand for unit root reveals that it is a 
stationary process with or without the time trend and a constant. However, since 
the logarithm of GDP per capita and that of gasoline price have shown some 
evidence of unit root, it is important to test for cointegration of the variables in 
order to determine if indeed a long run relationship between them does exist. 
 
Processes that are unit root cannot be estimated by standard OLS techniques for 
the risk of spurious regression. However, different unit root processes can still be 
related to each other over time. Even though the logarithm of gasoline demand in 
the EU did not show a unit root tendency, we still go ahead and perform a 
cointegration test to determine the long run relationship between gasoline 
demand, GDP per capita and gasoline price in the EU27. Variables are cointegrated 
if a linear relationship exists between two or more unit root processes. The test for 
cointegration establishes the validity of such a relationship. 
 
Testing for cointegration centres on testing whether the error term in a standard 
regression model is stationary or unit root. 
 Considering a general regression below: 
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(3.14) 
 
If  is unit root then and  are not cointegrated 
If  is stationary then and  are cointegrated 
Testing for cointegration is done in 2-steps Engle-Granger test by first estimating 
the general equation by OLS to obtain residuals and then apply the ADF test on the 
residual without a constant and a trend to test for unit root i.e. 
 
                                        
(3.15) 
 
With Ho :  implying no cointegration and 
          HI :  implying existence of cointegration between and . 
The ADF statistic i.e.  is compared to critical values from the 
DĐ<ŝŶŶŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ? 
 
Therefore, to test for cointegration we first regress   onto  and a 
Constant in with the variables defined as before. This regression reproduces the 
results shown in Table 3.1. 
 
From the regression above we store the residuals and use them to test for 
cointegration. The results from sequential testing are shown in the Table 3.6 below 
with 3 lags i.e.  k=3.  
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Table 3.6: OLS estimation for cointegration testing 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error          T-Ratio[Prob] 
R(-1) -0.441 0.207 -2.134[0.047] 
DR(-1) 0.134 0.242 -0.553[0.587] 
DR(-2) 0.022 0.223 -0.100[0.921] 
DR(-3) 0.303 0.233 -4.303[0.079] 
R-squared =0.273   : F-stat. = F(3,18) 2.252[0.117]:  S.E. of Regression = 0.050    
 
 
At 10% confidence interval the test statistics is obtained from the McKinnon 
response surface with three variables and a constant and is calculated as follows: 
10% c.v = -3.4518-[6.241/26]-[2.79/676] = -3.696 
 
The ADF statistics is -4.303 and the critical Engle-Granger critical value has been 
calculated as -3.696. This means we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
between the variables and conclude that cointegration does exist. This means that a 
long run relationship between the logarithm of gasoline demand, gasoline price and 
EU27 real GDP per capita exist. Having established a long run relationship between 
the EU27 gasoline demand, real GDP per capita and the price of gasoline and testing 
the validity of the model, we now develop the EU27 demand for bioethanol.  
 
3.4.2 Bioethanol demand  
A binding bioethanol blend mandate means the demand for bioethanol is derived 
from that of gasoline as shown in equation (3.16).  
                                 
(3.16) 
tŚĞƌĞDŝƐƚŚĞďůĞŶĚŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐŚĂƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
From the equation above the derived demand for bioethanol in the EU27 with a 
binding mandate at any time t ( is simply the demand for gasoline at any time t 
 multiplied by the % blend ratio M in energy equivalence as stipulated by the 
mandate. 
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Realistically, the demand for transport fuel should be the same with or without the 
blend mandate such that transport fuel consumers do not really mind what the 
blend mandate is. The supply of gasoline is flat at the market price, while ethanol 
supply is upward sloping. Bioethanol might have such a high marginal cost that its 
supply start at a level above the gasoline price. Thus, without government 
intervention, no bioethanol is produced. In this case, the government essentially 
decides the mix of fuel to gasoline by introducing a subsidy. The subsidy is set at a 
level at which the market clears so that just enough bioethanol (the amount 
stipulated in the mandate) is produced. For transport fuel consumers not to feel the 
effect of the mandate, the price of the blended fuel should be the same as that of 
gasoline. As has been noted by Verboven (2002), the dominant engine 
characteristic for which consumers have heterogeneous preferences appears to be 
the fuel cost per mile.  
 
Therefore, the biothanol subsidy will ensure an upward sloping bioethanol supply 
until enough bioethanol is produced to meet the blend mandate in place. Once the 
price of bioethanol equals that of gasoline, which corresponds to the quantities of 
bioethanol required by the blend mandate, no extra bioethanol is produced.  
 
The conceptualisation of this situation is shown in Figure 3-5 below: 
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Figure 3-5: The bioethanol blend mandate model with government subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allowing government intervention such that the blend mandate does not affect 
overall fuel demand and consumption, we have the derive Figure 3-5 as shown 
above. The aggregate bioethanol supply curve is the upward sloping part of the 
thick bold line shown in the figure.   
Pe= the market price for bioethanol without government subsidy  
Pg= the price of gasoline  
Se= the ethanol supply curve 
Se (subsidy) =supply of ethanol with subsidy 
Sg= the gasoline supply curve 
Dg= the gasoline demand. 
Qe= M*Qg= ethanol market clearing quantities, where M is the blend mandate 
percentage. 
Q 
P 
Qe=M*Qg  Qg 
Pe 
Pg 
Se (subsidy) 
Se  
Sg 
Dg  
Ch.3 - Bioethanol models review, design and analysis of EU27 
bioethanol model 
3-33 
 
Qg = gasoline market clearing quantities  
The amount of subsidy will therefore be the area Qe*(Pe - Pg). This method subsidy 
calculation is called the price gap approach and has been applied in various studies 
that calculate subsidies in the transport fuel market13. Because of this government 
subsidy, we therefore model the effect of the blend mandate on bioethanol crops 
commodities without effect on the transport fuel sector. This will be via the 
depression of bioethanol crops commodities output in the EU region by the amount 
of the equilibrium conditions from the blend mandate as has been mentioned.  
The energy equivalent of bioethanol is about 2/3 of that of gasoline. Thus, a 5.75% 
blend mandate percentage calculated in energy equivalence equates to 
5.75%*3/2=8.6% of bioethanol blended with gasoline in volume equivalence. At 
10% bioethanol blend mandate percentage the energy equivalence becomes 
10%*3/2= 15% in volumetric terms.    
In summary therefore, the bioethanol demand at equilibrium is simply derived from 
that of gasoline by use of equation 3.16 above.  
As noted by Tokgoz (2009) if the fuel demand is perfectly inelastic, then the 
mandate will have no impact on fuel consumption, but each gallon of bioethanol 
will exactly displace one gallon of gasoline consumption.  
Figure 3-6 below shows the effect of an increase in blend mandate on the demand 
for bioethanol. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
For detailed discussion of the price gap approach use in energy markets please see Koplow (2009)  
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Figure 3-6: Blend mandate effect on bioethanol demand 
                                                                                                                                                                         
         
                                
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the above diagram, as in Figure 3-6  
Pe= the market price for bioethanol without government subsidy  
Pg= the price of gasoline  
Se= the ethanol supply curve 
Sg= the gasoline supply curve 
Dg= the gasoline demand. 
Qe= M*Qg = ethanol market clearing quantities, where M is the blend mandate 
percentage. 
Qg = gasoline market clearing quantities  
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PĞ ? = the ŵĂƌŬĞƚƉƌŝĐĞĨŽƌďŝŽĞƚŚĂŶŽůǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƵďƐŝĚǇĂƚD ?AND 
From Figure 3-6 above it can be seen that the effect of the increase in blend 
mandate is to shift the bioethanol supply curve to the right. Since this shift does not 
affect the gasoline market, the only effect it has is to increase bioethanol demand 
by an amount proportional to the increase in the blend mandate.  
3.5 Gasoline and bioethanol equilibrium solution 
Solving for the equilibrium in the gasoline market implies equation supply to 
demand. The supply curve for gasoline is flat at the price as shown in Figure 3-5. 
Because we are interested in finding the effect of the blend mandate on bioethanol 
crops commodities using the GTAP 7 model, we will use the average market 
equilibrium price of gasoline for year 2004, which is the base year for the database 
used in the GTAP 7 model. After solving for the equilibrium gasoline market, solving 
for the bioethanol equilibrium is quite simple. This is by the application of equation 
3.16, where the equilibrium gasoline quantity is multiplied by the blend mandate. 
This means we will have two equilibriums for the bioethanol market i.e. at 5.75% 
and 10% blend mandate.  
Therefore using equation 3.12, i.e.  
 
 We take P as the average price of gasoline in the EU in 2004 = ¼ 976/1000L 
GDP is also valued at its EU average in 2004 = ¼ 16632  
Therefore using these figures, we have that; 
=  
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From the gasoline demand estimated derived before; 
= 7.648 
= -0.393 
= 0.302 
It follows therefore that; 
= 7.873 
Therefore;  
= = 21.07 = 2625 thousand barrels per day 
From this calculated fuel demand, the equivalent bioethanol demand is calculated 
as follows: 
At 5.75%  blend mandate (calculated in energy equivalence) 
=M* = 226 thousand barrels per day or 0.226 million barrels a day 
At 10% blend mandate 
= M* = 394 thousand barrels per day or 0.394 million barrels a day 
The above equilibrium results are summarized in Table 3.7 below: 
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Table 3.7: 2004 equilibrium gasoline and bioethanol demand 
Gasoline Demand 
(thousands of barrels per 
day) 
Bioethanol demand in thousands of barrels per day 
(and in billions of litres per year) 
2625 
5.75% blend mandate 10% blend mandate 
226 (13.1) 394 (22.9) 
These bioethanol quantities will subsequently be transferred into the GTAP model 
to determine their effect on food markets, which we undertake in chapter 6 of our 
study. 
On the bioethanol supply side, equilibrium conditions dictate that supply equals 
demand. However, the supply of bioethanol in the EU region is too low to meet the 
calculated demand meaning that government has to subsidize its production as 
discussed before.  
If the EU is to increase internal bioethanol production by such large amounts, this 
will have significant impact on EU and global food markets and our research aim is 
to determine this impact. This production increase will require a large increase in 
the prices of bioethanol, which could result in large increases in the prices of the 
blended fuel. To avoid such a situation therefore, government introduces a 
bioethanol production subsidy. As has been noted, the subsidy is set at a level at 
which the market clears so that just enough ethanol (the amount stipulated by the 
mandate) is produced. At the equilibrium bioethanol market the following equation 
therefore holds; 
 
M*  
(3.17) 
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Where as before,  
M= blend mandate percentage 
=demand for gasoline valued at its price P 
=bioethanol supply valued at gasoline price P and  
= is a unit subsidy, i.e. a subsidy paid for every litre of bioethanol. 
 
Equation 3.17 above implies that the demand for bioethanol evaluated at the 
market price for gasoline should be equal to the subsidised ethanol supplied in the 
market. The bioethanol equilibrium quantities are as shown in Table 3.7 for the 
2004 reference year. 
Our next task therefore is to derive the EU27 bioethanol supply curve and 
determine the required subsidy to bring this bioethanol supply to the calculated 
demand values shown in Table 3.7. 
3.6 EU bioethanol supply model 
Bioethanol in the EU is produced from a number of crops each of which is expected 
to have different supply elasticity with different impacts on agricultural markets. It 
is necessary to develop the various supply models from the different bioethanol 
crops in the EU27 to come up with one general supply equation that will be used in 
the analysis of the potential effects of the blend mandate in the region.  
 
The supply model is adapted from the profit maximization FAPRI models discussed 
above in section 3.2 of this chapter. These profit maximizing bioethanol supply 
models are driven by the prices of bioethanol and bioethanol by-products versus 
the prices of bioethanol crops commodities. Generally, bioethanol supply is 
positively related to its own price and the price of its by-products. It is negatively 
related to the price of bioethanol crops commodities. Our EU27 bioethanol supply 
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model will therefore be an extension of the FAPRI USA and Brazilian bioethanol 
supply models by considering all the bioethanol crops used in the production of 
bioethanol in the region.  
 
Bioethanol production from grain crops like wheat, barley, corn and rye follows the 
same process of fermentation, with the use of various enzymes and the end 
product is bioethanol and DDGs used as an animal feed. This means that modelling 
the production of bioethanol from grain crops will follow the same concept as in the 
production of bioethanol from corn. Production of bioethanol from sugar beet is 
similar to its production from sugar cane. Bioethanol production will therefore 
depend on the bioethanol crops area harvested and its market price versus that of 
the bioethanol crops commodities.  
 
The bioethanol production efficiency of bioethanol crops vary depending on their 
starch content. For example, as noted by Punter et al (2004) 1 acre of good arable 
land (0.44 ha) can produce 3.5 tonnes of wheat grain at 16% moisture (8 t/ha) 
which, after drying, gives 3.03 tonnes of dried wheat grain (with about 3% 
moisture) and about 1.4 tonnes of straw. Hydrolysis, fermentation, distillation and 
dehydration will produce about 1 tone of bioethanol, giving a yield of about 2.3 
tonnes per hectare. A residue of 1.14 tonnes of DDG is also produced.  
The production process of bioethanol from grain crops can be represented by the 
Figure 3-7 below:  
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Figure 3-7: Bioethanol production process from grain crops (dry milling) 
 
                          Milled grain (Corn, Wheat, Rye or Barley) + Water 
 
                                              
 
   
  
    
   
  
     
  
  
                                            
 
 
 
Source: Olsen (2007)  
As shown from the production process of bioethanol from grain crops the main 
product of the process is the alcohol, in this case bioethanol and DDGs. This shows 
that bioethanol production from grain crops follow similar processes. Differences 
are only in the production efficiencies of the various bioethanol crops since some of 
the crops have higher starch or energy contents. For example, barley has low starch 
content (about 55%) than corn (about 70%) and as such, it produces lesser amounts 
of bioethanol compared to corn (USDA, 2007).  In addition, the prices or market 
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values of the crops are different which means their elasticities of supply, which are 
driven by their market prices, will be different. The main aim is to come up with one 
EU27 bioethanol supply curve that reflects all these forces.  
Therefore, the supply curve for bioethanol in the EU27 is an aggregation of the 
various supply curves depending on the beginning crops or feedstock, with the final 
supply curve being the combination of all the individual supply curves. The corn 
bioethanol supply model is motivated by the profit maximization of the firm as 
follows:  
The net return per kilogram of corn for a bioethanol plant can be expressed as;  
 
                                    
  (3.18) 
In the above equation; 
= the net return per kilogram of corn for bioethanol production at time t 
= the price of bioethanol at time t 
=the price of DDG at time t 
= the price of corn at time t 
= the price of other by-products of corn production at time t 
A?ƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĂĐŚƉƌŝĐĞƚŽƵƌŽƐ ? ? )ƉĞƌ
kilogram of corn 
= the conversion rate that is used to convert eacŚƉƌŝĐĞŽĨ'ƚŽƵƌŽ ? ? )ƉĞƌ
kilogram of corn 
The bioethanol production function from corn is then given by the formula below: 
 
                   
(3.19) 
Where 
= the bioethanol production function in the EU from corn at time t 
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= a constant 
= the elasticity of bioethanol production to its net return from corn, which is 
expected to be positive 
= the net return per kilogram of corn for bioethanol production at time t 
The significance of equation 3.18 is that the production of bioethanol from the 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌ ?s point of view is driven by its prevailing market price compared to the 
market prices of the crop used. The bioethanol supply model for the other grain 
crops follow similar arguments and are again determined by the price of bioethanol 
versus the prices of the bioethanol crops commodities.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the only difference between the bioethanol output from 
grain crops are the production efficiencies of the various crops used. For 
simplification, we assume similar conversion efficiencies for all the bioethanol 
crops. Due to lack of relevant data, we will also assume that the by-products of 
grain crops ethanol production process are zero such that the term in equation 
3.18 disappears. Therefore, the supply function for bioethanol from grain crops can 
be summarized by equation 3.20 and 3.21 below: 
 
                                      
(3.20) 
 
In the above equation; 
= the net return per kilogram of grain crop i for bioethanol production at time 
t 
= the price of bioethanol in the EU at time t 
=the price of DDG at time t 
= the price of grain crop i in the EU at time t (per kilogram) 
A?ƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĂĐŚƉƌŝĐĞƚŽƵƌŽƐ ? ? )ƉĞƌ
kilogram of grain crop 
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A?ƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƌĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĂĐŚƉƌŝĐĞŽĨ'ƚŽƵƌŽ ? ? )ƉĞƌ
Kilogram of grain crop 
= corn, rye, wheat, barley 
The bioethanol production function from grain crops is therefore given by the 
formula below: 
 
                   
(3.21) 
 
Where 
= the bioethanol production function in the EU from grain crops at any given 
time t 
= a constant 
= the elasticity of bioethanol production to its net return from grain crop, which 
is expected to be positive 
= the net return per kilogram of grain crop for bioethanol production at any 
given time t. 
 
The same argument used to motivate the bioethanol supply functions above is 
adapted for from sugar beet with slight alterations because the by-products are 
different from those for bioethanol production from grains. In the case of sugar 
beet, no DDG is produced. 
 
 Again, the net return of a sugar beet bioethanol plant is shown in equation 3.22 
below: 
 
                                      
(3.22) 
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Where; 
= net return per kilogram of sugar beet for bioethanol production at time t 
= price of bioethanol in the EU at time t 
= price of sugar in the EU at time t (per kilogram) 
= price of other products from sugar beet production at time t (per kilogram) 
= the conversion rates that are used to convert each price to Euros per kilogram 
of sugar beet. 
Again, the other by-products from sugar beet are taken to be zero due to lack of 
data and in order to simplify the model. This means that the term in equation 
3.22 disappears. 
Therefore, the bioethanol production function from sugar beet is given by the 
following relationship; 
                       
(3.23) 
 
Where 
= the bioethanol production function in the EU from sugar beet 
= a constant 
= the elasticity of bioethanol production to its net return from sugar beet, 
which is expected to be positive 
 
= the net return per kilogram of sugar beet for bioethanol production 
Finally, to combine all the bioethanol supply curves into one it is important to 
calibrate them so that they produce relevant and comparable elasticities. Their 
calibration involves taking into account the weights or share of each bioethanol 
crop during the bioethanol production process. This standardization or calibration 
also simplifies the calculations of the equilibrium bioethanol quantities and prices 
ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĐƌŽƉ ?Ɛbioethanol conversion efficiency.  The advantage of 
using this modelling approach is that supply is price driven and as such, the share of 
Ch.3 - Bioethanol models review, design and analysis of EU27 
bioethanol model 
3-45 
 
bioethanol production from a given crop can be viewed as determined by the prices 
of the various end products of the bioethanol crops compared to the price of 
bioethanol. For this reason, bioethanol price is viewed as a hinge in the production 
of the other commodities from bioethanol crops. For example, if the price of sugar 
goes up, the share of sugar beet used in bioethanol production will go down as 
producers will choose to produce more sugar. However, for a binding blend 
mandate the bioethanol supply will also be driven by the demand for gasoline that 
in turn affects the prices and therefore the production of bioethanol crops 
products.  
Following the double log transformation as has been done for the bioethanol 
demand model, the final ethanol supply curve then is the combination of all the 
individual supply curves from the different crops weighted by the share that each 
crop contributes to the ethanol production function. This is shown by equation 3.24 
below: 
                 
                                                                                                  (3.24) 
In equation 3.24 above; 
= total bioethanol supply in the EU from the various crops at time t 
= price of bioethanol in the EU at time t  
= the price of DDG in the EU at time t 
= the price of corn in the EU at time t  
= the price of wheat in the EU at time t 
=the price of barley in the EU at time t  
= the price of rye in the EU at time t  
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= the price of sugar beet in the EU at time t  
= share of bioethanol production from wheat  
= share of bioethanol production from rye  
= share of bioethanol production from barley  
= share of bioethanol production from corn  
= share of bioethanol production from sugar beet  
, = coefficients on prices 
 
With the assumption that all the bioethanol in the EU27 is produced from the above 
crops considered then;  
= 1 
 
The model in equation 3.24 assumes a double log linear relationship between the 
bioethanol production function and prices. For the bioethanol crops commodities 
the coefficients are interpreted directly as cross price elasticities of bioethanol 
production (as opposed to their own price elasticities).        
               
After the motivation of the bioethol supply in the EU, we now run the regression 
analysis of the supply model developed. Bioethanol grain crop prices are obtained 
from Eurostat and are avarages of the reported prices of the EU27 member states 
ranging from 1992 to 2009 ĂŶĚĂƌĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶ ? ?100kg. The sugar beet prices are 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŬŐ ?dŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƐĨŽƌǁŚĞĂƚĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƐŽĨƚǁŚĞĂƚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚĐŽĚĞ
1120, for rye they are product code 1150, barley is product code 1160, maize is 
product code 1200 and sugar beet prices are for the standard quality product code 
1372. 
The bioethanol supply data is from EIA and is from 1992 to 2009. There was no 
bioethanol production in the region according to this data source prior to 1992 
meaning our regression is for annual data from 1992 to 2009 with 18 observations. 
The data series is too short for time series analysis but as noted before, one of the 
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main challenges of studying biofuels is lack of data. However, this data series will 
provide useful insights to the aims of this research despite the fact that it is of 
relatively short duration. Since the production of bioethanol in the EU still does not 
have a significant market structure the data for the prices of DDGs are the prices of 
this commodity in the USA obtained from USA Economic Research Outlook (2008). 
These prices are converted to Euros per 1000Kg to make them comparable to the 
prices quoted for bioethanol crops in the EU. 
As shown by the bioethanol supply model from grain, bioethanol production 
decisions are determined mostly by the prices of the beginning stock. The prices of 
bioethanol crop have been increasing in the EU in the last decade. The crop prices 
are related to that of bioethanol in that an increase in the price of bioethanol will 
increase the prices of bioethanol crops commodities, which in turn will shift 
production decisions away from bioethanol production. Thus, these forces act as 
some form of feedback loops with the prices having all the information to 
determine production decisions. The average price trends of the various bioethanol 
crops commodities in the EU during the past decade are shown in the Figure 3-8 
below: 
Figure 3-8: Average selling price of grain in the EU from 1997- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?<Ő ? 
 
Data source: Eurostat (2006) 
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As the Figure 3-8 shows, the prices of the bioethanol crops commodities are 
correlated signifying that they are determined by the same market forces. The 
graph shows that the prices of grain in the EU have generally been stable from the 
ŵŝĚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛand then started to rise in the year 2007. For sugar beet, the price trend 
is as shown in Figure 3-9 below: 
Figure 3-9: Average price of sugar beet in the EU from 1997- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?<Ő ?
 
Source: Eurostat (2006) 
Figure 3-9 above shows that the price of sugar beet in the EU has generally been 
stable and has started to fall around the year 2007. It is interesting to note that the 
prices of grain have increased at around the same time when the prices of sugar 
beet started to fall. 
Next, we analyse the EU bioethanol supply and demand for the EU27 region. Recent 
supply of bioethanol and that demanded by the EU motor industry in the past years 
is shown in Figure 3-10 below: 
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Figure 3-10: Annual demand and supply of bioethanol in the EU under different 
blend mandates in thousands of barrels per day  
 
Figure 3-10 above shows that EU bioethanol supply has to increase in order to meet 
demand due to the blend mandate. Therefore, in order to increase bioethanol 
supply it is necessary to increase its price. The demand for bioethanol is determined 
by the demand for motor gasoline according to our model. Gasoline demand is 
driven by the demand for oil. As shown in Figure 3-10, gasoline demand went down 
around the year 2007 as expected since this was the year of record oil prices and 
the start of the global economic recession.  
In order to determine the price elasticities for the bioethanol supply in the EU 
region, certain assumptions are made which are the following: 
 The price of bioethanol is simply equal to the price of gasoline as in the 
demand motivation.  
 The bioethanol crops commodities shares in the bioethanol production 
process is assumed constant for the duration of the period of the regression 
analysis. However, intuition has it that the share that each bioethanol crop 
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commodity contributes to the bioethanol production process should vary 
with price in that if the price of that bioethanol crop commodity rises 
relative to the others, its share in bioethanol production should fall. 
However, the prices of grains have been shown to be positively correlated as 
shown in Figure 3-9 above. This means that it is reasonable to assume 
constant share contribution for the duration of the period under study 
irrespective of the price movements. Jank et al (2009), using information 
from eBio and the EC calculated bioethanol crops shares up to 2012 as being 
the following:  32.3%,  12.8%, 12.8%, 28.2%,  5.6% 
and 8.3% for other sources. 
 Since it is difficult to model bioethanol production from other sources  we 
assume that all the bioethanol produced in the EU is from the bioethanol 
crops commodities under analysis i.e. wheat, rye, corn, barley and sugar 
beet. Under this assumption and using the information from Jank et al we 
then derive the following shares:  35.22%,  13.96%, 
13.96%, 30.75% and  6.11% bringing the total to 100%. 
 A report from eBio shows that sugar beet share in EU bioethanol production 
was 28% in 2006 as opposed to the 5.6% (and the 6.11% that can be implied 
from the data) as reported by Jank et al (2007). However, for our analysis we 
will use the 28% (which calculates to 31.1% if we assume no other sources 
of bioethanol except bioethanol crops) sugar beet share reported by eBio 
and adjust the other ethanol crops shares according to the shares reported 
by Jank et al (2007). The use of a higher sugar beet share is in line with the 
scope of our study to analyse the potential effect of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy on ACP sugar production and trade.  
 A higher sugar beet share of 100% is also used to analyse the effect of the 
blend mandate on global sugar markets as a sensitivity analysis. Using a 
higher sugar beet share for the production of bioethanol is in line with 
attempts to analyse the effect on the blend mandate on sugar markets. 
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Using sugar beet to produce bioethanol in the EU region is reasonable in 
that it is expected to have less adverse effects on food markets given the 
fact that sugar is not a vital food source. It will also have a potential of 
developing ACP sugar industries and their export potential. This is in line 
with the scope of the study that places emphasis on sugar markets because 
of the importance of this commodity to ACP countries.  In this way, a higher 
sugar beet share means the blend mandate will potentially have a win-win 
outcome.   
The period under study is too short for a time series analysis and since the demand 
for bioethanol outweighs its supply, it is reasonable to assume no time lag in EU 
bioethanol supply. Significant production of biofuel in the EU only started in earnest 
around the late 1990s and there is no accurate bioethanol production and 
consumption data prior to those years to extend the regression analysis data. 
From equation 3.24 it can be seen that the cross price biethanol supply elasticities 
for the bioethanol crops commodities include their shares in bioethanol production 
(Si). In this way, the elasticities reported will have to be divided by the bioethanol 
crop shares to come up with the final cross price elasticities. Changes in bioethanol 
crops commodities shares will result in changes in the reported elasticities. This 
means that, modelled this way, the supply elasticities capture the dynamic effects 
of changes in the bioethanol crops shares. These dynamics are also as a result of 
cross price elasticities between the various bioethanol crops commodities 
themselves.  
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3.6.1 Bioethanol supply model results  
The results of the bioethanol supply regression of equation 3.24 are shown in Table 
3.8 below: 
Table 3.8: EU27 bioethanol supply elasticities 
Own Price 
elasticity 
Wheat Rye  Barley Sugar 
beet 
Maize DDG 
3.22 
(0.073) 
-9.423 
(0.082) 
-1.712 
(0.542) 
-6.215 
(0.323) 
-1.452 
(0.046) 
-3.786 
(0.035) 
0.781 
(0.033) 
R-Squared = 0.887; N=18; *Values in brackets represent p-values 
Since our interest is on bioethanol own price supply elasticity and finding of 
equilibrium conditions in the bioethanol market, the various cross price elasticities 
of bioethanol supply for the various bioethanol crops commodities will not be 
pursued further.  
However, these elasticities have the correct signs but their values are not very 
useful given the fact that the bioethanol market in the EU is still in its infancy and 
does not have a significant influence on the bioethanol crop commodities markets. 
The bioethanol cross price elasticities of supply for bioethanol crops commodities 
are expected to be negative in that high prices of a given bioethanol crop 
commodity means less of it is used in bioethanol production. Bioethanol should be 
positively related to the price of DDG since these are co-products as is the case in 
our results. 
Fabiosa et al (2010) reported bioethanol supply elasticities of -0.2 and -0.12 for 
sugar beet and wheat respectively for the EU region. However, their study used an 
international FAPRI model with elasticities estimated as sample averages from year 
2000 to 2004. Such studies suffer the shortfall that the data set is too short. For this 
reason, such data set do not produce a reliable indicator of the true effects of the 
bioethanol market on bioethanol crops commodities and land use in the region. 
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This shortfall is also complicated by the fact that the bioethanol industry in the EU is 
still at its infancy and is therefore not expected to have a significant impact on 
bioethanol crops commodities markets in its present state. This is the reason why 
our study has used an assumption of a binding EC blend mandate and in this way, 
our bioethanol market has been artificially created.  
Our study show that the own price elasticity of supply for bioethanol in the EU 
region is 3.22. Luchansky and Monks (2009) estimated the own price elasticity of 
bioethanol supply in the USA market to be 0.24. Zhang et.al. (2010) estimated it to 
be 6.24 for a USA gasoline mixture composed of 10% to 20% bioethanol 
component. These estimated values are divergent and highlight the difficulty of 
coming up with consistent estimates in this new market distorted by subsidies, 
varying blend mandate levels and tax credits. As noted by Gardner (2007), supply 
and demand parameters for ethanol are impossible to estimate with precision 
because only a few years of market data exist under structural conditions favouring 
fuel ethanol use (i.e., technology, institutions, and regulations). Gardner (2007) 
further noted that the bioethanol supply elasticity is expected to be larger (ranging 
from 1 to 5) in the longer term as  constraints imposed by fixed ethanol production 
capacity and capacity in the ethanol plant building industry are relaxed. 
 
3.7 Subsidy derivation from equilibrium conditions  
Using the bioethanol blend mandate market clearing conditions as calculated in the 
bioethanol and gasoline model for 2004, our task is to calculate the level of subsidy 
required to produce the equilibrium amount of bioethanol as follows; 
Starting from equation 3.17, i.e. 
M*  
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Our aim is to solve for the market price of bioethanol, Pe in Figure 3-5 and the 
subsidy value following the price gap approach will be equal to:  
(Pe- Pg )M*Qg 
(3.25) 
where, as before, 
M=blend mandate 
Qg=gasoline demand at equilibrium 
Pg= price of gasoline 
Pe= price of bioethanol 
For bioethanol supply, we derived equation 3.24 before as shown below;  
                
                                                  
From the above equation, we define: 
  
  
(3.26) 
With B again evaluated at the year 2004 variables mean. Therefore, we have:  
 
(3.27) 
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The equilibrium conditions imply that; 
 
(3.28) 
From the equilibrium bioethanol quantities reported in Table 3.7 we now solve for 
Pe as follows; 
At 5.75% blend mandate we have: 
 
Therefore = ¼3740 /1000L 
At 10% blend mandate we have: 
 
Therefore = ¼4220/1000L 
Therefore, using the price gap approach, the amount of the subsidy is determined 
as follows: 
At 5.75% blend mandate: 
Qe*(Pe - Pg) =226 x (3740-976) x 365 x 158.9 A? ?36.3 billion per year 
At 10%, blend mandate: 
Qe*(Pe - Pg) = 394 x (4220-976) x 365 x 158.99 A? ? ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶƉĞƌǇĞĂƌ 
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It can be seen that the higher the blend mandate, the higher the subsidy required 
to produce the demanded amount of bioethanol as per intuition. 
Our calculated subsidies are huge but are not an abnormality in the energy and 
agricultural markets. For example, using the price-gap methodology, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010) estimated that fossil-fuel-related 
consumption subsidies amounted to US$ 557 billion in 2008 in OECD member 
countries. For agricultural markets, subsidies in OECD countries have been 
estimated to be almost US$ 400 billion in 2008 (OECD, 2009). 
3.7.1 Discussion of equilibrium results 
From the results it is seen that if the EU goes ahead or had gone ahead with the 
blending mandate plans as outlined in the EC directive i.e. a 5.75% blend target by 
2010, the region would have had to produce about 0.226 million barrels of 
bioethanol per day to satisfy the requirements of the mandate using 2004 gasoline 
market equilibrium conditions. At the proposed blend target of 10% by 2020, about 
0.394 milllion barrels of bioethanol per day will be demanded by this EC set target 
at equilibrium from 2004 gasoline equilibrium market conditions.  
0.226 million barrels per day equates to an annual EU bioethanol demand of about 
82 million barrels or 13.1 billion litres.14According to the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA, 2008) the EU27 produced 2.1 billion litres of bioethanol in 
2008 with a forecasted increase to 3.4 billion litres by the end of 2010. This means 
that at 5.75% blend target, the production of bioethanol in the EU has to increase 
by about 523% from 2008 production levels to satisfy the equilibrium requirements 
of the mandate and for production to be increased by about 285% from 2010 
forecast. 
                                                          
14
 This calculation is based on the conversion of 1 barrel (oil, petroleum)=158.99L 
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A total of 0.394 million barrels of bioethanol per day, which will be the equilibrium 
quantity at 10% blend mandate target equates to an annual EU27 bioethanol 
demand of 22.9 billion litres. This means that at 10% blend mandate, the 
production of bioethanol in the EU has to increase by about 990% from 2008 
production levels to satisfy the requirements of this mandate. These increases are 
very large and they have a potential serious impact when one considers the 
pressure they will put on bioethanol crops commodities and their implications on 
food prices.  
However, according to the USDA (2008) the production potential for bioethanol in 
the EU27 was calculated to be at 9 billion litres by 2010. This may seem as if the 
EU27 can be able to produce more than half of their bioethanol requirements at 
5.75% blend mandate. However, it is not possible to fully exploit this production 
potential due to other external effects. For example, the USDA (2008) noted that in 
2007 only about 45 % of the available EU capacity to produce bioethanol was 
utilized due to high grain prices, in particular wheat. This is expected since 
increased bioethanol production exert pressure on demand and prices for 
bioethanol crops commodities, land and labour thus making the full utilization of 
the potential not feasible.  
 
After calculating the equilibrium bioethanol quantities (at 5.75 and 10% blend 
mandate), the next step is to determine their effect on EU/global bioethanol crops 
commodities markets and on global welfare,which is undertaken in Chapter 6.  
 
3.8 Conclusion and extension 
In this Chapter, we reviewed the relevant bioethanol models mainly for the USA 
and Brazil, the two countries with well developed bioethanol markets. These 
models were reviewed with the aim of designing the EU27 bioethanol model under 
certain assumptions. The EU bioethanol demand was derived from the demand for 
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gasoline while the bioethanol supply was driven by the price of bioethanol versus 
the prices of bioethanol crops. Bioethanol demand was motivated under an 
assumption of a government subsidy. This government subsidy results in production 
of just enough bioethanol to meet the blend mandate demand in place. Since the 
production of bioethanol in the EU region is still at infant stages, there must be 
substantial government intervention in the form of such subsidies to increase 
production to meet the demand as will be created by the blend mandates. These 
subsidies ensure that the price of bioethanol and ultimately that of the fuel mixture 
remain the same as that for unblended gasoline.  
The extension of this derived EU bioethanol partial equilibrium model is to analyse 
its implication on EU/ACP food markets in terms of welfare changes and changes in 
bioethanol crops commodities production and trade. For this reason, policies that 
support bioethanol crop production in the EU and those that support trade 
between the EU27 and ACP countries will be reviewed and this is the subject of the 
next chapter. Again, policies that promote sugar production and trade within the EU 
region will be given special emphasis.  
Given the fact that the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is not a policy acting in 
isolation, it is interesting to know how it will interact with future trade policies 
between the EU and ACP countries, the most important of these policies being the 
EPA policies.  The next section therefore will also review these future policies 
between the EU27 and ACP countries. Our ultimate aim is to analyse their potential 
interaction with the EC biofuel policy again in terms of welfare, production and 
trade changes in bioethanol crops commodities. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The EU/global sugar market: production and trade policies 
4.0 Introduction 
As Chapter 2 highlighted, bioethanol can be produced from a number of crops one 
of which is sugar. If sugar is to play an increasingly important role in helping the EU 
meet its self-imposed blend mandate then it is important to understand how that 
could affect the EU sugar regime and its relationship with African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries. For this reason, it is important to understand how the policy 
regime for EU sugar is designed and implemented. Altering the pattern of 
production could require regime reform and that in turn will affect both EU and ACP 
countries, not simply in terms of output but also trade volumes and prices. 
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to review global, EU and ACP sugar markets. In 
particular, emphasis will be put on policies that support EU sugar production and 
trade with ACP countries. Future, policies that will form trade framework between 
ACP countries and EU27 will also be reviewed. These future policies are mainly the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and ACP countries. The 
review of these future policies is in line with the objectives of our research that aim 
to analyse their potential interaction with the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. 
In this way, analysis of the policies linked to the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
will be useful in coming up with detailed and more informative conclusions on the 
ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ potential effects.   
The ACP/EU sugar trade and trade policy agreements between the two regions is 
important for the following reasons; 
 Sugar trade remains one of the most important sources of revenue for many 
ACP countries with the EU market being an important destination for ACP 
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sugar. For this reason, trends and developments that affect the EU sugar 
markets, as the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is expected to do, are 
important for ACP countries. 
 In general, ACP ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?sugar cannot compete with sugar from lower cost 
producers like Brazil. This makes bilateral trade policies that ensure and 
support trade between the EU and ACP important for the latter. 
 The EU is a global player in sugar production and trade. As such, 
developments in the EU sugar market also affect the world sugar market. 
Such repercussions are in turn transmitted to ACP countries who export 
some of their sugar to the world market.   
 The EU is a high cost producer of sugar. This means that the regions ? sugar 
production and trade is supported by policies that promote its sugar sector, 
which in turn benefit ACP countries.  
Our study scope therefore makes it important to understand the EU policies that 
form the framework for sugar production in the region and those that support 
sugar trade between the EU and ACP countries.  
The chapter is therefore structured as follows; in Section 4.1 we provide an 
overview of the global sugar markets including that of the EU. Section 4.2 outlines 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its support for agricultural productivity in 
the EU region while section 4.3 reviews the Common Market Organisation that 
specifically supports sugar production in the region. In section 4.4 we review the 
general trade agreements between the EU and ACP countries while section 4.5 
reviews the EU and ACP policies that support specifically sugar trade between the 
two regions. Section 4.6 gives an overview of ACP sugar industries, section 4.7 
discusses recent reforms and policies affecting the EU/ACP sugar regimes and 
section 4.8 is the conclusion.  
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4.1 The global sugar market  
As the EU is an important global sugar producer and trader, we begin our analysis 
by reviewing the global sugar markets and the positions of EU and ACP sugar 
sectors in world sugar production and trade. As noted by Bureau (2008), sugar is 
one of the most highly protected agricultural commodities worldwide and this 
depresses trade opportunities and prices received by exporters without preferential 
market access. Further ? ƵƌĞƵ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŽĚĂǇ ?s sugar markets are being 
driven by a complex array of dynamic and emerging supply, demand, and policy 
forces that need to be understood. The importance of policy intervention in the 
sugar market is seen in the case of the EU sugar industry. According to Huan-Niemi 
and Kerkelä (2005), the EU is a net exporter of sugar due to policies that support 
production and give preferential market access to developing countries. This makes 
the EU an important global sugar exporter and importer not because of having a 
competitive advantage in sugar production but because of distorting domestic 
policies. Such EU policies include high import duties that have the effect of 
artificially increasing the prices of sugar above world market prices and thus 
increasing output. The excess sugar produced is exported to the world market by 
use of export subsidies.  
The degree of intervention in the sugar market makes it an ideal commodity to 
study if one is interested in finding out how policy reform will shape future global 
trade. The inter-linkage and trade implications between the biofuel policies and 
sugar policies therefore provide an interesting case study. Due to the potential 
relationship between sugar and biofuels, specifically bioethanol, sugar policies can 
therefore affect the climate change and renewable energy initiatives. Table 4.1 
below shows the sugar production statistics of leading global sugar producers as 
compared to African and Carribean sugar production levels in 2004 and 2011. 
Production statistics close to year 2004 are useful for our research since the GTAP 
database that we will use in our policy analysis is based on ƚŚĂƚǇĞĂƌ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůƚƌĂĚĞ
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data. This means that production and trade changes because of our policy 
simulation are with reference to year 2004 statistics.  
Table 4.1: World sugar production statistics in year 2004 (2011) 
 
Country Production- million metric tonnes raw value World Share % 
Brazil 28. 4 (39.6) 20 (24) 
European Union 19.9 (15) 15 (9) 
India 15.8 (28.3) 10 (17) 
China 10.5 (12) 7 (7) 
United States 7.8 (7.4) 5 (4) 
Mexico 5.4 (5.6) 4 (3) 
1SADC  5.2 (5.9) 4(3) 
Rest of Africa 2.9 (2.4) 6 (5) 
Total Caribbeans 3.2 (1.8) 2 (1) 
2ROW 42.2 (65.5) 30  (39) 
World Production 141.7 (168.0) 100 
Source:USDA (2012) 
1SADC refers to Southern African Development Community 
2ROW refers to Rest of the World 
Sugar export is an important revenue earner for many ACP countries as noted 
previously. In this way, it is important to compared ACP sugar export to that of 
leading global sugar exporters and this is shown in Table 4.2 for the years 2004 and 
2011.   
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Table 4.2: World sugar exports in year 2004 (2011) 
Country Exports -million metric tones raw value World Share % 
Brazil 18.02 (27.3) 38 (49) 
European Union 6. 03 (1.01) 13 (2) 
United States 0.2 (0.18) 0.5 (0.3) 
Australia 4. 44 (2.85) 9 (5) 
Thailand 3. 12 (7.30) 7 (13) 
Guatemala 1. 50 (1.81) 3 (2) 
SADC 2.3 (2.5) 5 (4) 
Rest of Africa 1.0 (0.6) 2 (1) 
Total Caribbean 2.1(0.9)   4 (2) 
ROW 9.08 ( 11.25) 19 (20)  
Total World Export 47 .75 (55.7) 100 
Source: USDA (2012) 
 
 
The tables 4.1 and 4.2 above shows that the EU is indeed a major sugar producer 
and exporter, ranking second to Brazil in sugar production with a world market 
share of 15% in 2004. The tables also show that global sugar production and export 
has increased from 2004 to 2011 with notable increases seen in Brazil, who remain 
a global leader. Of note however is the decrease in EU sugar production and export 
in recent years. For example, EU sugar production in 2011 was 30% less than its 
2004 level with exports decreasing by a whopping 83% for the same years. This is 
likely due to the EU policy of cut in sugar intervention price, which started in 2006. 
This has the effect of decrease EU sugar output and exports. The policy of cut in EU 
intervention price will be discussed in details in section 4.7 of this chapter.  
 
Individual ACP countries play a minor role in global sugar production and export. 
For example, averages over the years 2002/03 through to 2006/07 show that Africa 
and the Caribbean regions combined accounted for 11.3% and 7.5% of global sugar 
production and exports respectively (Sandrey and Vink, 2007). Table 4.1 supports 
this finding and shows that the African and Caribbean regions contributed 11.3% 
and 10.1% of global sugar production in 2004 and 2011 respectively. The same 
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regions accounted for 5.4% and 4% of global sugar exports in 2004 and 2011 
respectively. Caribbean sugar production and export has been declining due mainly 
to erosion of preferences in the USA and EU markets and increasing production 
costs (Michell, 2005). 
 
Although the global sugar share of individual ACP countries is not very significant, 
sugar remains an important income generator for most of the ACP economies, 
meaning that policy developments in the EU/global sugar markets has important 
economic implications for these states. As the production of bioethanol is expected 
to increase demand for sugar cane or beet, a global look at the sugar consumption 
is necessary to predict the effect that bioethanol production might have on global 
sugar markets. Table 4.3 below shows the major world sugar consumers in the 
years 2004 and 2011.  
 
Table 4.3: Major global sugar consumers in year 2004 (2011) 
 Region Consumption (million tonnes raw sugar) 
World 143.3 (162) 
Brazil 10.5 (12.5) 
USA 9.6 (10.3) 
EU27 15 (17.5) 
India 18.8 (26.5) 
China 11.6 (13.6) 
Africa 8.0 (13.0) 
Middle East 10.8 (12.6) 
Source: FAO and USDA (2012) 
 
Table 4.3 shows that the EU27, China and India are amongst the leading consumers 
of sugar in the world. Figure 4-1 below summarises global sugar production and 
consumption from years 2004 to 2011.  
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Figure 4-1: Global sugar production and consumption from 2004 to 2011 (in 
millions of tonnes raw sugar) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 shows that global production of sugar is almost at par with consumption 
meaning that if bioethanol is to be produced from sugar cane or beet, global output 
has to be increased if demand is to be met at existing levels.  
Sugar production levels and trade affect its global prices. A look at world market 
sugar prices show that they have been volatile in recent years, a general 
characteristic of agricultural products. Figure 4-2 shows the evolution of sugar 
prices from 2002 to 2010 in the EU, USA and world market.  
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Figure 4-2: EU, USA and World market sugar prices from year 2002 to 2010 (US 
cents per pound) 
 
 
Figure 4-2 shows that the EU preferential prices for sugar have generally been 
above the USA and world market sugar prices. However, in 2010 the EU sugar prices 
dipped below those of the world and USA markets. USA sugar prices have genarally 
been flat at around 20 US cents per pound while those of the EU fell by almost 28% 
between 2008 and 2010. World market sugar prices have been on a steady increase 
from 2007, a factor that could be due to decreased EU output. Having reviewed the 
global sugar status we now analyse the sugar production, consumption and trade 
status specifically for the EU region.  
 
4.1.1 The EU sugar market and trade status 
 
Sugar in the EU region is produced from sugar beet unlike in the ACP member states 
where it is produced from sugar cane. Much as the EU is a high producer of sugar it 
is also a high consumer with production and consumption being almost at par. 
Figure 4-3 gives an overview of EU sugar production and consumption in recent 
years. 
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Figure 4-3: EU sugar production and consumption (million tonnes) from 2003 to 
2011 
 
Source: USDA (2012) 
Figure 4-3 shows that EU sugar consumption has been lower than production until 
2006 where consumption started to be above production. Sugar production in the 
h ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƋƵŽƚĂƐ ŶĂŵĞůǇ  ‘ ? ?  ‘ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ ? ƋƵŽƚĂƐ ?Details on the EU 
sugar quotas will be discussed in section 4.4.1 of this chapter.  
In terms of sugar trade, the EU is both an importer and exporter and these trade 
statistics are shown in Figure 4-4 below.   
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Figure 4-4: EU sugar import and export from 2003 to 2011 (million tonnes) 
 
Source: USDA (2011) 
Figure 4-4 shows that the EU has been a net exporter of sugar until after 2006 
where imports started to surpass exports. This shows the effect of the 2006 sugar 
reform of price cut which resulted in decrease sugar production in the EU with 
consumption remaining elavated. 
The EU sugar trade policies and international relations result in the region importing 
and re-exporting sugar to world markets. Most of the EU sugar imports come from 
ACP countries under the trade arrangements outlined in the sugar protocol and this 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.5 below. However, this EU sugar import 
and subsidised re-export has been challenged by other world sugar trading nations 
and has subsequently been ruled illegal by WTO.  
 
Having reviewed the global sugar production and trade statistics, we now discuss 
policies that support sugar production in the EU region. As an agricultural 
commodity, sugar production is supported by the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).  
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4.2 The CAP and its reforms 
EU agriculture has been governed by the CAP since after the Second World War. 
The CAP came into existence in 1957, drafted by the European Commission from 
the Treaty of Rome that established the common market.15 The objectives of the 
CAP as outlined in Article 39, Agriculture and Fisheries section of the Treaty of the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐKĨĨŝĐŝĂů:ournal (2008) are the following; 
 (a) To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilization of the factors of production, in particular labour; 
(b) To ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
(c) To stabilize markets; 
(d) To assure the availability of supplies; 
(e) To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
Article 40 of the treaty then establishes the common organization of agriculture 
that takes the following forms depending on the product concerned: 
 (a) Common rules on competition; 
(b) Compulsory coordination of the various national market organizations; 
(c) A European market organization 
 
Further, Article 40 sets out that the common organization will include measures to 
attain the following objectives: regulation of prices (with any common price policy 
based on common criteria and uniform methods of calculation), aids for the 
production and marketing of the various products, storage and carryover 
                                                          
15For a more detailed discussion of the establishment of CAP and its development please see inter 
alia Ackrill (2000) 
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arrangements and common machinery for stabilizing imports or exports and non-
discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community.  
 
The CAP however covers mostly external products that have the potential to 
compete with local products within the EU. Thus, the overriding objective of the 
CAP is to protect the EU market from external competition. In order to achieve its 
mandates the CAP intervenes in markets using various means. These include 
application of import levies to bring world market prices to be at par with the prices 
that prevail in the EU, import quotas that limit the amount of goods that can be 
imported into the EU. However, specific exemptions enable some member states 
from developing countries to export certain products duty free into the EU market.  
 
The EU also sets an internal intervention price for certain commodities and ensures 
that domestically, if their price falls below intervention prices, the EU will buy such 
commodities in order to raise their price to the intervention price level. The 
intervention price is set lower than the target price such that the prices of 
commodities in the EU vary between these two price levels. Market intervention 
also includes direct subsidies paid out to farmers, originally aimed at encouraging 
farmers to grow certain crops. There is also an arrangement for production quota 
and set-aside land payments to reduce overproduction of commodities such as 
milk, wine and grain. Currently, set aside land has been suspended following rising 
prices of some commodities and more interest in biofuel (Waterfield 2007). 
 
The CAP is funded from EC buget and accounts for 40% of total EC expenduture 
(Overseas Development Institute  WODI, 2011). Figure 4-5 below shows the evolution 
of CAP expenditure and the share of this expenditure to total EU GDP.  
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EU15 
EU25 
EU10 
EU12 
Figure 4-5:  CAP expenditure time path* 
 
 
*Primary axis: CAP expenditure in billion Euros; Secondary axis: Expenditure as % of 
EU GDP 
Source: DG agri (2011) 
Figure 4-5 shows that with continued CAP reform and the expansion of the EU, the 
CAP budget share as a percentage of  EU GDP has been steadily declining from the 
1980s to 2008. 
 
The CAP has undergone a number of changes and reforms driven by the WTO 
trading rules and as a means to limit production and spending on farm subsidies16. 
One significant reform is the McSharry (named after Ray McSharry, agricultural 
commissioner at the time) reform of 1992 that was aimed at reducing increasing 
agricultural production. This reform reduced the levels of support by 29% for 
                                                          
16
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cereals and 15% for beef and introduced set aside land payments for land taken out 
of production and promoted forestation.  
 
Another major reform to the CAP was the Agenda 2000 ( ?ŐĞŶĚĂ  ? ? ? ? P &Žƌ Ă
stronger ĂŶĚ ǁŝĚĞƌ hŶŝŽŶ ?). The Agenda 2000 was initiated in Madrid European 
Council at the end of 1995 following concerns of the EU financial systems in the 
light of the EU enlargement.17  This EU enlargement was with the proposed addition 
of 12 new member states from the existing EU15 members.18 The concerns that 
brought about the reform was that agriculture played a more important economic 
role in the new EU member states yet these states were relatively poorer that the 
EU15 members. This posed a problem of financing agricultural support for these 
new member states and the general administration of these finances. There was 
therefore a need to reform the CAP while maintaining production support and rural 
development under budgetary control. The changes in the CAP were thus aimed at 
achieving the following objectives (Pezaros, 1999): 
 To improve EU agriculture competitiveness while lowering prices and 
improving the quality of agricultural products;  
 To reduce agricultural output surpluses while protecting farm income; 
 To give more emphasis to food safety and environmental protection; 
 To make rural development part of the CAP and bring it under the 
agricultural budget; 
 To improve the WTO negotiation power of the EU region;  
 To accommodate the new comers within the existing EU budget;   
 
                                                          
17 The Agenda 2000 was finally adopted in the Berlin Agreement of March 1999.  
18 The enlargement of the EU was with the proposed addition of 12 new member states into the 
EU15 and these 12 new members were namely Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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The proposed reforms of the Agenda 2000 did not therefore have a direct impact 
on EU sugar production and trade with ACP countries. However, it had a potential 
to affect cereal crops output in the EU region and thus the regions ability to 
produce bioethanol from bioethanol grain crops commodities. 
 
In 2003, the CAP again underwent a major reform when the EU adopted a method 
of decoupling subsidies for certain crops. Such decoupled payments were subject to 
conditions, called cross compliance conditions related to environmental protection, 
food safety and animal welfare standards. Other reforms included the capping of 
the EU national budget for subsidies to control expenditure. The reform entered 
into force in 2004-2005 and member states were allowed to apply for a transitional 
period delaying the reform in their countries to 2007 and phasing in reforms up to 
2012 (adapted from the EU website, 2012). 
Continued CAP budgetary concerns also gave rise to the CAP health check of 2008. 
The CAP health check included changes in direct payments; phasing out of dairy 
quotas; and mechanisms that caused budget transfers from direct payments 
towards funding of rural development; and guidelines to deal with new challenges 
such as risk management, climate change and sustainable water management 
(Bureau and Mahé, 2005) 
Despite its budgetary costs and subsequent reforms, the CAP has been an effective 
policy in supporting and promoting food production in the EU region. As has been 
noted by Andrews & Nelson (2001), in the late 1960s, the European Community was 
the largest grain-importing region in the world but by late 1970s the community 
had become a significant net exporter of cereals. Figure 4-6 below shows the EU 
cereal net trade on a four-year average from 1974 to 2011. 
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Figure 4-6: EU cereal net trade  
 
 Source: adapted from Andrews & Nelson (2001) and USDA database (2012) 
 
Figure 4-6 shows that the EU has turned from being a net importer of course grains 
in the 1970s to being a net exporter by the 1980s. The figure also shows that net 
wheat export has increased from less that 10 million tonnes in the 1970s to almost 
20 million tonnes in 1990s and has stayed elavated up to 2010. However, a binding 
EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is expected to increase demand for bioethanol 
crops meaning that the CAP need to be reformed further to take into account the 
need to produce biofuel crops in the region. In the next section we discuss in details 
the EU policies that has made the region a global leader in sugar production and 
trade. 
 
4.3 The Common Market Organization19 
 
The sugar market in the EU is under the auspices of the Common Market 
Organization (CMO). The CMO was set up in 1968 as an integral part of the CAP and 
its main purpose was to guarantee sugar producers a fair income, to provide self-
                                                          
19
The initial discussion of the EU sugar regime covers the period up to June 2006 with most of the 
discussion sourced from the EC treaty on the Common Market Organization of 2004 report 
AGRI/63362/2004 where details on CMO can also be found.  Reform to the policy that took place in 
the light of the WTO disputes after this date will be considered later. 
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sufficiency in sugar and to ensure that supplies reach consumers throughout the 
Community (OECD, 2007).  
The goals of the CMO have pursued through the establishment of an intervention 
price which sugar producers in the EU receive but which also include internal 
production quotas and import controls. The EU intervention price is generally 
higher than the world market price and creates a floor price for EU sugar. The 
higher price of sugar in the community above the world price means that it is 
consumers that subsidize sugar producers since they pay prices above production 
costs. As with other agricultural trade policies, the CMO do not act in isolation but is 
linked to other policies. Figure 4-7 is a summary of the relationship between the 
CMO policy and other policies that support agriculture and trade in the EU region. 
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Figure 4-7: The CMO and related policies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Huan-Niemi and Kerkelä (2005) 
Figure 4-7 shows that the EU sugar policy as set out by the CMO is subject to other 
global policy interactions, with the main influence coming from the WTO 
concessions. As such, the EU sugar policies are expected to be aligned to WTO trade 
agreements. For example, the EPAs between the EU and ACP countries are 
attempts by the EU to comply with WTO trade protocols. Sugar production in the 
EU region, as promoted by the CMO is controlled through quota restrictions which 
we discuss next. 
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4.3.1 Production quotas 
Sugar production in the EU region is subject to quota restrictions and three quotas 
are identified, namely the  ‘A ?,  ‘B ? and  ‘C ? quota. dŚĞ  ‘ ?quota was initially set for 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůhĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂƚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞ ‘ ?ƋƵŽƚĂĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌ
cases of overproduĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ  ‘ ? ƋƵŽƚĂ ŝƐ ĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ
advantage in sugar thereby allowing some specialisation by certain countries 
 ?ŚĂƉůŝŶ ĂŶĚ DĂƚƚŚĞǁƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? WƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚ  ‘ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ ? ƋƵŽƚĂs 
ĨŽƌŵƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ ? ƋƵŽƚĂ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ Ğǆported into the world market.  ‘ ? ƋƵŽƚĂ ƐƵŐĂƌ 
attracts a fixed levy of 2% of ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƉƌŝĐĞ ? ‘ ?ƋƵŽƚĂƐƵŐĂƌ face a variable 
levy of up to 37.5% of intervention price (dependent upon the cost of export 
refunds) while   ‘C ? quota sugar is not eligible for intervention buying and is sold to 
the world market without subsidy (Milner, Morgan and Zgovu; 2003). 
 
The different levies charged on the sugar quotas means that the sugar quota prices 
differ but are all related to the set intervention price. The EU sugar quotas price 
dynamics can be explained by Figure 4-8 below: 
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Figure 4-8: EU sugar quota mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Milner, Morgan and Zgovu; 2003 
In Figure 4-8, P1 is the EU intervention price and PA and PB ĂƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƐŽĨ ‘ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ ?ƐƵŐĂƌquota output respectively. dŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨ ‘ ?ƐƵŐĂƌŝƐŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚĨŽƌ ‘ ?
sugar because of the lower levy ĐŚĂƌŐĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ ?ƐƵŐĂƌ ? ‘ ?ƐƵŐĂƌprice is the same as 
the world market price PW.  If EU sugar consumption is at Q1, which corresponds to 
the intersection of the EU sugar demand curve D and the intervention price P1 it 
then follows that (A+B-Q1) represents ĞǆĐĞƐƐ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ŽĨ  ‘ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ ? ƐƵŐĂƌ ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? 
Since excess supply of  ‘A ? and  ‘B ? quota is sold at the world market price, the 
revenue loss from this excess sugar production is shown by areas c+d in the 
diagram.  This revenue loss must the covered by the revenue gain from the levies 
charged on  ‘A ? and  ‘B ? sugar production which is shown by the shaded areas a+b+c. 
Thus, if well balanced, the levies charged for  ‘A ? and  ‘B ? sugar production could be 
enough to cover excess production that is sold at the lower world market price. 
With the integration of the ACP countries and India into the trading regimes, the  ‘A ? 
sugar quota was calculated as the total consumption demand in the EU less 
P1 
PA 
PB 
PW 
Price 
A B C Q1 
a 
b c 
d 
S 
D 
Output (Q) 
Ch. 4 - The EU/global sugar market: production and trade policies 
 
4-21 
 
projected imports from these countries. The  ‘C ? sugar then, together with the 
exportable  ‘A ? and  ‘B ? quota from the EU and the preferential ACP and Indian 
imports makes the EU one of the leading global exporter of sugar.  
Table 4.4 is a summary of the sugar quota distribution in the EU25 
. 
Table 4.4: The quota distribution of sugar in the EU25 (2004) 
Region (tonnes of 
white sugar) 
A Quota B Quota Total 
Czech Republic  441 209,0 13 653,0 454 862,0 
Denmark  325 000,0 95 745,5 420 745,5 
Germany  2 612 913,3 803 982,2 3 416 895,5 
Greece  288 638,0 28 863,8 317 501,8 
Spain  957 082,4 39 878,5 996 960,9 
France (continental)  2 536 487,4 752 259,5 3 288 746,9 
France Overseas 
Department 
433 872,0 46 372,5 480 244,5 
Ireland 181 145,2 18 114,5 199 259,7 
Italy 1 310 903,9 246 539,3 1 557 443,2 
Lativia 66 400,0 105,0 66 505,0 
Lithuania 103 010,0 0,0 103 010,0 
Hungary 400 454,0 1 230,0 401 684,0 
Netherlands 684 112,4 180 447,1 864 559,5 
Austria 314 028,9 73 297,5 387 326,4 
Poland 1 580 000,0 91 926,0 1 671 926,0 
Portugal 63 380,2 6 338,0 69 718,2 
Autonomic regions 
of Azores 
9 048,2 904,8 9 953,0 
Slovakia 189 760,0 17 672,0 207 432,0 
Slovenia 48 157,0 4 816,0 52 973,0 
Finland 132 806,3 13 280,4 146 086,7 
Sweden 334 784,2 33 478,0 368 262,2 
*BLEU 674 905,5 144 906,1 819 811,6 
United Kingdom 1 035 115,4 103 511,5 1 138 626,9 
Total EU 25 14 723 213,3 2 717 321,2 17 440 534,5 
Source: EC, 2004 
*The Belgium Luxemburg Economic Union  
 
Various other sweeteners compete with sugar in the EU region. Such sweeteners 
may be natural or artificial. Since these sweeteners compete with sugar, they affect 
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the sugar market and trade. Examples of these sweeteners include iso-glucose that 
is an isomer of glucose. Since this sweetener became a strong competitor to sugar, 
the CMO in 1977 limited its production to 300 000 tones (EC, 2004). The point of 
interest here is the potential to increase the production of these alternative 
sweeteners that can have the effect of displacing sugar from the market and thus 
liberate the raw material for sugar production to the production of bioethanol.  
 
Sugar production also produces by-products of economic importance e.g. molasses. 
Molasses has high energy value and is used mainly for production of alcohol (e.g. 
bioethanol) and as an animal feed. Import duties also support the production of 
molasses in the EU. It is reported by the EC, 2004 that the community produces 4-5 
million tonnes of molasses per year and imports about 3 million tonnes of cane 
molasses for animal feed. This means that converting molasses into bioethanol 
could directly affect the animal feed market and thus it can be expected to have an 
effect on the prices of food of animal origin. As production of bioethanol from grain 
crops produces Dried Distillers Grains (DDGs) which are used as an animal feed, this 
means that DDGs can potentially have an impact on molasses use as an animal feed 
in the EU region.  
 
In the next section we discuss the EU sugar price structure that has made the region 
a global sugar producer and trader. 
 
4.3.2 Sugar prices and levies  
 
Price support for EU sugar involves an intervention price at which agencies in the 
region are required to buy eligible sugar delivered to them. Since 1993 it has been 
ĨƌŽǌĞŶĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌƚŽŶŶĞĨŽƌǁŚŝƚĞ sugar and  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌƚŽŶŶĞĨŽƌƌĂǁƐƵŐĂƌ ? 
Figure 4-9 below show the changes in the intervention prices of white sugar in the 
EU from 1968 to 2003 at constant exchange rate. 
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Figure 4-9: EU Intervention price for whitĞƐƵŐĂƌĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ?ŝŶ ? ?ƚonne  
 
 
Source: EC report, 2006 
 
Figure 4-9 shows that the EU sugar intervention prices has steadily been increasing 
up to the early 1980s ǁŚĞƌĞ ŝƚ ƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĞĚ Ăƚ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽŶŶĞ ? /ƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞŶ
increased in 1993 to  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽŶŶĞ where it has remained until 2006. This EU 
intervention price is at most times higher than the world market price for sugar as 
we have seen earlier in section 4.1 of this chapter. According to the EC (2004), the 
world market/intervention sugar price ratio, has been increasing from around 1:2 in 
the opening years of the organization 1:3 by 2004. This high EU artificial price of 
sugar is also benefiting the trading countries of the ACP. However, the proposed cut 
in the intervention price after 2006 has resulted in the EU sugar price dropping 
below the world price as we saw in Figure 4-2.  
 
As we have seen in the previous section, sugar production in the EU region is 
subject to various levies that depend on the production quota. These levies become 
part of the Community budget after the Member States have withheld 25% in 
collection charges (EC, 2004). The calculation of the levies from the sugar quota 
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allocation and consumption in the EU region has been discussed in section 4.4.1. 
The precise levy rates are determined each year by the Commission using 
production and consumption statistics and the average rate of the various 
Community refunds on sugar. 
 
At the start of the CMO in 1968, sugar levies applied only to  ‘B ? quota sugar, which 
represented the sugar that could be exported with refunds. However, the levies 
charŐĞĚ ŽŶ  ‘ ? ƐƵŐĂƌ ƋƵŽƚĂ ĐŽƵůĚ no longer cover the cost of surplus sugar 
production with increase sugar output in the EU region and this therefore meant 
extending the levies to  ‘A ? quota sugar.  
The levies on the sugar quotas are applied as follows;   
¾ A basic levy on all  ‘A ? quota production at a fixed rate of 2% of the 
intervention price; 
¾ A  ‘B ?ƋƵŽƚĂ levy at a maximum rate of 37.5% of the intervention price; 
¾ An additional levy that is imposed if the amount generated is still 
insufficient to cover the cost of surplus sugar. This levy is charged as a 
flat-rate percentage with no maximum being set so as to achieve the 
sum required.  
 
Table 4.5 summarises the average levy arrangement in the EU sugar industry for the 
years 1990 to 2002. 
 
Table 4.5: The average levy regime for the EU sugar industry from 1990 to 2002 
 
>s/^ ? ?ƉĞƌ TONNE OF SUGAR) SHARE   ? ?ƉĞƌ TONNE OF SUGAR) 
A B AVERAGE A-B MANUFACTURERS PRODUCERS 
13 238 53 22 31 
Source: EC report, 2006 
 
On levies applicable to international trade, the EU sugar market is protected by 
import duties that artificially increase the internal market price of sugar above that 
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which prevail in the world market. The import duties started in 1968 and have been 
applied in accordance with the price of sugar in the world market.  
 
These import duties are important to understand since they can potentially be used 
to protect the EU bioethanol market. However, these import duties have less 
significance when considering switching from trade in preferential sugar to 
bioethanol since preferential sugar is shielded from these import duties. Trade 
liberilisation policies in as far as sugar trade between EU and ACP countries abolish 
the quotas that is allocated to ACP countries. This means ACP countries can export 
sugar to the EU market without the restriction of quota. In theory therefore ACP 
sugar industries have a potential to expand according to how competitive they are 
and according to the sugar demand dynamics in the EU region. Policies that 
increase sugar demand in the EU region and those that abolish trade restrictions 
will be favourable to the development of ACP sugar industries.  
 
The average price of raw cane sugar imports into the Community is stable at about 
 ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌƚŽŶŶĞ ?Comext/Eurostat, 2006). This price is higher than the world market 
price for sugar and favours countries that export sugar to the EU market. 
Preferential sugar from ACP countries in particular benefits from this high priced EU 
sugar market. As Community production is in surplus, the raw cane sugar imported 
at a high price must be re-exported to the lower priced world market with an export 
refund to sugar traders to ensure profitability of the sector. This export refund 
mechanism makes the EU the second largest global exporter of sugar after Brazil.  In 
cases where sugar prices in the EU region is less than that of the world market, the 
export refund becomes an export levy to ensure adequate amount of sugar in the 
region. In order for the refunds to reflect the true world sugar market prices, they 
are offered to traders after they bid for them in a tendering system.  
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In the next section we discuss the trade arrangements between EU and ACP 
countries. Some of these trade arrangements have helped made the EU a global 
sugar trader. 
 
4.4 General trade agreements between the EU and ACP countries 
There have been various trade protocols dating from the 1970s between the EU and 
ACP countries most of which are former colonies of various EU countries.20  These 
ACP countries are former British, Dutch, Belgian and French colonies. Such trade 
protocols between the EU and ACP countries are therefore a form of aid for 
development in these former European colonies. These agreements basically offer 
duty free access to the EU market for certain ACP products in a quota arrangement 
at a guaranteed price known or preferential price for an indefinite period of time. 
Sugar produced by ACP countries has been one of the commodities entering the EU 
under these arrangements and which therefore had to be incooperated into 
Europe ?ƐDKƐƵŐĂƌ. This guaranteed price is often above the world market price 
and as such, these trade agreements are an important source of foreign revenue for 
most ACP countries that could otherwise not break even if they were exporting at 
world market price. It is for this reason that sugar entering the EU under the 
preferential trade agreements has been the mainstay of many ACP economies. The 
two most significant trade agreements between the EU and the ACP member states 
had been the Lomé convention (together with its amendments) and the Cotonou 
Agreements. 
                                                          
20
 For details discussion on the developments of the trade agreements between the EU and ACP 
countries please see Morgan (2008). 
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The Lomé convention I was started in 1975 and included 46 ACP countries.21  Its 
main aim was to enable preferential access for most of ACP agricultural and mineral 
exports to the EC free of duty. This preferential access was on an agreed quota 
system on selected products like beef and sugar. Besides this preferential access, 
the agreements also involved aid and investments in ACP member states.  
The Lomé convention I was followed by the Lomé convention II of 1979 which 
included 58 ACP countries; the Lomé Convention III included 65 ACP countries and 
lastly the Lomé convention IV of 1989 which included 68 ACP countries and these 
were increased to 70 by 1995. In June 2000, the EU and 78 ACP countries entered 
into the Cotonou Agreement that included 48 African states. The Cotonou 
Agreement of June 2000 expired in 2008 and was a waiver given to ACP countries 
by WTO to replace the Lomé scheme.22  
The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries trade in Agricultural 
products stipulates, in article 1 of the General Trade Agreements: annex v, that; 
Products originating in the ACP States shall be imported into the Community free of 
customs duties and charges having equivalent effect; 
(a) For products originating in the ACP States: listed in Annex I to the Treaty where 
they come under a Common Organization of the market within the meaning of 
Article 34 of the Treaty, or subject, on import into the Community, to specific rules 
introduced as a result of the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy, the 
Community shall take the necessary measures to ensure more favorable treatment 
than that granted to third countries benefiting from the most-favored-nation clause 
for the same products. 
                                                          
21
 The Lomé Convention was the first trade and aid agreement signed between the EU and 71 ACP 
countries. It was signed in February 1975 in   Lomé, Togo and is thus named after the capitial city of 
the host country. 
22 There have been other trade agreements between the EC and former African colonies like the 
Younde Convention of 1963 between EC and 18 African ex colonies and the Arusha convention of 
1969 between the EC and the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.  
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(Article 1 of the General Trade Agreements, annex v-The Cotonou) 
The Cotonou agreement as mentioned has been signed by 78 ACP countries but 
only 19 of these are involved in the  ACP/EU Sugar Protocol and these are namely: 
ĂƌďĂĚŽƐ ? ĞůŝǌĞ ? ŽŶŐŽ ? ŽƚĞ Ě ?/ǀŽƌĞ ? &ŝũŝ ? 'ƵǇĂŶĂ ? :amaica, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, Surinam, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
The hallmark of all these trade agreements is their non-reciprocity and violation of 
the Most Favored Nations (MFN) clause of the WTO and as such they were only 
temporarily covered by a WTO waiver (specifically the Cotonou Agreement) 
provided by the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) which was previously 
known as the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) which expired in 
December 2007 (Vollmer, 2009). The GSP or previously the GATT is a formal system 
that excludes certain member countries from the WTO MFN rules. The EPAs 
between the EU and ACP countries are as a result of the expiration of this WTO 
waiver. The next section discusses the EU and ACP trade agreements specific to 
sugar. 
 
4.5 The ACP/EU trade agreements specific to sugar 
Sugar trade between the EU and ACP countries has been guided by the sugar 
protocol agreements and agreements on special preference sugar. First, we review 
the ACP/EU sugar protocol arrangements. 
4.5.1 The ACP/EU sugar protocol 
Sugar trade between the EU and ACP countries has been guided by the ACP/EU 
Sugar Protocol, an agreement signed in 1975 and which allows a fixed quantity of 
sugar from ACP countries to enter the EU market at preferential prices for an 
indefinite period of time. The preferential price or guaranteed price is basically the 
same price as that received by the EU Community sugar producers. The EU sugar 
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policy to support EU farmers therefore has also benefited ACP countries because of 
this sugar protocol agreement as the sugar price received by EU community sugar 
producers has been generally above the world market price. This ACP/EU sugar 
protocol is likely to have supported high cost ACP countries sugar producers who 
would not have survived if they exported at world market sugar prices. Thus for 
some high cost ACP sugar producers the EU market has more economic importance 
to them than low cost producers. In addition, as mentioned before, ACP sugar 
cannot compete with sugar from lower cost producers like Brazil. This makes 
bilateral trade policies that ensure and support trade between the EU and ACP 
important for these countries. 
Table 4.6 below shows the ACP countries involved in this agreement and the 
quantities they are allowed to export to the EU at various periods. 
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Table 4.6: Sugar quotas of ACP Protocol countries 
ACP Country 1975 2003/2004 
Belize* 39 400 40 349 
Congo 10 000 10 186 
Ivory Coast - 10 186 
Fiji 163 600 165 348 
Guyana 157 700 159 410 
Jamaica 118 300 118 696 
Kenya 5 000 0 
Barbados 49 300 50 312 
Madagascar* 10 000 10 760 
Malawi* 20 000 20 824 
Mauritius 487 200 491 031 
Uganda 5 000 0 
St. Kitts and Nevis 14 800 15 591 
Surinam 4 000 0 
Swaziland 116 000 117 845 
Tanzania* 10 000 10 186 
Trinidad and Tobago* 69 000 43 751 
Zambia* - 0 
Zimbabwe - 30 225 
Total 1 279 300 
  
1 294 700 
 
Source: EC, 2004 
* refers to LDC and ACP 
 
Table 4.6 above shows that the allocated sugar quota of various SPS ACP countries 
has not changed by much from 1975 to 2004.  
 
The Sugar Protocol between the EU and ACP countries states that; 
 
'the [European] Community undertakes for an indefinite period to purchase and 
import, at guaranteed prices, specific quantities of cane sugar, raw or white, which 
originate in the ACP states and which these States undertake to deliver to it' 
(Article 1 of the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol) 
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The EU regulation on the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector 
(No. 2038/1999) ensures that the Protocol quantities are irreducible even in cases 
where the Community has to reduce  ‘A ? and  ‘B ? production quotas on account of its 
Uruguay Round commitments. 
Further, Article 1 of ACP/EU Sugar Protocol is reflected in Cotonou Agreement 
which states that; 
'In accordance with Article 25 of the ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé signed on 28 
February 1975 and with Protocol 3 annexed thereto, the Community has undertaken 
ĨŽƌ ĂŶ ŝŶĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ  ? ƚŽ ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚ ? ĂƚŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞĚ ƉƌŝĐĞƐ ? ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ
quantities of cane sugar, raw or white, which originates in the ACP States producing 
and exporting cane sugar and which those States have undertaken to deliver to it.' 
(Article 13 of Annex V: Trade Regime Applicable During the Preparatory Period) 
 
ACP guaranteed prices are negotiated annually between the EU and the ACP states 
signatory to the Sugar Protocol, 'within the price range obtaining in the Community, 
taking into account all relevant economic factors' (Article 5(4) of the ACP/EU Sugar 
Protocol). 
 
Generally, the ACP states receive the same price as Community sugar producers. 
This is because the Community has always linked the guaranteed price for ACP raw 
cane sugar to the intervention price for EU produced raw sugar, and the guaranteed 
price of white sugar to the derived intervention price in the UK. The level of the 
guaranteed price is that at which, 'the Community undertakes to purchase, within 
the agreed quantities, preferential sugar which cannot be marketed in the 
Community at a price equivalent to or in excess of the guaranteed price.'  (Article 
5(3) of the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol). 
 
 ‘/ŶĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞ ĚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? in the Protocol gives legal guarantee to ACP sugar supplying 
states and reflects the commitments of the EC to these trade arrangements. 
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However, the sugar protocol, though related to the traditional trade agreement 
between the EU and ACP countries (Lomé and Cotonou) was made independent of 
them. This means that the sugar protocol could be amended independently without 
violation of the broader trade agreements. 
 
All the guarantees contained in the Sugar Protocol are also enshrined in the IVth 
Lomé Convention which, in its Article 213, reiterates the commitments undertaken 
in terms of the Protocol, notably the indefinite duration of the Protocol, the non-
applicability of the safeguard clause under Article 177 of the Convention, and the 
fact that should the Convention be terminated, measures must be taken to secure 
the continued application of the Sugar Protocol.  
 
The above provisions, both under the Sugar Protocol and reinforced under the 
Lomé Convention guarantees that the application of the Protocol is for an indefinite 
period. However, the sugar protocol between the EU and ACP countries was 
updated to include the Agreement on Special Preferential Sugar, which we now 
discuss. 
 
4.5.2 The agreement on Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) 
 
Sugar import into the EU from ACP countries is also subject to the SPS protocol, 
which we discuss next. Most of the information is adapted from the ACP sugar 
group website (http://www.acpsugar.org/SPS.html). The SPS agreement came into 
existence with the aim of supplying raw sugar deficit of Portugal and Spain. Entry of 
these two countries into the EU in 1986 therefore resulted in the need to refine 
existing sugar protocols with the introduction of a Maximum Supply Need (MSN) 
aimed at setting a ceiling to the amount of sugar that could be imported to the EU. 
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The SPS agreement with ACP states was reached on 1 June 1995, and, like the 
ACP/EU Sugar Protocol, it is a government-to-government agreement, but unlike 
the Protocol, it is of a fixed duration and the ACP states are liable to supply the 
quantities of sugar covered by the SPS agreement. The SPS agreement was for an 
initial period of six years and is as outlined below:  
'the European Community undertakes to open annually a special tariff quota for the 
import of raw cane sugar for refining which originates in ACP states, on the basis of 
the needs determined by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3 ("bilan"), 
and the ACP states undertake to supply the said quantities under conditions fixed by 
this agreement and by the measures taken by the Commission for the application of 
this agreement within the framework of the management of the common 
organization of the markets in the sugar sector. ? 
(http://www.acpsugar.org/SPS.html)  
According to a report by Berkum et al (2005), the SPS amount is the difference 
between the MSN and sugar imports from French Overseas Departments (DOM), 
those under the ACP/Indian quotas, the MFN sugar quotas and, more recently, the 
Everything But Arms Initiative (EBAI) sugar import quota. No import duty is paid on 
ƚŚĞ ^W^ ƐƵŐĂƌ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƉĞƌ ƚŽŶne (EU support price for raw sugar 
ŵŝŶƵƐ Ă ƌĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŝĚ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ƉĞƌ ƚŽŶ ) ?  &ƵƌƚŚĞƌ, Berkum et al (2005) noted that 
following the EBAI, the volume of SPS sugar has been reduced to about 217,000 
tonnes in 2002-03 with further reductions in the volume of SPS sugar expected due 
to increases in EBAI quotas and possible cuts in the MSN.   
The possible effects of a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy therefore is to 
act against reduction in the MSN sugar. This is possible due to the likely increase in 
demand for sugar in the EU27 region as more sugar beet is diverted to bioethanol 
production. Gotor (2009) noted that nearly 60 percent of all SPS sugar supplies 
came from the SADC countries, with Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Malawi being 
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priority suppliers. Table 4.7 shows the ACP Sugar Protocol (SP) and ACP SPS sugar 
quota allocations for the years 2002-2004 and the respective ACP country sugar 
production average.  
Table 4.7: ACP SP and SPS sugar quotas and average production levels (in tonnes 
white sugar equivalent) 
Countries  SP quota allocation 
(2003/04)  
SPS quota allocation 
(2002/03)  
Production, average 
(2001/03 ) 
Barbados  32,097  0  40,000  
Belize  40,349  5,527  105,000  
Congo  10,186  2,249  41,000  
Cote d'Ivoire  10,186  9,704  144,000  
Fiji  165,348  21,060  304,000  
Guyana  159,410  17,111  282,000  
Jamaica  118,696  18,894  164,000  
Kenya  5,000  10,908  418,000  
Madagascar  10,760  0  36,000  
Malawi   20,824  9,897  222,000  
Mauritius  491.031  21,266  545,000  
Mozambique   6,000  0  140,000  
St. Kitts   15,591  0  19,000  
Swaziland  117,845  45,030  569,000  
Tanzania   10,186  2,183  159,000  
Trinidad   43,751  5,658  82,000  
Zambia   7,215  12,863  203,000  
Zimbabwe  30,225  29,948  489,000  
Total  1,294,700  217,298  3,962,000  
(Berkum et al 2005) 
Table 4.7 above shows that the SP sugar quota is generally higher that the SPS sugar 
quota for most of the ACP member states. It is also seen that the importance of the 
EU sugar market differs for the different ACP sugar protocol countries in that their 
Ch. 4 - The EU/global sugar market: production and trade policies 
 
4-35 
 
EU export as a percentage of total sugar production vary as we will see in section 
4.7. 
In summary therefore, prior to 2006, sugar from ACP countries entered the EU 
market under three trading agreements, which are the EBAI for LDCs, the ACP/EU 
Sugar Protocol, and the SPS agreement. The complete classification of countries 
into whether they are ACP members, ACP/LDCs, ACP/EU SPS or ACP/EU SPS/LDCs is 
shown in Table 4.8 below:  
Table 4.8: Summary Classification of ACP countries and trade arrangement with 
the EU 
 
ACP Country ACP/LDCs ACP/EU SPS ACP/EU SPS/LDC 
Angola  Angola Barbados Madagascar 
Antigua and Barbuda  Benin Belize Malawi 
Bahamas, The  Burkina Faso Congo Mauritania 
Barbados  Burundi Cote d'Ivore  Tanzania 
Belize  Cape Verde  Fiji Uganda 
Benin  Central African Guyana Zambia 
Botswana  Chad Jamaica  
Burkina Faso  Comoros Islands Kenya   
Burundi  Congo, Democratic Madagascar   
Cameroon  Djibouti Malawi   
Cape Verde  Equatorial Guinea Mauritius   
Central African Republic  Eritrea St Kitts and   
Chad  Ethiopia Surinam   
Comoros  Gambia Swaziland   
Dem. Rep. of Congo  Guinea  Tanzania   
Congo  Guinea-Bissau Trinidad   
Cook Islands  Haiti Uganda   
Cote d'Ivoire  Kiribati Zambia   
Djibouti  Laos Zimbabwe   
Dominica  Lesotho     
Dominican Republic  Liberia     
Equatorial Guinea  Madagascar     
Eritrea  Malawi     
Ethiopia  Mali     
Fiji  Mauritania     
Gabon  Mozambique     
Ch. 4 - The EU/global sugar market: production and trade policies 
 
4-36 
 
Gambia  Niger     
Ghana  Rwanda     
Grenada  Samoa     
Guinea  São Tomé & Principe     
Guinea-Bissau  Senegal     
Guyana  Sierra Leone     
Haiti  Solomon Islands     
Jamaica  Somalia     
Kenya  Sudan     
Kiribati  Tanzania     
Lesotho  Togo     
Liberia  Uganda     
Madagascar  Vanuatu     
Malawi  Zambia     
Mali        
Marshall Islands        
Mauritania        
Mauritius        
Micronesia, Federated       
Mozambique        
Namibia        
Nauru        
Niger        
Nigeria        
Niue        
Palau        
Papua New Guinea        
Rwanda        
Saint Kitts and Nevis        
Saint Lucia        
Saint Vincent and the       
Samoa        
Sao Tome and Principe        
Senegal        
Seychelles        
Sierra Leone        
Solomon Islands        
Somalia        
Sudan        
Suriname        
Swaziland        
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Tanzania        
Timor Leste        
Togo        
Tonga        
Trinidad and Tobago        
Tuvalu        
Uganda        
Vanuatu        
Zambia        
Zimbabwe        
 
In a nutshell therefore, these various trade agreements and the internal EU sugar 
policies have been important determinants of the price that ACP countries receive 
for their sugar and the quantities they are eligible to export to the EU sugar market. 
As such, these policies and trade arrangements have historically affected sugar 
production decisions in ACP countries and have played an important role in the 
economic development of these states. This again highlights the importance of the 
EU sugar policies and possible developments on EU sugar markets for ACP 
countries. This means that for ACP countries, future production decisions and trade 
potential hinges on understanding EU policy developments and trade protocols in 
that region. In this light, we next discuss the ACP sugar markets with the aim of 
understanding the potential impact on ACP sugar sector of policies that affect 
international sugar markets especially the EU sugar regime. 
 
4.6 ACP sugar industries  
 
Since our thesis focus is on the effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
with special emphasis on ACP sugar production and trade, we will discuss in details 
the sugar sectors of ACP countries that had a traditional sugar trade arrangement 
with the EU. Only 18 ACP members are beneficiaries of the ACP/EU sugar protocols. 
These include six member states of the Caribbean, which are Barbados, Belize, 
Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Trinidad & Tobago. The African beneficiaries 
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ĂƌĞŶĂŵĞůǇŽŶŐŽ ?ŽƚĞĚ ?/ǀŽƌĞ ?<ĞŶǇĂ ?DĂĚĂŐĂƐĐĂƌ ?DĂůĂǁŝ ?DĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?w^aziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe while Fiji is the only Pacific member.  
 
Sugar production in the ACP region dates back to the first human settlements 
thanks to the favourable climatic conditions for growing sugar cane. The favourable 
climatic conditions mean most of the ACP regions have a competitive advantage in 
sugar production as seen in Figure 4-10 below. 
Figure 4-10: Relative sugar production cost for period 2006-2010 
 
Source: Illovo (2010) 
*refers to sugar beet production, rest is sugar cane. 
 
According to Figure 4-10 Malawi, in Southern African is the lowest cost sugar cane 
producer ahead of Brazil. Many countries in Southern Africa and which are part of 
the ACP sugar protocol are also low cost sugar producers and these countries 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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include Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique. 
Generally, the Southern African region is more competitive in sugar production that 
the Caribbean and the Pacific. This observation is supported by an Oxford Policy 
Management study (2003) which analysed the impact of erosion preferences on 
ACP sugar viability based on production costs. Their study outcomes divided ACP 
sugar producers into three distinct groups when comparing sugar industry 
profitability pre and post reform as follows;  
 Countries where sugar production will still be viable under pre-reform 
industry structure or restructuring plans: Congo, Malawi, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
 Countries where sugar production is potentially viable if restructuring 
beyond pre-reform plans is undertaken: Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius; and, 
 Countries where sugar production will be no longer be viable under any 
circumstances: Barbados, Belize ? ŽƚĞ Ě ?/ǀŽŝƌĞ ? :ĂŵĂŝĐĂ ? DĂĚĂŐĂƐĐĂƌ ? ^ƚ 
Kitts, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
It is apparent therefore that most Caribbean countries are less efficient in sugar 
production compared to the rest of ACP countries. However, this observation 
notwithstanding, most ACP countries are also endowed with cheap labour and land 
such that their sugar production potential is still high should favourable policies that 
increase sugar demand in global markets come into force. Sugar production in the 
ACP region has also been encouraged by increased trade in international markets, 
mostly under the preferential trade agreements with the EU region as we have 
discussed in section 4.6. 
 
International trade in sugar has made it an important commodity for most of ACP 
member states as seen by its contribution their GDP (please see Table 1.1 of the 
introduction chapter). As an example, in 2003 sugar generated over 17% of GDP in 
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Guyana and 24% in Swaziland, while in Fiji sugar production was responsible for 
over 90% of agricultural output (ACP sugar group, 2005). ACP trade in sugar dates 
back to the 16th and 17th centuries with an increase in cane production in European 
colonies firstly in the Caribbean, South American and later in the Southern Africa 
region for export to Europe. However, repeated rebellions in the colonies during 
the late 1700s and early 1800s and disruption in supplies encouraged European 
countries to establish their own sugar industries and through subsidised sugar beet 
production (Mitchell, 2004).  
 
However, bilateral trade between the EU and ACP countries is still in existence as 
we have seen. As has been alluded to, ACP sugar industries remain key to sustaining 
many ACP economies. Developments and policies that have the potential to affect 
global sugar markets are therefore of direct interest to most ACP member states. To 
give an overview of the ACP sugar industries we start with the Caribbean region. 
 
4.6.1 The Caribbean sugar industries 
 
The Caribbean sugar industry, as in other ACP regions, is an important foreign 
revenue earner and employer of skilled and non-skilled labour. According to Ahmed 
(2001), the Caribbean industry employed approximately 150,000 workers in 2000. 
However, Ahmend (2001) noted that the deregulated foreign exchange market 
resulting in increased prices of imported inputs like fertilizers, pesticide and 
irrigation material makes sugar production in the Caribbeans expensive. Sugar 
production in the Caribbeans forms a small portion of world production and has 
been on the decline in recent years as shown in Figure 4-11 below. 
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Figure 4-11: Caribbean Sugar production and consumption (millions of tonnes raw 
sugar equivalent) 
  
 
Source: USDA database (2011) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4-11 above, sugar production in the Caribbean started to 
decline from 2006 while consumption stayed elevated and above production. 
Annual sugar production in the Caribbean averaged 0.2 million metric tonnes in 
2011, which was only 0.1% of global sugar production. The decline in production 
corresponded with increase in imports and decrease in exports as seen in Figure 4-
12 below. 
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Figure 4-12: Caribbean sugar import and export (million of tonnes raw sugar 
equivalent) 
 
 
 
Source: USDA database (2011) 
 
The recent developments in the Caribbean sugar industry therefore shows the 
effect of the EU sugar reform of 2006 that negatively affected sugar production in 
the region and increased imports. Such sugar reform has resulted in St. Kitts and the 
Nevis going out of sugar production completely. The EU market affects ACP 
countries differently depending on how much of their sugar production is exported 
to that market. Generally, Caribbean countries, besides being relatively higher cost 
producers, exported a higher percentage of their sugar to the EU markets. Figure 4-
13 below shows the sugar production and export to the EU market of the various 
sugar protocol countries in 2003, before the sugar reform. 
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Figure 4-13: Sugar production and export to EU for ACP sugar protocol countries in 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-13 above also shows that most members of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries export a lower share of their sugar 
output to the EU market.23 This means that, besides being relatively lower cost 
sugar producers, they are expected to be less affected by the EU sugar reform 
compared to the Caribbean countries and Fiji in the Pacific. As such, policies that 
affect the EU sugar market will have different effect on the various ACP sugar 
industries. The heterogeneity in the ACP sugar sector therefore makes it important 
to disaggregate the ACP regions into various trading blocs when analysing policies 
                                                          
23
The SADC region is made up of 15 member states which are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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that affect their industries. The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, which will 
increase sugar demand in the EU region, is also expected to affect the production 
and export profile of these countries ? sugar sectors differently depending on the 
importance of the EU market to their sugar industries. It is the aim of this research 
to determine how this export profile will change at regional level and specifically for 
the SADC region as compared to the rest of the ACP region.   
 
Next, we analyse the sugar industries of the African member states. Our emphasis 
will be on the SADC countries that form part of the ACP/EU sugar protocol for two 
reasons. Firstly, as we have seen, most of the SADC countries have a competitive 
advantage in sugar production. In this way, sugar will most likely remain an 
important commodity for this region. Secondly, the SADC region has an agenda to 
liberate trade amongst themselves and ultimately form a common market. In this 
way, policy outcomes that are likely to affect their important industries are 
informative as a way of guiding their future developmental plans. Despite the fact 
that the EU sugar market is not as important to SADC region as it is for the 
Caribbean member states, SADC countries will likely continue trading with the EU 
given their relative competitive advantage in sugar production. 
 Further, the EU is a global player is sugar trade and changes in its sugar market will 
be transmitted to the world market where SADC countries also trade. As such, the 
EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is expected to affect SADC sugar industries 
(directly and indirectly) and it is important to analyse such possible effects. Our 
interest therefore is on the sugar industries of the SADC trading block, most of 
which are also signatories of the SPS sugar arrangement with the EU. 
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4.6.2 The African/SADC sugar industries 
The SADC region's sugar production originated in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century on the physically and politically distant Indian Ocean island of Mauritius 
(Lincoln, 2006). International trade and the favourable conditions for sugar cane 
production in most of the region have seen the SADC sugar industry grow to play a 
crucial economic role. Table 4.9 below show sugar cane production and area 
harvested in 2010 for selected SADC sugar cane producing countries.  
Table 4.9: Sugar cane production in SADC region in 2010 
SADC country Production (x 1000 
tonnes) 
Area Harvested 
(Ha) 
Tonnes/Ha 
Angola 360 95000 3.8 
DRC 1827 40000 45.7 
Madagascar 3000 95000 31.6 
Malawi 2500 23000 108.7 
Mauritius 4366 58709 74.4 
Mozambique 2800 215000 13.0 
South Africa 16016 267000 60.0 
Swaziland 5000 52000 96.2 
Zambia 4050 38500 105.2 
Zimbabwe 3100 39000 79.5 
 Source: FAO (2012) and author calculation 
With reference to Table 4.8, Angola and Mozambique are not part of the EU/ACP 
SPS but are included because they are part of SADC. Likewise, South Africa is not 
part of the SPS per se but has a free trade agreement with the EU under the Trade 
and Development Cooperation Agenda (TDCA), which for sugar has similar effect as 
the duty free SPS sugar from ACP countries. Being members of a trading block, it is 
reasonable therefore to class South Africa as part of the SPS SADC countries. 
However, with the coming into force of the EPAs, the SPS sugar arrangement of ACP 
countries with the EU becomes invalid but the sake of simplify our analysis we will 
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concentrate on analysis of countries that had a previous SPS arrangement with the 
EU and which are part of a regional trading bloc. 
 
Table 4.9 shows that individual SADC countries have different sugar cane 
production efficiency and this highlights a within region heterogeneity. It can be 
seen that Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia are the three most efficient sugar cane 
producers in the region as they produce more sugar cane per hectare while Angola, 
because of its dry weather conditions, is the least efficient sugar cane producer. 
Efficient sugar cane producers are relatively more likely to expand their industries 
should policies that increase global sugar demand come into existence. 
Total SADC sugar production and consumption from selected members of SADC 
(which are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius 
and Mozambique) are summarised in Figure 4-14 below for the years 2003/2004 to 
2009/2010. 
Figure 4-14: SADC sugar production and consumption (million tonnes raw sugar 
equivalent)  
 
Source: Illovo annual report, 2010 
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Figure 4-14 above shows that SADC sugar production has been almost stable with 
an average annual output of 5.3 million tonnes for the years 2003 to 2010. 
Consumption has shown a slight but steady increase with an annual average of 3.4 
million tonnes raw sugar equivalence for the same years. Since production has 
persistently outstripped consumption, the region remains a net exporter of sugar. 
Figure 4-15 shows the export destinations of SADC sugar. 
Figure 4-15: SADC sugar export markets destinations (millions tonnes raw sugar 
equivalent) 
 
Source: Illovo annual report (2010) 
Figure 4-15 above shows that most SADC sugar is exported into the world market. 
However, the EU market remain an import market for these countries sugar given 
the fact that almost  40% of annual SADC sugar is exported to this market. 
The relative competitive advantage of the SADC sugar industries in general means 
that they are likely to expand should policies that increase global sugar demand and 
world prices come into existence. However, whether the industries of smaller 
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countries like Swaziland and Madagascar can competitive with absolute advantage 
low cost producers like Brazil and Australia for example is contentious. Much as the 
SADC region is suitable for production of sugar cane, challenges still persist in the 
expansion of the sugar sector. These include increased need for irrigation water, 
more investment into skilled labour, infrastructure and research. The importance of 
water in particular is seen by the fact that Botswana, a SADC country, does not 
produce any sugar cane because of its dry weather conditions. Huge investment in 
irrigation would make it a high cost sugar cane grower. 
In summary therefore, for the SADC sugar industry to remain viable especially after 
the derogation of preferences there should be; 
 Major restructuring of the industries to reduce production cost 
 More investment in infrastructure and skilled personnel 
 Existence of global policies that will have the effect of increasing global 
sugar demand and prices 
 Diversification of the industries into for example bioethanol production 
The EC bioethanol blend mandate is one policy that is expected to increase global 
sugar demand and therefore support sugar production and export in the SADC 
region and ACP countries in general. 
In the pacific region, only Fiji had a special sugar trade agreement with the EU 
region. Figure 4-16 below show sugar cane production in Fiji in recent years. 
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Figure 4-16: Fiji Sugar cane production and area harvested* 
 
*Primary axis: Hactares; Secondary axis: Tonnes 
Source: FAO Statistics 
 
Like is the case in most SADC ACP member states the sugar industry has historical 
economic importance to Fiji economy. For example, in 2005 the most recent period 
for which published data is available, sugar accounted for 6% of GDP and some 26 
% of total merchandise exports (The Fiji Sugar Corporation ltd, 2012). However, Fiji 
sugar production has been on a steady decline from the year 2000 as seen in Figure 
4-16. Since most of the Pacific region has not had a special sugar trade arrangement 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh ?ƚŚĂƚƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵŐĂƌƐĞĐƚŽƌǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ?  
Having reviewed the ACP sugar industries, specifically those that had special trade 
arrangements with the EU, we now discuss recent policies and reforms affecting EU 
sugar regime. These policies and reforms are expected to have an effect on the ACP 
sugar industries that benefited from preferential trade arrangements with the EU as 
we have alluded to. 
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4.7 Recent EU/ACP sugar trade regime reforms 
 
The EU sugar regime has undergone some major reforms mostly in an attempt to 
comply with WTO trading rules. In discussing the reforms and policies that are 
expected to affect the EU sugar regime, we start with the EU sugar reform of 2006. 
 
4.7.1 The EU sugar reform of 2006 
 
As of 21 February 2006, the EU decided to reduce the guaranteed price of sugar by 
36% over four years, starting in 2006. According to the EC (2006) this was the first 
serious reform of sugar under the CAP for 40 years. This EU sugar reforms followed 
the developments in 2003 in which the most efficient sugar producers that do not 
have access to the highly protected EU market, namely Brazil, Australia, and 
Thailand, filed a complaint against EU subsidized sugar exports. The complainants 
claimed that the subsidized re-export of EU sugar was above the levels agreed to in 
Uruguay Round world trade negotiations and these included the subsidization of 
the export of 1.6 million tonnes of sugar from ACP and Indian. A WTO panel and the 
Appellate Body ruled in favor of the complainants, finding that the EU exceeded its 
export subsidy commitment level by the exported quantity of 2.8 million tonnes. 
Therefore, the EU was obliged to bring its domestic market regulation into 
conformity with its WTO obligations (Analytical Note Report, 2007). This price cut 
then is an attempt to reduce the amount of sugar produced and imported into the 
EU.  
 
The major features of the reform as outlined by Gudoshnikov (2010) are the 
following:
24
  
 
 Reduction in sugar reference prices by 36% over four years starting from 
2006/07. The 2006/07 whitĞƐƵŐĂƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƉƌŝĐĞŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌtonne would 
                                                          
24
 For details of the EU sugar reform, please see House of Commons, Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee report, Volume 1. 
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ďĞ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ƚŽ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƉĞƌtonne by the end of the transition period in 
2009/10  
 Intervention after the four-year transition would be abolished and replaced 
with a system of private storage with producers taking advantage of the 
scheme being paid a private storage aid. Intervention during the transition 
period will be limited to 600 thousand tonnes per marketing year and the 
buying-in will take place at 80% of the reference price of the following 
marketing year;  
 To compensate farmers leaving the sector direct payments would cover 
64.2% of the income loss;  
 A restructuring fund woulĚƉĂǇĂďĂƐŝĐ ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌtonne in the first two years 
for producers, renouncing their quotas and quitting the industry with at 
ůĞĂƐƚ  ? ? ? ƉĞƌtonne going to ex-growers. To qualify for the restructuring 
mŽŶĞǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨĂůůƐ ƚŽ  ? ? ? ? ƉĞƌ ƚŽŶŶĞ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ?520 per tonne in 
2009/10, sugar companies had to give up their rights to the quota, stop 
production altogether in at least one factory, close the factory and restore 
good environmental conditions of the site and help the redeployment of 
factory staff; and  
 dŚĞƋƵŽƚĂƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐƐŝŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚ ?dŚĞ “ ?ĂŶĚ “ ?ƋƵŽƚĂƐǁĞƌĞŵĞƌŐĞĚŝŶƚŽ
a single quota. The previous basic maximum (A+B) quotas applicable would 
apply for the first four years as there will be no compulsory quota reduction 
applicable during that time.  
 
The EU measures of price cut in particular affects EU sugar production and incomes 
in the 19 ACP countries that benefit from the preferential price from the Special 
and Preferential sugar. The evolution of the price cuts is shown in Table 4.10 below. 
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Table 4.10: EU support prices from 2005-2010 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Reference price for producers 
 ? ? ?ƚŽŶŶĞ ) 
631.9 505.5 458.1 410.7 404.4 
% reduction in reference price 0 20.0 27.5 35.0 36.0 
Reference price for consumers 
 ? ? ?ƚŽŶŶĞ ) 
631.9 631.9 631.9 541.5 404.4 
% reduction in consumer 
prices 
0 0 0 14.3 36.0 
ZĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐůĞǀǇ ? ? ?ƚŽŶŶĞ ) 0 126.4 173.8 113.3 0 
Reference price (ACP raw 
sugar- ? ?ƚŽŶŶĞ ) 
523.7 496.8 496.8 448.8 335.2 
% reduction in raw sugar price 0 5.1 5.1 14.3 36.0 
Minimum sugar beet price 
 ? ? ?ƚŽŶŶĞ ) 
43.63 32.9 29.8 27.8 26.3 
% reduction in minimum sugar 
beet price 
0 24.7 31.7 36.2 39.7 
Source: International sugar organisation (ISO), 2010 
 
Table 4.10 above show that the guaranteed prices that ACP countries receive for 
sugar export to the EU has gradually eroded from 2006 to reach the target 36% in 
2010. This reduction in guaranteed price is expected to affect the production of 
sugar both in the EU and in ACP countries. A study by Elbehri et al (2008) concluded 
that the combined effect of cuts in the intervention prices and production quotas 
would lead to lower EU sugar production, lower prices for consumers and increase 
consumption.  The study further concluded that the EU sugar exports would decline 
because of a combination of lower production, lower export subsidies, and 
restrictions on exports of non-quota sugar and consequently, EU sugar imports will 
have to rise to bring the market into balance. These findings have interesting 
implications for the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, whose application will 
lead to further increase in demand for sugar in the region with significant impact to 
the EU and global sugar markets. 
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A study by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2007) concluded that a 36% cut in EU intervention price will result in 7.7% 
reduction in EU sugar imports, 86.6% reduction in EU sugar export and increase in 
world market price for white sugar of 1.2% by 2015.  The study further noted that 
efficient sugar producers will benefit from this intervention price cut with sugar 
exports rising by 3.1% for South Africa, 0.9% for Brazil, 1.3% for Cuba, 0.2% for 
Australia and 1.5% for Thailand. Moyo and Spreen (2011) found that the EU cut in 
intervention price for sugar will result in a decrease in EU annual sugar production 
of 3.82% between 2000/2001 and 2010/2011 agricultural marketing years. 
 
The intervention price cut has adversely affected a majority of ACP countries that 
were benefitting from the high priced EU sugar market. This is a direct result of 
revenue loss due to the lower prices. For example, the cut in intervention price has 
seen exports from the Caribbean regions to the EU drop significantly as has been 
seen in Figure 4-12 with some of these countries moving away from sugar 
production to tourism. The Ramphal centre for international trade law, policy & 
services of the University of the West Indies (2010) noted that with the exception of 
Guyana and Belize, ƚŚĞĂƌŝďďĞĂŶƐƵŐĂƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŚĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇ
been replaced by the tourism industry. It further noted that according to the 
Bureau of Statistics of Guyana, the sugar industry contributed 4.7% to the Guyanese 
economy in 2009 as compared to 15.8% contribution in 2003. 
 
Figure 4-17 below is an estimate of the loss of revenue to various ACP countries as a 
result of the reform in EU sugar regime.  
 
 
 
 
 
Ch. 4 - The EU/global sugar market: production and trade policies 
 
4-54 
 
Figure 4-17: ACP estimated revenue loss due to EU sugar reform (US$/tonne) 
 
Source: USDA (2011) 
Figure 4-17 above shows that ACP countries are affected differently because of 
their differences in dependencies on the EU sugar market and the speed of 
diversification to other industries. This further highlights the significance of country 
or regional heterogeneity in response to a policy change. 
 
Since one of the aims of this research is to model the potential effects of a binding 
EC bioethanol policy on ACP sugar trade with the EU, the preferential price 
agreements become important. This is because the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy is envisaged to increase demand and therefore the price of sugar in the 
region. These dynamics will potentially have an opposite effect to the proposed 
intervention price cut by the EC.  
As well as the specific reform of the EU sugar regime arising from the WTO ruling in 
2006, there are various other policies that are expected to affect the EU sugar 
regime with direct and indirect spillover effects to ACP sugar industries. The most 
important ones are discussed next. 
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4.7.2 The EU biofuel policy 
 
The EU biofuel policy and its link to the EU sugar market has been extensively 
reviewed earlier. For completion, the biofuel blend mandate directive is as follows: 
 
Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 123, 
17/052003. The Directive on Biofuels set a reference value for the national 
indicative targets at 2%, calculated on the *basis of energy content*, of all fuels for 
transport purposes placed on their markets by 2005, while the market share of 
biofuels is set at 5.75% for 2010. In 2007 the European Commission recommends a 
minimum share of 10% for biofuels by 2020 in its schedule regarding renewable 
energy (Hingyi H, 2007). 
 
Our interest in this derective is on bioethanol production in the EU region as a 
result of its application. Since bioethanol in the EU is also produced from sugar 
beet, it is expected that this blend mandate will affect the EU sugar market by 
increasing demand for sugar. This will have implications on sugar production and 
trade between the EU and ACP countries. 
However, analysis of the potential effect of this directive on the EU sugar market 
cannot be done in isolation without a study of its possible interactions with the 
other policies that affect the EU/ACP sugar trade protocols. The most important 
trade policies between the EU and ACP countries are the EPA policies which we 
discuss next.  
 
4.7.3 The EPAs 
 
The EPAs aim to replace the Lomé and the Cotonou Agreements between the EU 
and ACP countries. The Cotonou Agreement of June 2000 expired in 2008 and was a 
waiver given to ACP countries by WTO to replace the Lomé scheme. Both 
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agreements were not in line with the WTO MFN clause, thus resulting in the 
EU/ACP EPA trade negotiations which aim to comply with this WTO clause.25 
 
The Sugar Protocol preferences generally violate the nondiscrimination obligations 
contained in the GATT 1994 clause of the WTO. In order to deal with preferential 
arrangement between the EU and ACP countries, the EU had received a special 
waiver with regard to this WTO clause which allowed it to grant trade preferences 
under the Cotonou Agreement, which also embraces the Sugar Protocol . The WTO 
waiver expired at the end of 2007 meaning such preferences became highly 
vulnerable to legal challenge from other WTO members. The denunciation of the 
Sugar Protocol remedied this vulnerability with effect from October 2009 by the 
creation of the EPAs between the EU and ACP member states which were 
beneficiaries to the preferential trade agreements (Analytical Note Report, 2007).  
 
The first vulnerability of the legal status of the EU and ACP trade protocols was first 
exposed by the USA in 1995. The USA at the time filed an application to the WTO 
requesting an investigation on whether the Lomé IV convention was not a violation 
of the WTO trade rules. After investigation the WTO ruled that the trade 
arrangement between the EU and ACP countries was indeed in violation of its rules. 
Hence, for continued existence of these trade arrangements between the EU and 
ACP, a special waiver was required. 
 
Therefore, in an attempt to comply with the WTO trade rules the EU, as mentioned 
before has proposed the EPAs which will see the end of preferential trade 
arrangements between the EU and ACP countries and will introduce reciprocity and 
                                                          
25
 GATT Article I: provides for WTO Members to accord Most-Favoured-Nation treatment to like 
products of other WTO Members regarding tariffs, regulations on exports and imports, internal taxes 
and charges, and internal regulations. In other words, "like" products from all WTO Members must 
be given the same treatment as the most advantageous treatment accorded the products of any 
state. 
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non discrimination trade arrangements between the two regions. There has 
however been a lot of speculation about the outcome of EPAs between the EU and 
ACP countries on whether they will promote regional integration or subject ACP 
countries to unfair competition from subsidized EU exports.  
 
For example, Stevens (2005) noted that such uncertainties arise due to questions 
like: how much liberalization would each ACP country have to undertake to meet 
the definition of  ‘substantially ? all trade in the EPAs clause, how difficult is it likely to 
be to forge common regional positions under EPAs that do not result in future 
problems and what effect will EPA liberalization have on ACP government revenues. 
Some of these questions arise from the EPA ĐůĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĂǇƐ  ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ƚƌĂĚĞ
ůŝďĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĐůĞĂƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐůĂƵƐĞ 
 
Other important contentious issues in the EPAs as far as trade liberalization and 
reciprocity arrangement with the EU is concerned is the heterogeneity of the ACP 
countries in their trade and tariff lines, their production efficiencies, speed of 
adjustment to policies changes and therefore on their classification of sensitive 
products. These issues makes the arguments proposed by the EU that the EPAs will 
promote regional integration look over ambitious and not easy to model and 
support empirically. The review of the ACP sugar industries has highlighted such 
heterogeneity amongst ACP countries. 
 
The first step to the EPAs negotiations was for the ACP countries to form 
themselves into regional groups, some of which are actually more advanced in 
regional integration than others, and six groups have emerged namely; The 
Caribbean, Central Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa (SADC), East and Southern 
Africa (ESA) and the East and African Community (EAC). Some African countries 
have yet to decide which group they are in and some are members of more than 
one group, e.g., Zambia is in ESA and SADC; Tanzania is in ESA, SADC and EAC. One 
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of the problems faced by these regional groups, as noted by Lyakurwa et al (1997) is 
that existing regional integration arrangements (RIAs) are at best weak, have 
proved politically difficult to sustain and have unclear economic benefits generated.  
 
These are some of the difficulties the EPAs are likely to encounter and the sugar 
trade protocol is expected to be at the centre stage of these trade developments. 
This is because it is expected that these EPAs will affect sugar exporting ACP 
countries differently due to among other things, their different production and 
transport cost, differences in the contributions of the sugar trade arrangements to 
their GDP, speed of production adjustments and reforms and the interlinkages of 
sugar to other commodities in the classification of sensitive products which are  
therefore subject to tariff protection as we have already seen. The potential 
complexities of the EPAs therefore means that in order to analyse their likely effects 
on  the sugar protocol between the EU/ACP countries, assumptions have to be 
made about the EPA arrangement in place in as far as tariff lines and trade 
liberation arrangement between the various ACP countries and EU is concerned.  
 
Figure 4-18 is the summary of recent EU policy development that will have impacts 
on the EU/global sugar market and therefore have impacts, directly or indirectly on 
the sugar trade regime between the EU and ACP countries. 
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Figure 4-18: EU sugar policy developments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: expanded from Analytical Note, 2007 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the policies that sustain agricultural markets in the EU 
with special attention given to the EU sugar market, one which will potentially be 
affected by the EC biofuel policy. It has thus reviewed the EU sugar regime and its 
linkages to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in details. The CAP policy, due to 
its protectionist mechanism has helped increased agricultural productivity in the EU 
region. The intricate CMO policies that are linked to the CAP have helped made the 
EU a global sugar producer and trader despite the fact that the region is a high cost 
producer of this commodity. EU sugar imports from ACP countries have been 
important in shaping the EU sugar regime. In this way, historical policies that have 
sustained trade between the EU and ACP countries were also been discussed. These 
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include the Lomé and the Cotonou trade Agreements which have since expired to 
give way to the EPAs which are more in line with WTO trade expectations.  
 
These policies have sustained sugar industries and ACP countries. In this way, the 
ACP sugar industries have also been reviewed to point out their heterogeneity in as 
far as their dependence on the EU sugar market and sugar production efficiencies 
are concerned. In this way, this highlights their potential different reactions from 
policies that affect the EU sugar markets.  Recent policy developments in the EU 
sugar regime as an attempt to comply with WTO rules have also been discussed 
more especially the 2006 reform of 36% price cut in sugar intervention prices which 
has already had an impact on EU and ACP sugar sectors.  
 
A binding EC bioethanol policy will have the effect of increasing demand for sugar in 
the EU region as more sugar beet is diverted into the production of bioethanol as 
discussed in Chapter 3. In this way, such a policy is expected to have an impact on 
EU and global bioethanol crops commodities markets including sugar markets. The 
challenge is to be able to model the global impact of this policy together with its 
interaction with other future trade policies between the EU and ACP countries in 
order to come up with meaningful conclusions.  
 
In the next chapter, we review and motivate the GTAP model, a global CGE model 
that is ideal to analyse international trade policies.   
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Chapter 5  
A review of the GTAP model 
5.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we set up an EU27 bioethanol supply and demand model under an 
assumption of a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. The EU bioethanol 
supply and demand was then used to determine the equilibrium bioethanol 
conditions for the region. These bioethanol equilibrium conditions are expected to 
affect EU/global bioethanol crop commodities ? markets.  
It is the aim of this study to analyse these EU bioethanol market equilibrium effects 
on bioethanol crops commodities markets especially those of ACP countries. It is 
also interesting to analyse how the EC bioethanol blend mandate will interact with 
other future trade policies between the EU and ACP countries. Analysis of the global 
effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy and its interaction with other 
trade policies therefore requires a global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model. In this dissertation, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is the 
CGE model that will be used to analyse these policies. In the next section, we 
discuss this model so as to show its relevance and suitability for our study. We also 
motivate the theoretical foundations of the trade and welfare effects of the policies 
that we aim to simulate.  
This chapter is therefore structured as follows; section 5.1 offers an introduction to 
CGE and the GTAP modelling techniques. With reference to our study objectives, 
the theoretical foundations underpinning the GTAP model are discussed in section 
5.2 and section 5.3 motivates the model closure and linearisation of accounting 
equations. Section 5.4 discusses the application of the GTAP model in our study and 
the basis for our policy simulation results while section 5.5 is the conclusion. 
 
Ch.5 - A review of the GTAP model 
 
5-2 
 
5.1 CGE and GTAP modelling 
Partial equilibrium models are informative, detailed and easy to model for a small-
scale market simulation of a policy change but they are generally not convenient to 
study spillover effects, especially at a global or international level. Partial 
equilibrium models are also not suitable to analyse multi-policy interaction, as is 
one of the objectives for this study. As such, an alternative means of capturing 
global spillovers of policies and their interaction, our study is going to utilise CGE 
modelling techniques. 
 
CGE modelling, as first conceptualised by Walras (1834-1910), has its underpinnings 
on a system of equations based on the assumption of an economy in perfect 
competition where firms maximise profits subject to their production function and 
consumers maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint. In this case then 
there are various economic agents and the sum of excess demand across markets 
must be equal to zero. CGE models are therefore based on a general equilibrium 
approach where economic agents are represented by a set of equations that 
describe their optimisation behaviour. The modeler specifies the equations that 
describe the agent behaviour and how these various economic agents are related to 
each other. The key to these equations, however is that they are interdependent in 
a given economy through accounting mechanisms. For example, economic agents 
could be households, government and firms. With reference to income, households 
use their factors of production to obtain wages that they spend on private 
consumption, government taxes and savings. There is thus a circular flow of income 
through all these economic agents and this flow must balance. 
 
CGE modelling, as its name suggests, therefore aims to determine a point in a 
market where supply equals demand i.e. Walrasian equilibrium. At this equilibrium 
point markets clear, households maximise utility under a budget constraint and 
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firms maximise profits, which are driven down to zero. The aim of CGE modelling 
then is to solve for prices and quantities that will prevail at the equilibrium point. In 
the Walrasian equilibrium model the flexible price vector determines the 
equilibrium while in the Keynesian equilibrium model in the short-run the quantities 
vary while the prices remain fixed (Khan, 2007). CGE models are calibrated against 
data at a given point in time. The database and its size depend on the economy 
under analysis. Experiments are designed by manipulating certain key variables in a 
balanced dataset and analysing the resulting changes in variables specified as 
endogenous.  
Such models have been used in a wide range of studies and in various fields of 
economic and environmental policy analysis. For example, CGE modelling 
techniques have been used to analyse taxes and international trade (Shoven and 
Whalley ,1984), in the study of developing economies (Decaluwé and Martens, 
1988), to analyse energy and the environment (Bhattacharyya, 1996) and in analysis 
of benefits and losses resulting from free trade agreements (Lloyd and MacLafren, 
2004). 
The advantage of CGE models is that they take a holistic view of the entire economy 
under analysis and consider the interrelationships between the various economic 
agents across a given economy. In this way, they offer useful insights on possible 
economic impacts of changes in key variables and this makes them informative. 
They also integrate many aspects of economic theory and the basic assumption of 
agent behaviour can be manipulated by the modeler to suite the economy under 
analysis.  
Their major drawback is that they are static and cannot predict outcome in a time-
series manner. This makes them unsuitable for forecasting. Another disadvantage is 
that the assumptions made by the model are sometimes not realistic and can affect 
simulation outcomes. They also generally need a lot of data from various sources 
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and some of the data may not be accurate, which may result in misleading 
experimental outcomes. Further, CGE models tend to be large and as such they 
cannot relate results or outcomes accurately to a specific cause or shock in the 
database. As noted by Wing (2004) CGE models are viewed with suspicion in the 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂƐĂ “ďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ? ?ǁŚŽƐĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĐĂŶŶŽƚ
be meaningfully traced to any particular features of their data base or input 
parameters, algebraic structure or method of solution. However, for empirical 
studies of policies with global spillovers they remain the methods of choice.  
 
The GTAP model, which is an example of a CGE model, was developed by Hertel in 
1997. It is a static, multi sector, multi region model that has been widely used to 
simulate international trade policies. It is based on a detailed database with a broad 
coverage of trade and explicit statistics on transport margins. Firms use constant-
returns-to-scale technologies and import demand is modelled through the 
Armington assumption26 of imperfect substitutability between domestic and 
imported goods. Since the GTAP model is multiregional and multimarket, it is able 
to analyse local and international ŵƵůƚŝĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚǇŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? changes in production 
and trade profiles due to a local or regional policy. This makes the model ideal to 
analyse the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Armington (1969) made the assumption that internationally traded products are separable by 
their country of origin.  In this way, the assumption also differentiate between domestic and 
imported products. This has made internationally traded products (both for consumption and 
production) heterogenous and separable by use of CES. This assumption is widely used in CGE 
models and differs from the Heckscher-Ohlin models of homegenous products. This Armington 
assumption does not allow relocation of firms but since this is a static model this assumptioin is 
therefore not strong. 
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5.2 Theoretical foundations of the GTAP model 
The GTAP model is an example of a CGE model and its basis is a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM). A SAM is a square matrix of economic transactions (in monetary 
terms) in a macroeconomic entity. The SAM, being a square matrix, is designed such 
that rows (which represent income) are equal to columns (which represent 
expenditure) in the accounting flow of commodities. The database for a SAM is 
from Input-Output Tables, national accounts, government fiscal accounts and trade 
data. 
A typical structure of a SAM is shown in Table 5.1 below: 
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Table 5.1: A typical structure of a Social Accounting Matrix 
Expenditure 
/Income 
Commodities  Activities Factor 
Payments 
Households  Government Capital 
Account 
Rest of 
World 
Total 
Incomes 
Commodities  Intermediate 
Consumption 
 Household 
Consumption 
expenditure 
Government 
consumption 
expenditure 
Investment 
and 
inventory 
expenditure 
Export 
revenue 
Commodity 
demand 
Activities Marketed 
Production 
      Domestic 
Production 
Factors  Value Added  Domestic 
Employment 
Government 
Employment 
 Factor 
income from 
abroad 
Factor 
incomes 
Institutions: 
Households 
  Labour 
incomes 
and 
distributed 
profits 
Inter-
household 
transfers 
Government 
transfers to 
households 
 Remittances 
to 
households 
from abroad 
Household 
incomes 
Institutions: 
Government 
Tariff Revenue Indirect tax 
revenue less 
subsidies plus 
tariff revenue 
Taxes on 
labour and 
profits 
Tax revenue 
from 
households 
 Tax revenue 
from capital 
account 
Government 
income from 
world 
Government 
revenue 
Capital 
Account 
   Household 
saving 
Government 
saving 
 Current 
account  BoP 
Total 
Savings 
Rest of world   Competitive 
commodity 
Imports 
Non 
Competitive 
commodity 
imports 
Factor 
payments 
abroad 
Households 
transfer to 
world 
Government 
transfer to 
world 
  Total 
imports 
Total 
Expenditures 
Commodity 
supply 
Production Factor 
outlay 
Household 
expenditure 
Government 
expenditure 
Capital 
expenditure 
Total 
exports 
 
Source : Lange et al (2002) 
Ch.5 - A review of the GTAP model 
 
5-7 
 
As seen in the Table 5.1, the structure of the SAM describes a circular flow of 
commodities in a given economy. The accounts must balance, with income from a 
given activity being equal to expenditure for that activity. However, a SAM is not an 
economic model although its structure has a Keynesian flavour, reflecting its origins 
ŝŶ>ĞŽŶƚŝĞĨ ?ƐŝŶƉƵƚ-output schema and Keynesian macroeconomics (McDonald et. al, 
1997). The database of the SAM is therefore used with CGE modelling techniques to 
offer a powerful but user-friendly tool to analyze regional and international policies 
affecting the representative economic entity.   
 
In the flow of commodities in a typical SAM, households are the owners of means of 
production (capital and labour). Households rent out these factors of production to 
firms who produce the commodities that are in turn used up by the households. In 
the SAM flow of commodities a third party is added in this scenario, the 
government that acts to harmonize the flow of commodities between the firms and 
households by taxes and other policies that smooth this flow (Wing, 2003). Thus 
ƵƐŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐůŽƐĞd ůŽŽƉ ? ĨůŽǁ ŽĨ ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^D, the CGE is a zero-sum 
game, which enables it to have a unique solution in prices, allocation of goods and 
factors of production.  
Adapted from the concept of the SAM and CGE modelling, the overview of the 
GTAP model is then motivate following a paper by Brockmeier (2001)27. Figure 5-1 
below shows the basic structure of the GTAP depicting a one region closed 
economy without government intervention in the form of taxes and subsidies. This 
is the simplest form of the model showing the various economic agents and their 
linkages to each other via production, consumption and savings flow. The main 
                                                          
27
 Full exposition of the theoretical underpinnings of the model including behavoural equations can 
be found in Hertel and Tsigas (1997). The discussion here is with reference to our study objectives 
but we will maintain the variable notations as in the original GTAP model for ease of motivation of 
the adaptation of the model. For ease of decription and adaptation of the model, most of our 
discussion will therefore follow closely the paper by Hertel and Tsigas (1997) 
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economic agent in the model is the regional household, which is made up of 
government, private household and a saving agent as Figure 5-1 shows. 
Figure 5-1:  GTAP model - closed economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hertel and Tsigas (1997) 
In such an economy, all income accumulates to regional households who are 
owners of the factors of production. The source of this income is therefore 
producers who pay the regional households for use of factor endowments, namely 
labour, land and capital to produce commodities. These payments from producers 
to regional households are shown as Value of Output at Agents Price or VOAP in the 
diagram.  
The regional households use their incomes as Private Households Expenditure 
(PrExp), Savings (Save) and Government Expenditure (GovExp). These regional 
incomes are assumed to be distributed into these three components according to a 
Regional Households 
Private Households Government Savings 
Producers 
PrExp Save GovExp 
VDPA NetInv 
VOAP VDGA 
VDFA 
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Cobb-Douglas per capita utility function. These fixed expenditures can be viewed as 
representing households budget constraints in which case exogenous shocks can be 
analysed by the way the households adjust given their budget expenditure. The 
household budget constraint is also the sources of welfare changes from policies 
that affect commodity prices and therefore household incomes. In the above 
exposition the Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ behaviour, besides the purchase of factors of production, 
VOAP, also purchase intermediate products, which are denoted as Value of 
Domestic Purchase by fiƌŵƐ Ăƚ ŐĞŶƚ ?Ɛ WƌŝĐĞ  ?s& ) ? ^ince the firms themselves 
produce these intermediate goods, they enter into this economy in a cyclical 
manner within producers meaning that their net effect is zero.  
Government expenditure must therefore be equal to the Value of their Domestic 
purchases at Agents prices (VDGA), Private household expenditure must be equal to 
the Value of their Domestic purchases at Agents prices (VDPA) and households 
invest their savings as Net Investments (NetInv). The motivation above does not 
involve trade flows since it is a closed economy scenario as already mentioned. This 
simplified one region scenario also does not involve policy intervention such as the 
introduction of taxes and subsidies in the flow of commodities. Involvement of 
taxes, subsidies and international trade result in the open economy scenarios as 
shown in Figure 5-2.  
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Figure 5-2: GTAP model  ? open economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hertel and Tsigas (1997). 
In Figure 5-2, the openness of the economy is seen by the introduction of another 
region namely the Rest Of the World (ROW). This region is an aggregation of all the 
trading partners of the reference economy. In this open economy, producers in the 
reference region also gain additional revenue from exporting goods to the rest of 
the world and these are denoted by VXMD. The producers also import intermediate 
products from the rest of the world and these are shown as VIFA. 
The savings component has been modified in this open economy to GLOBAL 
savings, which is the collection of all saving in the global economy. Since households 
and governments are on their budget constraint and because firm profits are driven 
to zero, these global savings are equivalent to global investments as per the 
ĚŝĐƚĂƚĞƐ ŽĨ tĂůƌĂƐ ? >Ăǁ ?In this extended economy, government and private 
VDPA 
Taxes 
VOAP 
Regional Households 
Private 
Household
s 
Government Global Savings 
Producers 
PrExp Save GovExp 
NetInv 
VDGA 
VIFA 
Rest of the 
World 
VXMD 
Taxes 
Taxes 
VIPA VIGA 
XTAX MTAX 
VDFA 
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households also import commodities, besides the use of domestic commodities to 
satisfy their demand. These imported commodities are denoted as VIGA and VIPA 
for government and household imports respectively. In this way, producers 
combine domestic intermediate inputs and imported intermediate inputs to 
maximise their profit while government and private households combine local 
commodities and imported commodities to maximise their utility subject to a 
budget constraint. 
Value of exports (i.e export price multiplied by the exported quantity) from the 
reference economy to the rest of the world are denoted by VXMD . Taxes have also 
been included in this extended scenario, where MTAX refer to import taxes paid by 
regional households to the rest of the world while export taxes, paid by the rest of 
the world to regional households are denoted by XTAX. Taxes here mean  ‘taxes and 
subsidies ? where subsidies are negative taxes. For example, an import tax result in 
the price of the domestic commodity being higher than the rest of the world price 
and an import subsidy has the opposite effect.  Likewise, an export tax results in the 
rest of the world price for the exported commodity being higher that the domestic 
price, with an export subsidy having an opposite effect.  
The effect of an export subsidy in an open economy can be explained by Figure 5-3 
below;  
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a b 
c 
d 
e o 
Figure 5-3: Effect of an export subsidy in region r  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3 above shows that the imposition of an export subsidy results in the Free 
on Board price of commodity i from region r to region s i.e.  PFOB (i,r,s), being lower 
than its domestic price shown as PM (i,r). In the above diagram, QXS (i,r,s) 
represent the quantity of exports of commodity i from region r to region s. S1 and S0 
are the subsidized and pre-subsidized export supply respectively of commodity i 
from region r to region s. D represent the demand for commodity i supplied from 
region r to region s.  
With reference to Figure 5-3 the following variables are defined;  
VXMD (i,r,s) = Value of exports of commodity i from region r to region s at 
ĞǆƉŽƌƚĞƌ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŝĐĞ. This is shown by the area aboe.  
VXWD (i,r,s) = Value of export of commodity i from region r to region s at FOB price. 
This is shown by the area cdoe 
XTAX (i,r,s) = Value of expenditure on subsidy, which is equivalent to a negative tax. 
This is shown by the area abcd. 
It therefore follows that; 
 
PM  (i,r) 
   PFOB (i,r,s) 
   QXS (i,r,s) 
 
 
D 
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 VXWD (i,r,s) = VXMD (i,r,s)  W XTAX (i,r,s)              
 (5.1) 
 
The effect of the export subsidy shows that region r is worse off since it has to pay 
the subsidy which is equivalent to XTAX (i,r,s), which represents a negative tax to 
the economy.  
The effect of an export tax is opposite to that of an export subsidy and is shown in 
Figure 5-4. 
 
Figure 5-4: Effect of an export tax in region r  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 5-4 above shows, the effect of the export tax is to raise the market price 
of the exported commodity i from region r i.e. PM (i,r,) to the free on board price 
PFOB  (i,r,s) by an amount of the tax. This means that government in the exporting 
country r gains revenue equivalent to XTAX (i,r,s).  
In the case of the export tax with reference to Figure 5-4 therefore;  
VXMD (i,r,s), which is the value of exports of commodity i from region r to region s 
ĂƚĞǆƉŽƌƚĞƌ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŝĐĞŝƐŶŽǁƐŚŽǁŶďǇƚŚĞĂƌĞĂhijo.  
PFOB  (i,r,s) 
   PM (i,r) 
   QXS (i,r,s) 
 
 
D 
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k l 
m n 
p o 
VXWD (i,r,s), which is the value of export of commodity i from region r to region s at 
FOB price is now shown by the area fgjo.  
XTAX (i,r,s), which is the  value of the export tax imposed by region r on commodity 
i being exported to region s is now shown by the area fghi and represent a positive 
tax or revenue to the economy of region r.  
 Again it follows that:  
VXWD (i,r,s) = VXMD (i,r,s) + XTAX (i,r,s)        
(5.2) 
The effects of import taxes (subsidies) work in an opposite manner to the effects of 
exports taxes (subsidies) and their effects are summarised by the Figures 5-5 and 5-
6 below: 
Figure 5-5: Effect of an import subsidy in region s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5 shows that the imposition of an import subsidy results in the domestic 
price of the imported commodity i from region r to regions s shown as PMS (i,s) 
being lower that its cost insurance and freight price PCIF (i,r,s) price. In the diagram 
D0 is the pre-subsidized net demand of commodity i supplied from region r to 
S 
PCIF  (i,r,s) 
   PMS (i,s) 
   QXS (i,r,s) 
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region s. D1 is the subsidized net demand of commodity i supplied from region r to 
region s. Region s therefore pay for the import subsidy equivalent to MTAX (i,r,s), 
which is equivalent to a negative tax to the economy.   
With reference to Figure 5-5 we again define the following variables; 
VIMS (i,r,s)  = Value of imports of commodity i from region r to region s at 
iŵƉŽƌƚĞƌ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŝĐĞ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƐŚŽǁŶďǇƚŚĞĂƌĞĂmnop. 
VIWS (i,r,s) = Value of imports of commodity i from region r to region s at CIF price. 
This is shown by the area klop. 
MTAX (i,r,s) = Value of expenditure on import subsidy of commodity i supplied from 
region r to region s. This is shown by the area klmn. 
In the above case then it follows that: 
VIMS (i,r,s) = VIWS (i,r,s)  W MTAX (i,r,s)           
 (5.3) 
And finally the effect of an import tax is shown below: 
Figure 5-6: Effects of an import tax in region s  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PMS (i,s) 
   PCIF (i,r,s) 
   QXS (i,r,s) 
 
 S 
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From Figure 5-6 above, the effect of the import tax is to raise the domestic price of 
commodity i supplied from region r to region s shown as PMS (i,s) to be above the 
cost insurance and freight price PCFI (i,r,s) by the amount of the import tax. In this 
case therefore, it is clearly apparent that policies that have the tendency of 
reducing the import tax will be welfare enhancing in that they will reduce the 
domestic price that households face and in this way result in positive equivalent 
variation outcomes.  
In this case therefore; 
VIMS (i,r,s), which is the  value of imports of commodity i from region r to region s 
ĂƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĞƌ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŝĐĞŝŶŶŽǁƐŚŽǁŶďǇƚŚĞĂƌĞĂqvou. 
VIWS (i,r,s), which is the value of imports of commodity i from region r to region s at 
CIF price is now shown by the area  xtou.  
MTAX (i,r,s), which is the value of gain on import tax of commodity i supplied from 
region r to region s is now shown by the area qvxt. 
Again, the identity below holds 
 
VIMS (i,r,s) = VIWS (i,r,s) + MTAX (i,r,s)                        
   (5.4) 
When the market price exceeds the world price, i.e. PMS (i,r,s) > PCIF (i,r,s) then 
MTAX (i,r,s)> 0 and this contributes to regional income. In this case, therefore the 
equation below holds;   
 
VIMS (i,r,s)  W VIWS (i,r,s) = ʏimp(i,r,s) PCIF (i,r,s)QXS (i,r,s) >0 
(5.5) 
 
With VIMS (i,r,s) and  VIWS (i,r,s) defined as before and ʏimp(i,r,s)  is the import tax 
on commodity i imported from region r to region s. PCIF (i,r,s) is the world (cif) price 
Ch.5 - A review of the GTAP model 
 
5-17 
 
of tradeable commodity i imported from source r to destination s. The manipulation 
of the tax rate on imports in the GTAP model is key to simulating trade liberalisation 
agreements like the EPA policies between the EU and ACP countries.  
The effects of the taxes on domestic prices can be shown by equation 5.6 below: 
 
PS (i,r) [1 + ʏ ?ŝ ?ƌ ? ? = PM (i,r)                 
(5.6) 
 
Where PS (i,r) is the supply price of nonsaving commodity i in region r and PM (i,r) is 
the market price of nonsaving commodity i in region r. In this case, ʏ ?ŝ ?ƌ ? represents 
the ad valorem tax rate. This then means that; 
 
VOM (i,r)  W VOA (i,r) = ʏ ?ŝ ?ƌ)PM (i,r)QO (i,r) 
                             
(5.7) 
 
Where VOM (i,r) and VOA (i,r) are the values of nonsaving commodity i produced in 
region r evaluated at market price and agent price respectively. Equation 5.7 will 
allow us to simulate the effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy by 
artificially depressing EU bioethanol crops commodities output through increasing 
their output tax as we will see later. 
 
In the next section, we discuss the equations that characterise the behaviour of 
various economic agents in the model. Behavioural equations are based on the 
assumptions made about economic variables like consumer spending and 
production functions and they represent the decision characterising the choices 
made by such economic agents in a model. 
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5.2.1 Behavioural equations 
&ŝƌŵƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ: The behavior of firms like those of households follows a constant 
return to scale with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES). The elasticity of 
substitution for the combination of primary and intermediate inputs is Leontief 
meaning these are combined in fixed proportions. The CES assumption in the GTAP 
model allows for separability of the factors of production. The exposition of firm ?s 
behaviour is summarised by a production tree as shown in Figure 5-7 below.  
Figure 5-7: Production tree for output (QO) in the GTAP model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bryant and Campiche, 2009 
The production tree in Figure 5-7 shows that to produce output QO firms use 
primary factors of production, which are mainly labour, capital and land combined 
with intermediate factors of production. The primary factors of production are 
assumed immobile across regions. However, factors are fully mobile across 
production sectors, and the equilibria generated by the model are therefore long 
run (Bryant and Campiche, 2009). On the other hand, regions adjust immediately to 
an external shock so as to remain in continuous equilibrium. The lack of a clear time 
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path response to policy changes in standard CGE models is their major shortfall that 
hinders their usefulness for policy makers. However, they do offer useful policy 
simulation outcomes albeit of a static nature.  
Household behaviour: Regional household behaviour is driven by an aggregate 
utility function, specified over composite private consumption, composite 
government purchases, and savings.  
Households dispose total regional income according to a Cobb-Douglas per capita 
utility function specified over the three forms of final demand which are household 
expenditures, government expenditures and savings. Thus in the standard closure, 
the claims of each of these areas represent a constant share of total income.  
Government Expenditure: Government collects taxes from households 
levied on factor incomes, on factor use and against production sectors. 
Taxes are also levied on import and export of commodities. These taxes 
form total government income that is in turn exhausted on income payment 
for households and on the purchase of composite goods in a Cobb-Douglas 
expenditure of the budget. 
Private Expenditure: Households, as owners of the factors of production 
receive income from the production sector and transfer payments from 
government. This income is used as savings and for consumption, with the 
consumption of differentiated goods specified on a CES assumption. 
Households aim to maximise their utility under a budget constraint. Factors 
that improve household utility are welfare improving while those that 
reduce household utility result in welfare loss. For example, policies that 
have an effect of reducing domestic prices for commodities are welfare 
improving since households can now afford larger bundles of goods and 
services and therefore reach a higher utility curve.  
In the GTAP model, the computation of the utility of private household 
consumption takes into account the population growth rate meaning that it is 
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expressed on a per capita basis. Private household behaviour is summarised in 
Figure 5-8 below: 
Figure 5-8: Private household behavioural tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bryant and Campiche, 2009 
 
5.2.2 Model closure and linearization  
 
Closure of the model implies the specification of variables as being endogenous or 
exogenous. For the model to have a unique solution, the number of endogenous 
variables must be equal to the number of equations. In the standard GTAP model 
closure prices and quantities of all endowment commodities and regional incomes 
are set to be endogenous. Policy variables, technical change variables and 
population are all exogenous. In the standard model closure, and as a model 
consistency check, global saving must be equal to global investments. Simulations in 
the model are performed by manipulation of exogenous variables. However, 
exogenous variables can be swapped for endogenous variables but in all cases of 
model closure, Walras Law must hold. For this study, it is not necessary to change 
the standard GTAP closure since the exogenous variables specified in this closure 
can be manipulated appropriately to simulate all our experiments. The linearisation 
problem in the equilibrium solution of CGE models following a policy change is best 
explained by Figure 5-9 below with its discussion as adapted from Hertel and Tsigas 
(1997). 
Utility, UMax 
Savings Consumption 
Commodity 1  Q Commodity N 
CES 
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Figure 5-9:  A graphical exposition of linearization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Hertel and Tsigas (1997). 
The linearisation in the GTAP model is motivated by first considering a model given 
by a single equation g(X,Y) = 0 (with X being exogenous and Y being endogenous) 
and an initial equilibrium at point (X0, Y0). These points and the model are shown in 
Figure 5-9 above. Policy simulation involves  ‘shocking ? the exogenous variable to 
say X1, and computing the resulting endogenous outcome Y1. Evaluating the 
linearized representation of the model at (X0, Y0) means the equations would 
predict the outcome BJ = (X1, YJ). This is the Johansen approach and is not accurate 
in that YJ > Y1. This type of error has led to criticism of the individuals using 
linearized CGE models. However, the accuracy of the linearized model can be 
considerably improved by dividing the shock to X into two parts and updating the 
equilibrium sequentially.  This approach means moving from point A to C2 to B2 and 
Bj 
B2 
g(X,Y)=0 
B 
C2 
X1 X0 
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evaluating the Y outcome at YE2, which has a lower error compared to Yj. This 
method is termed Euler's method of solution via linearized representation. By 
increasing the number of steps, one obtains an increasingly accurate solution of the 
nonlinear model, which will eventually converge to the true values i.e. (X1, Y1). The 
default method used for solving the GTAP model is Gragg's method in which case 
the model is solved as a stepwise approach.  
In summary therefore, the GTAP model has three solution methods for simulation 
experiments, which are the Johansen, Gragg, ĂŶĚƵůĞƌ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? For all our policy 
simulation experiments, we will assume a linear solution outcome and apply the 
Johansen approach. The reason is that the Johansen approach is the one that is 
used in many simulation studies that use the GTAP model. Further, the exogenous 
variables that we manipulate to simulate our policy experiments have a linear 
relationship with the endogenous variables as seen in equations 5.5 and 5.7 above. 
5.3 Study application of the GTAP model  
 
Policy simulation in the GTAP model is done by manipulating the variables that are 
set as exogenous in the GTAP closure. In setting up the EU bioethanol market 
model, one of the key assumptions we made was that the region produces its entire 
bioethanol requirements locally as will be demanded by the mandate, by diverting 
some of the bioethanol crops from food production to bioethanol production. In 
this way, modelling the effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on 
bioethanol crops commodities market in the EU region can be done through 
artificially depressing bioethanol crops commodities amount marketed in the region 
by an amount equivalent to that which will be demanded by a binding blend 
mandate.  
 
Artificially depressing bioethanol crops commodities output or production in the EU 
to simulate the EC bioethanol blend mandate effects is not straight forward in the 
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GTAP model given the fact that prices and quantities of all commodities are set to 
be endogenous in a standard GTAP closure. However, policy variables like taxes or 
subsidies are all exogenous in the model. In this way to simulate the artificial 
reduction in bioethanol crops commodities output in the EU region we will use the 
exogenously defined tax rates i.e. ʏ (i,r).   
 
The manipulation of the tax rates is the standard procedure used in the GTAP 
model to obtain regional elasticities of various commodities. This is done by altering 
the tax by enough to raise the market price, pm (i,r), by 1%, one commodity and 
one region at a time. The percentage reduction in output {qo (i,r)} is then recorded 
and the own price elasticity of demand is then simply define as; { ?  ?ŝ ?ƌ ? A?
qo(i,r)/pm(i,r)}.  
 
In our analysis qo (i,r) will represent the artificial percentage decrease in bioethanol 
crops commodities output in the EU due to bioethanol production. In this way, the 
model is able to simulate the effects of the EU bioethanol partial equilibrium 
conditions as derived in chapter 3. The idea is that bioethanol production will divert 
some bioethanol crops commodities to bioethanol production. Therefore, we will 
simulate ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? as an artificial decrease in bioethanol crops commodities 
output in the EU region. The amount of bioethanol crops commodities diverted to 
be bioethanol production will be determined from the bioethanol market clearing 
quantities as derived in chapter 3. Therefore, using bioethanol crops commodities 
own price elasticities and manipulating the variable pm (i,r) via the exogenously 
defined tax variable we are able to manipulate the variable qo (i,r) which is the 
percentage change in quantity of non saving commodity i ouput in region r. 
 
The simulation of the EPA policies is also via the exogenously defined tax on imports 
of tradeable commodity i from region r to destination s and levied in region s. To 
simulate a full EPA, the import tax is reduced to zero percent between the EU27 
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and ACP countries and vice versa because of reciprocity. Reducing import tax to 
zero percent is the extreme case in that it does not consider sensitive products that 
are not liberalised and thus it takes the EPA clause of  ‘substantial ? liberalization of 
tradeable commodities as  ‘full ?ůŝďĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?However, it is a reasonable scenario in 
the analysis of the possible effects of the EPAs on the ACP member states as an 
upper bound outcome. 
 
The economic effect of a policy change is usually measured in its welfare outcomes 
on consumers or households. Therefore, welfare changes, industry output changes 
and changes in trade balances as a result of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy, EPA policies and their interactions are the outcomes of interest to be 
analysed. 
 
In a perfectly working global economy prices for the same commodity will be equal 
due to arbitrage tendencies. However, taxes in the form of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers are market distorting. Import tariffs for example result in welfare loss since 
they have a tendency of increasing domestic prices for households above those that 
prevail in the world market. In theory therefore, it is envisaged that cuts in import 
tariffs will benefit domestic consumers in that they will be able to obtain products 
from lowest cost producers elsewhere. In this case, abolition of trade barriers 
should result in an efficient global economy. The simulation of the EPA policies 
therefore aims to quantify the welfare gain from the abolition of import duties. On 
the other hand, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is expected to result in 
welfare loss as a direct result of increase in the prices of bioethanol crops 
commodities in the EU region.  
 
One measure of welfare outcome of a policy is the equivalent variation (EV) which 
is defined as the amount of money paid to a consumer so as to leave them as well 
off as they would be after a policy change. Equivalently, equivalent variation can be 
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A 
B 
C 
defined as a change in nominal income that is equivalent in its effect on utility to a 
change in the price of a commodity. To motivate the idea of equivalent variation we  
use the exposition shown in Figure 5-10 below;  
 
Figure 5-10: Graphical exposition of equivalent variation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, consider an economy with two goods Q1 and Q2. In the above diagram, BC 
refers to the budget constraint line. Suppose we begin with BC1 and optimal 
consumption at A on indifference curve U1. There is then a policy change e.g. an 
increase in import tax that results in the price of good Q1 to rise. This causes the 
budget constraint line to pivot inwards to become BC2 such that the new point of 
optimality is at B on indifference curve U0. The price increase therefore has the 
same effect as a fall in ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞĂů ŝŶĐŽŵĞ and as such, the consumer is 
worse off as he/she is now at a lower indifference curve. The equivalent variation in 
monetary terms as a result of this price increase is determined by moving the old 
budget line BC1 in a parallel fashion until it targents at the lower indifference curve 
Q2 
Q1 
U1 
U0 
BC2 
BC3 BC1 
       EV 
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U0 (i.e. point C). This results in a new bugdet line BC3 and the equivalent variation is 
then measured on the vertical axis in monetary units as the difference between BC1 
and BC3.  
 
Taxes and subsidies, because they result in changes in prices of goods, have welfare 
implications. Generally, policies that decrease (increase) the prices of goods, like 
import subsidies (taxes) result in welfare gain (loss). The welfare effect of an 
international trade policy like an import tax can also be explained by its effects on 
production and trade following Pant et al (2000). Let us assume that a country has 
imposed a prohibitive import tariff that makes it remain at autarky. Let P represent 
the relative price of importable goods in terms of exportable goods, Q is the output 
for the given country and X is a vector of demand. The autarky equilibrium is given 
by the function (Po, Qo, Xo). The effect of the tax on price P0 is given by; 
Po= P* (1+To) 
where P* is the world price of the importable and To is the ad valorem tariff rate. 
Therefore we have (Qo = Xo) which represent the autarky equilibrium. If the country 
removes the tariff fully so that the change in domestic price ratio is equal to the 
international terms of trade i.e. P1= P* holds and letting (P1, Q1, X1) = the new 
equilibrium after tariff removal, then; 
 
EV = PoX1 - PoXo 
= Po(E1 + Q1 - PoQo) 
=P*(1+To)E1 + Po(Q1- Qo) 
 
Where E1 is a vector of excess demand, which is equal to (X-Q). 
Noting that the aggregate value of excess demand disappears at world prices, the 
expression becomes; 
 
EV = P*ToE1 + Po (Q1-Q0) 
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EV depends on changes in quantity of net imports E1 and changes in output. 
The first term is positive if imports increase due to removal of tariff. For the second 
term, if the economy was operating at full efficiency at autarky then PoQo>PoQ1. 
However, if trade liberalisation improves efficiency and promotes competitive 
firms, then the second term will be positive. Therefore, the removal of tax on 
imports will be welfare improving if it will increase imports and promote efficiency 
among domestic firms. As noted by McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001), import 
restrictions creates an anti-export bias by raising the price of importable goods 
relative to exportable goods. The removal of this bias through trade liberalization 
therefore results in re-allocation of resources from the production of import 
substitutes to the production of export-oriented goods. This in turn stimulates 
growth in the short to medium term as the country adjusts to the new allocation of 
resources to sectors that have a relative competitive advantage.  
 
In the GTAP model, welfare effects are composed of endowment contribution, 
technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, investment/savings effects and terms of 
trade changes. Endownment contribution arises from changes in the availability of 
primary factors of production while technical efficiency arises from changes in the 
use of factors of production. Allocative efficiency is a result of changes in the 
allocation of resources in response to relative price changes. Terms of trade effects 
are due to the difference between the value of the initial and new vector of net 
exports prices and if this difference is positive, the country experiences a welfare 
gain (Pant et al, 2000). Terms of trade welfare gains may also be due to a policy 
change that result in cheaper imports or an increase in prices of exports. Both these 
outcomes has the effect of increasing the income of a given country or region thus 
resulting in welfare gain. A terms of trade (TOT) welfare gain can also occur 
therefore when there is an incomplete pass-through of a newly imposed tariff to 
domestic prices (Chong and Hur, 2007).  
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Allocative and technical efficiency contribution to welfare is explained by the 
diagrams below as adapted from Huff and Hertel (2000). The diagram shows a two-
sector economy A and B with labour input L. MVPL refers to the Marginal Value 
Product of labour in the two sectors. In the production of the two commodities, the 
efficient labour input equilibrium is at point e*. If sector A labour is taxed by 
ĂŵŽƵŶƚ ʏ it makes it more expensive and therefore less efficient. This shifts the 
labour equilibrium allocation of the two sectors to point e. In this case, labour 
supply also shifts from the less efficient sector A to the more efficient sector B by an 
amount (L*-L). The triangle X therefore shows the allocative efficiency welfare loss 
because of the tax. The argument for the outcomes of improvement in technology 
will be similar to that due to the effect of the tax on production inputs. In such a 
case, an improvement in technology in one sector will improve production 
efficiency of that sector and shift of production inputs from the less to the more 
productive sector.  
There is no reason why the argument of endowment of factors of production 
cannot be viewed as having similar effect to technological progress. This is because 
better-endowed sectors are more efficient in production. This means they produce 
at a lower cost and have overall welfare gain to society. Indeed, opening up to trade 
has the effect of allocation of resources to better endowed and technologically 
advanced sectors. This results in more efficient production, lower prices and an 
overall welfare gain.  
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Figure 5-11: Allocative and technical efficiency contribution to welfare 
  
Source: adapted from Huff and Hertel (2000) 
High consumer demand results in high commodity prices and therefore shifting of 
resources from other sectors to the sector with high commodity demand. Shifting 
of resources means the sectors that lose such production resources become less 
endowed. This result in them being less efficient in production, which increases 
their production costs and thus resulting in welfare loss.  
High prices of bioethanol crops commodities as a result of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy result in households being less able to invest and save. If 
households are not investing, the endowment of factors of production goes down. 
Lower household income also results in less investment in technology, less technical 
ʏ 
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efficiency and therefore walfare loss. Increase in the local prices of bioethanol crops 
commodities means that imports become relatively cheaper. This results in an 
increase of imports of these commodities from external markets thus negatively 
affecting the terms of trade welfare gain in the affected region. 
The structure of the GTAP model therefore is suitable for the simulation of the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies and to explain the reasons behind the 
expected welfare outcomes.   
5.4 Conclusion 
The chapter has explained the GTAP model and has motivated the theory behind it. 
It has also justified the reasons why the GTAP model is suitable for our study 
objectives as well as the method to be used to simulate the policy changes under 
study. One of the major shortfalls of the GTAP model, and indeed most CGE models, 
is its static nature, which limits its use for policy makers. However, the GTAP is 
important in shedding some light on the potential effects of regional and 
international policies that have an impact on commodities production and trade.  
The chapter has also shown that welfare outcomes of a policy hinge on changes in 
prices of commodities and therefore on household incomes. The policies under our 
analysis all have an impact on prices of commodities. In this way, these policies will 
have important welfare outcomes which we are interested in analysing. For this 
reason, the theory behind welfare outcomes because of a policy change has also 
been discussed. This chapter has therefore laid down the framework for the 
simulation of our policy experiments and the discussion of the results based on 
theoretical foundations.   
The next chapters are the empirical simulation of the experiments, starting with the 
simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, which we undertake in 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6  
Simulating the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on ACP countries 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to simulate the effects of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy on EU and ACP member states bioethanol crops commodities 
markets using the GTAP 7 model and database. The GTAP model has been discussed 
in Chapter 5.  
In the simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, the equilibrium 
bioethanol quantities derived in Chapter 3 will first be converted to EU bioethanol 
crops commodities quantities in tonnes. This conversion is done by use of the 
various bioethanol crop ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚŝĞƐ ?ďŝŽĞƚŚĂŶŽůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ
shares in EU bioethanol production. 
These derived quantities will then be transferred into the GTAP model. The 
simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy therefore will be through an 
artificial decrease in bioethanol crops commodities production in the EU region. 
This artificial decrease in production is due to diversion of some of these bioethanol 
crops commodities to production of bioethanol. Since bioethanol uptake in the EU 
region will also affect gasoline use, the EU bioethanol equilibrium effects on petrol 
is also simulated. This simulation is through an artificial decrease in EU gasoline use, 
as some of it is displaced by bioethanol due to the blend mandate percentage 
requirements. 
The GTAP7 database used in this study has a base year of 2004. The simulation 
results therefore show changes from the 2004 baseline equilibrium after the policy 
simulations under study. The results given therefore in our study do not have a time 
path because of the static nature of the model. The process of time adjustment to 
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the new equilibrium is therefore not explicitly represented in such CGE models. This 
is one of the major shortfalls of such models as mentioned before since their 
usefulness as projection tools is limited.  
The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy outcome analysis mainly focuses on 
welfare effects and bioethanol crops commodities production and trade changes in 
the EU27 and ACP regions as a result of this policy. 
The Chapter is therefore structured as follows: Section 6.1 undertakes conversion of 
the EU bioethanol equilibrium quantities in litres as derived in Chapter 3 into 
bioethanol crop commodities quantities in tonnes. Section 6.2 motivates the 
transfer of these bioethanol crops commodities quantities derived in section 6.1 
into the GTAP model. The effect of the EU bioethanol equilibrium quantities on EU 
transport fuel sector is discussed in section 6.3 and section 6.4 is the GTAP 
experimental simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. Section 6.5 
presents and discusses the results of the simulation and section 6.6 is the 
conclusion.  
6.1 Conversion of bioethanol to bioethanol crops commodities equivalent 
The conversion of the EU bioethanol equilibrium quantities in litres into the various 
EU bioethanol crops commodities quantities equivalent in tonnes uses the share of 
that given bioethanol crop commodity in EU bioethanol production programme as 
mentioned. The shares of the bioethanol crops commodities used in the EU 
bioethanol production programme are derived from literature.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, using information from eBio and the Economic 
Commission (EC), Jank et al (2007) calculated the share for bioethanol production 
up to 2012 as being the following:  32.3%,  12.8%, 12.8%, 28.2%, 
 5.6%, with other sources making the remaining 8.3%. Again,  is the wheat 
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share,  is the rye share,  is the corn share, is the barley share and  is the 
sugar beet share. Since it is difficult to model bioethanol production from other 
sources we assume that all the bioethanol produced in the EU is from the 
bioethanol crops under analysis i.e. wheat, rye, corn, barley and sugar beet. Under 
this assumption therefore, the adjusted bioethanol crops shares are as follows:  
 35.22%,  13.96%, 13.96%, 30.75% and  6.11%, thus 
bringing the total to 100%. 
The shares reported by Jank et al (2007) are considered more accurate than annual 
shares because they are averages for the years 2004-2012. For example, eBio 
(2008) reported the EU bioethanol crop commodities shares for EU bioethanol 
production in 2006 as shown in Figure 6-1.  
Figure 6-1: EU bioethanol production by crop type in 2006  
Source: eBio (2008) 
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The report from eBio shows that sugar beet share in EU bioethanol production was 
28% in 2006 as opposed to the 5.6% (and the 6.11% that can be implied from the 
data) as reported by Jank et al (2007). However, we will use the 28% sugar beet 
share reported by eBio (which calculates to 31.1% if we assume no other sources of 
bioethanol except bioethanol crops) and adjust the other ethanol crops shares 
according to the shares reported by Jank et al (2007). In this way the bioethanol 
crop shares that will be used for simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy while keeping the initial assumption that all EU bioethanol is produced within 
the region from bioethanol crops are the following:   25.85%,  10.24%, 
10.24%, 22.57% and  31.1%.  
 As a sensitivity analysis, we will raise the share of sugar beet used in bioethanol 
production to 100% and subsequently analyse the impact of this sugar beet share 
increase on EU and global food markets. The use of sugar beet shares as a 
sensitivity analysis of the effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on 
global bioethanol crops commodities markets is in line with the scope of our study, 
which places emphasis on sugar markets. As mentioned before, it is expected that a 
higher sugar beet share used in bioethanol production will have less impact on 
global food markets given the fact that sugar is not a main food source for man and 
animals. As observed earlier, most of the bioethanol crops commodities (with the 
exception of sugar) are staple foods for the poorer ACP regions. In this way, their 
diversion to bioethanol production is expected to have adverse effects for these 
countries. Thus, increasing the sugar beet share in bioethanol production should 
result in lower welfare loss given the fact that households do not spend a lot of 
their income on sugar as a food source.  
In addition, increasing the sugar beet share used in bieothanol production in the EU 
is also expected to improve income for most of the ACP region that grow sugar for 
trade purposes. 
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Bioethanol crops have different bioethanol production efficiencies depending on 
their energy contents and enzymatic ease of the fermentation process. For 
example, sugar beet contains on average 16% sugar, 80% of which can be recovered 
by the extraction process. One tonne of sugar beet gives therefore a maximum of 
130 kg white sugar. The remaining sugar (non-crystallised) is left with the molasses, 
which contains 50% sugar. With yields ranging from 55 to 65 tonnes/ha, the 
expected sugar production could reach 7.8 tonnes per hectare of sugar beet in ideal 
conditions (FAO/European bank, 1999).  
For the simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, we need to link this 
Chapter with the bioethanol equilibrium quantities derived in Chapter 3. From the 
results of 5.75% EC binding bioethanol blend mandate the equilibrium quantity of 
bioethanol needed was calculated to be 226 thousand barrels of bioethanol a day. 
This equates to an annual EU27 production of 82.5 million barrels or 13.1 billion 
litres. At 10% blend mandate the equilibrium quantity of bioethanol was calculated 
to be 394 thousand barrels of bioethanol a day. This equates to an annual EU27 
bioethanol production of 143.8 million barrels or 22.9 billion litres. These results are 
adapted directly from Table 3.7 in Chapter 3 and they form the key in the 
simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. 
Adapted from Table 3.7 therefore, Table 6.1 below shows the share of bioethanol 
that has to be derived from sugar beet at a sugar beet share of 31.1% as calculate 
from shares reported by Jank and  eBio for EU bioethanol production in 2006.  
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Table 6.1: Bioethanol production from sugar beet at sugar beet share of 31.1% 
Total annual EU ethanol demand (Billion 
litres) 
Produced from sugar beet at 31.1 % 
sugar beet share 
5.75% blend 
mandate 
10 % blend 
mandate 
5.75% blend 
mandate 
10% blend 
mandate 
13.1 22.9 4.1 7.1 
Table 6.1 above shows that 31.1 % share of sugar beet bioethanol equates to 4.1 
and 7.1 billion litres per year at 5.75% and 10% blend mandate respectively. The 
higher the sugar beet share used in EU bioethanol production, the greater the 
impact the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will have on the EU/global sugar 
industry. This means that a higher sugar beet share in the EU bioethanol production 
process will have greater significance on the sugar regime and economies of sugar 
producing ACP countries. It is envisaged a priori that a higher sugar beet share in 
the EU27 bioethanol production programme will potentially expand sugar 
production in ACP countries. Such expansion will increase sugar exports from ACP 
countries to the EU region and improve ACP countries trade balance and welfare. 
This is especially the case given the fact that most of these countries are low cost 
sugar cane growers and sugar producers. 
After calculating the bioethanol equivalent of the sugar beet share in litres, the next 
step is to convert this share to sugar equivalent in tonnes. This is done in order to 
be able to artificially depress sugar output in the EU27 by the amount that will be 
demanded or diverted to the production of bioethanol. To convert bioethanol in 
litres to the corresponding bioethanol crops commodities in tonnes we use the 
bioethanol production convertion factors for the various bioethanol crops, which 
are indicators of their respective bioethanol production efficiencies. The conversion 
factors for bioethanol production from the various bioethanol crops commodities 
are shown in Table 6.2 below. 
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Table 6.2: Bioethanol productivity efficiency of grain crops and sugar beet 
 
Commodity Ethanol production 
factor(gallons per bushel) 
Ethanol production 
factor(litres per tonne) 
Barley 1.40  243.38 
Corn (wet mill) 2.65  460.69 
Corn (dry mill) 2.75  478.07 
Wheat 2.80  486.77 
Sugar beet  159.8 
Rye28 2.10 364.11 
Source: USDA (2006) 
From Table 6.2 it can be seen that amongst the grain crops commodities, corn is a 
more efficient bioethanol producer than barley. Rye is intermediate between corn 
and barley and wheat is the most efficient producer with a yield of 486.77 litres of 
bioethanol per tonne. However, these production efficiencies notwithstanding, 
production of bioethanol from grain crops is generally not the best option given the 
fact that these crop commodities are vital food sources.  
From Table 6.2 it can be seen that 1 tonne of sugar beet produces 159.8 litres of 
bioethanol. The sugar beet share in tonnes is further converted to sugar equivalent 
before it can be used in the GTAP model to artificially depress sugar output in the 
EU as a way of simulating the effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. As 
has been noted earlier, one (1) tonne of sugar beet gives a maximum of 130 kg 
white sugar. Because the GTAP7 database that will be used in our study to simulate 
the effects of the EC biofuel blend mandate policy is based on 2004 database, we 
will express the artificial depression of sugar production due to the mandate as a 
percentage of 2004 bioethanol crops commodities production in the EU. The 
conversion of the EU sugar beet bioethanol share to sugar equivalent is shown in 
Table 6.3: 
 
                                                          
28
 Source:  calculated from Wang 1997 
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Table 6.3: Conversion of EU bioethanol sugar beet share from litres to tonnes 
equivalent at 31.1% (100%) sugar beet share 
% Blend Mandate Sugar beet share in billion 
litres of bioethanol 
Sugar beet share in 
million tonnes  
equivalent 
5.75 4.1 (13.1) 25.7  (81.5) 
10 7.1 (22.9) 44.4 (143) 
 
According to USDA in 2004, the EU produced 21.65 million tonnes of sugar. The 
quantities of sugar equivalent that will be demanded by the bioethanol blend 
mandate policy at the various sugar beet share (Ssb) and blend mandate 
percentages are shown in Table 6.4. These sugar equivalent quantities are also 
expressed as a percentage of the total 2004 EU sugar production29.  
 
Table 6.4: Conversion of EU bioethanol sugar beet share to sugar equivalent and 
as a percentage of 2004 sugar production at 31.1% (100%) sugar beet share 
 
% Blend Mandate sugar equivalent (million 
tonnes) 
as a percetage of 2004 EU 
sugar production 
5.75 3.3 (10.6) 15.3% (49.1%) 
10 5.7 (18.6) 26.3% (85.9%) 
 
Table 6.4 shows that a higher blend mandate percentage demands higher amounts 
of bioethanol sugar equivalence at equilibrium. A higher sugar beet share used in 
bioethanol production results in higher bioethanol sugar equivalence at 
equilibrium. All these outcomes are according to intuition. Similar analysis as has 
been undertaken for sugar beet in the EU bioethanol production process is also 
undertaken for the other bioethanol crops commodities namely wheat, barley, corn 
and rye.  
 
                                                          
29
 2004 production statistics are used as a reference point since the GTAP 7 data base used to 
simulate the policies is based on 2004 global data set. 
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Using a sugar beet share of 31.1% as has been explained the bioethanol crops 
shares are summarized in Figure 6-2.  
 
Figure 6-2: Calculated % bioethanol crops share in the EU27 for bioethanol 
production as has been reported in literature  
 
 
 
The equilibrium amount of bioethanol demanded by the blend mandate in the 
EU27 was calculated to be 13.1 and 22.9 billion litres per year at 5.75% and 10% 
blend mandate respectively. These results are reported in Table 3.7 of Chapter 3 
and Table 6.1 of Chapter 6. Using these findings the bioethanol crop shares can 
therefore be converted to their equivalent in litres and tonnes by use of the 
respective conversion efficiency for each bioethanol crop. These Figures and 
conversions are shown in the Table 6.5 below. 
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Table 6.5: Bioethanol crop shares for bioethanol production in billion litres (and 
million tonnes equivalent) 
 
 5.75% Blend mandate 10%  Blend mandate 
Ethanol 
crop 
shares 
 25.85%,  10.24%, 
10.24%, 22.57% and 
 31.1% 
 25.85%,  10.24%, 
10.24%, 22.57% and 
 31.1% 
Corn+ 1.3 (2.7) 2.3 (4.8) 
Wheat 3.3 (6.7) 5.9 (12.1) 
Barley 3 (12.3) 5.2 (21.4) 
Rye 1.3 (3.5) 2.3 (6.3) 
Sugarbeet 4.1 (25.7) 7.1 (44.4) 
+The average of the wet and dry mill production efficiency is used 
 
The calculated bioethanol crops shares in tonnes equivalent are then expressed as a 
percentage of the 2004 EU27 bioethanol grain crop production. Figure 6-3 
summarizes the annual EU27 bioethanol crops production from 1997 to 2009.  
 
Figure 6-3: Annual bioethanol grain crop production in the EU27 from 1997-2009 
(x1000 tonnes)  
 
Source: Eurostat 
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level of about 60 million tonnes per year on average. Wheat production was on 
average higher at 131 million tonnes per year while rye production was lower 
averaging about 11 million tonnes per year. According to the Eurostat database, in 
2004 a downward output trend for wheat and maize was observed, partially due to 
the introduction of decoupled payments under the Common Agriculture Policy. 
 
Therefore, using the 2004 base year production of grain crops as a reference point 
the EC bioethanol blend mandate will demand the following percentages as are 
shown in Figures 6-4. 
Figure 6-4: Bioethanol crop shares for bioethanol production (at Sw=25.85%, 
Sr=10.24%, Sc=10.24%, Sb=22.57% and Ssb= 31.1%) as a percentage of 2004 EU27 
bioethanol crop production  
 
 
 
Figure 6-4 show that the bioethanol crops share for bioethanol production as a 
percentage of total EU bioethanol crop production depends also on the EU level of 
production of that bioethanol crop. This means that the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate will affect bioethanol crop commodities in the EU27 differently depending 
on the share that is used in the bioethanol production process and the EU level of 
production of that particular bioethanol crop. From the calculations, it is seen that 
the blend mandate will have a higher impact on the barley and rye markets where it 
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will result in crop demand of more that 15% of 2004 EU27 production levels. The 
demand on the other grain crops i.e. corn and wheat on the other hand will be less 
than 10% of their 2004 production levels at both the 5.75% and 10% blend 
mandate. 
 
Indeed the EU will be capable of producing all their bioethanol requirements from 
EU sugar beet as will be demanded by the blend mandate at equilibrium. This will 
require diversion of 49% and 86% of EU sugar production to bioethanol as has been 
calculated and presented in Table 6.4 above. It is envisaged, as has been discussed 
earlier, that using more sugar beet/sugar to produce bioethanol will have less 
adverse effects on global food markets and welfare. These dynamics and the effect 
of the blend mandate on sugar markets globally and especially on ACP member 
states will be analysed in the next section of this chapter.   
 
In the USA, bioethanol is produced from corn as has already been noted. According 
to Roberts and Schlenker (2012), enforcing the US Renewable Fuel Standard would 
require 12.4 billion bushels of corn, which translates to about 33% of USA corn 
production in 2010 and about 5% of world caloric production in the same year. The 
percentage requirement of bioethanol crops commodities for the USA bioethanol 
programme is comparable to those determined by our study with respect to the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy.  
 
Ideally, when modelling the production of bioethanol from grain crops, the by-
product DDGs should also be taken into account since they are used as an animal 
feed. Since DDGs is not a disaggregated product in the GTAP model it will be 
difficult to model its potential impact on markets due to the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy. For these reasons, the DDGs effect will be ignored in our analysis. 
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6.2 Transferring the bioethanol crops demanded into the GTAP model 
 
The next step in our analysis of the effect of a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy is to transfer the bioethanol crops commodities equivalent as will be 
demanded by the mandate into the GTAP model. This will be done by artificially 
reducing the reference year 2004-bioethanol crop commodities production in the 
EU by an equivalent amount as will be demanded by the bioethanol mandate 
equilibrium conditions as derived in Chapter 3.  
 
The reduction in quantities of bioethanol crops commodities due to the diversion of 
some of their output to the production of bioethanol will be modelled as an 
artificial reduction in demand for these commodities in the EU market. For 
example, it was calculated that 26.3% of total 2004 EU27 sugar production would 
be demand by bioethanol production at 10% blend mandate and sugar beet share 
(Ssb) of 31.1%. This change is therefore simulated as a reduction in demand for 
sugar in the EU27 by this percentage. The same concept is applied for the other 
bioethanol crops products i.e. wheat, rye, barley and corn. It should be noted that 
in the scenario when EU produces 100% of their bioethanol requirements from 
sugar beet/sugar, the other bioethanol crops would not be affected. In this case, 
only EU sugar production levels will be artificially reduced by 49% and 86% to 
simulate the effect of the blend mandate and 5.75% and 10% blend respectively. 
Quantity changes are endogenous in the GTAP model and therefore cannot be 
altered directly. For this reason, the uncompensated own price elasticities of 
demand for the various bioethanol crop commodities are used and percentage 
changes in quantities are manipulated via changes in prices. Table 6.6 shows the 
elasticities of demand for the various ethanol crops in the EU27 as reported in the 
GTAP model. 
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Table 6.6: EU27 uncompensated own price elasticity of demand for bioethanol 
crop commodities  
WheatFS  -0.027 
GrainFS -0.036 
SugarFS -0.049 
Sugar -0.631 
Extraction -0.640 
ProcFood -0.672 
Petroleum Products -0.692 
Source: GTAP7 DataBase 
 
The GTAP 7 database shows that the price elasticities of demand for corn, barley 
and rye are all equal with a value of -0.036 but their elasticity is not much different 
from that of wheat at -0.027. This means that EU27 bioethanol grain crops are not 
price elastic as per expectation, while sugar, which has a number of substitutes, is 
relatively more price elastic with an elasticity of -0.631. Petroleum products, which 
include petrol and diesel, have a price elasticity of -0.692.30  
However, manipulation of this elasticity on the GTAP model is not possible without 
changing the theory and the database of the model. Given that we cannot 
manipulate the model and the database, we will use this elasticity as stated in the 
model database.  
The artificial percentage decrease in quantities demanded for sugar, wheat, rye, 
corn and barley are modelled therefore as being due to an increase in their prices. 
Since price changes are also endogenous in the GTAP model and cannot be altered 
directly, they are simulated by changing the tax variable, which is exogenous in the 
model. The manipulation of the tax rate is the standard procedure used in the GTAP 
                                                          
30
 For example, Graham and Glaister (2002) estimated the long run price elasticities of demand for 
automobile fuel to be between -0.6 and -0.8 and short run elasticities between -0.2 and -0.3. These 
demand elasticities are within the ranges estimated in other studies (please see also Godwin et al., 
2004; Romero-Jordán et al., 2010; Dahl and Sterner, 1991 as discussed in chapter 3) 
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model to obtain regional elasticities of various commodities in the model as has 
been discussed in chapter 5.  
 
The demand elasticities for grain crops reported in the GTAP model are rather low. 
In this way, the method used to simulate the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, 
given the low demand elasticities, requires very large price effects. This therefore 
means a large tax rate is used to artificially depress output and this effectively 
means the welfare effects are over-estimated by probably a magnitude of 10. Our 
simulation will therefore have a larger effect on bioethanol crops commodities than 
other studies but the qualitative results are expected to be intuitive.  The problems 
with the elasticities reported in the GTAP model has also been observed by Berry 
(2011) who noted that the GTAP model uses elasticities that are estimated via 
simple (and incorrect) least squares techniques. 
The calculated required changes in quantities {qo (i,r)} (which is the percentage 
change in the output of non saving commodity i supplied in region r) at 5.75% (10%) 
blend mandate and the different bioethanol crops shares have been calculated 
before and are summarised in the Table 6.7 below:  
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Table 6.7: Calculated % quantity changes {qo (i,r)} at 5.75 (10) % blend mandate 
and different bioethanol crops shares * 
Sugar Barley Corn Rye Wheat 
At Ssb=31.1%, Sc=10.24%, Sw=25.85%, Sb=22.57% and Sr=10.24% 
15.3 (26.3) 17.9 (25.2) 3.7 (5.2) 23.2 (32.8) 4.4 (6.2) 
At Ssb=100% 
Sugar Barley Corn Rye Wheat 
49.1 (85.9) Nil Nil Nil Nil 
*These production percentages changes are with reference to 2004 EU27 
commodities production, this being the base year for the GTAP7 Data base that is 
used in this study. 
Using the elasticities shown in Table 6.6 the calculated percentage increases in 
prices {pm(i,r)} required to bring about the artificial decrease in bioethanol crop 
quantities as will be demanded by the EC bioethanol blend mandate are reported in 
Table 6.8. The concept here is simple. The simulation of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy into the GTAP model is by increasing the prices of bioethanol crops 
commodities in order to decrease their demand or output. The bioethanol crops 
commodities demand or output is decreased by an equivalent percentage as will be 
demanded by the EC bioethanol blend mandate. These percentages have been 
calculated and reported in Table 6.7 above and are with reference to the annual 
year 2004 EU bioethanol crops commodities output, 2004 being the base year for 
the GTAP7 database that is used in this analysis. 
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Table 6.8: Calculated % price changes {pm (i,r)} at 5.75 (10) % blend mandate and 
different ethanol crops shares 
Sugar Barley Corn Rye Wheat 
At Ssb=31.1, Sc=10.24, Sw=25.85, Sb=22.57 and Sr=10.24 
28.8(39.6) 312(457) 69 (102) 410  (582) 113 (152) 
At Ssb =100% 
77 (136) NIL NIL NIL NIL 
As has been noted before, the low price elasticity of demand for wheat, barley, corn 
and rye means that for a given percentage change in quantity demanded the 
percentage price change has to be high as is seen in the calculations reported in the 
Table 6.8. 
Decrease demand for gasoline due to the bioethanol blend mandate (as discussed 
in Chapter 3) needs also to be modelled into the GTAP model. Therefore using a 
similar approach for the bioethanol crops, the EC bioethanol blend mandate effect 
on transport fuel is then analysed. 
 6.3 Modelling the EC bioethanol blend mandate on petroleum products  
The effect of the blend mandate on the EU27 transport fuel market is modelled into 
the GTAP by altering the petroleum products sector of the model. This sector 
consists of the manufacture of coke oven products, refined petroleum products 
(which include petrol and diesel) and the processing of nuclear fuels. These sectors 
form part of the heavy manufacturing sector of the GTAP database. Petrol and 
diesel production are not isolated out in the model thus it is not possible to analyse 
accurately changes that affect these commodities. The method of analysing the 
effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate on transport fuel is similar to that which 
Ch.6 - Simulating  the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on ACP 
countries 
 
6-18 
 
was employed for the bioethanol crops commodities, i.e. uncompensated own price 
elasticity of demand for petroleum products is used.  
The simulation of the effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on 
petroleum products is simply to simulate a decrease in gasoline quantity or demand 
by 5.75% and 10%. This represents the amount of gasoline displaced by bioethanol 
at a blend mandate of 5.75% and 10%. 
Figure 6-6 shows the EU27 annual production of petroleum products (which include 
diesel and gasoline) in the EU27 from 1997 to 2007. 
 
Figure 6-5: EU27 annual total petroleum products, diesel and gasoline production 
(x1000 barrels per day) 1997-2008 
 
Source: EIA (2010) 
Figure 6-6 shows that the demand for diesel in the region has been steadily 
increasing and is higher than that of gasoline. In 2004 the average demand for 
diesel was 5.34 million barrels per day which equates to an annual demand of 310 
billion litres, about 34% of total petroleum products production in the EU27. 
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In 2004, the EIA estimated the EU27 demand for transport gasoline to be 2.66 
million barrels of gasoline per day. This equates to an annual demand 154 billion 
litres, which is about 17% of total petroleum products production in the EU27. In 
the GTAP model, gasoline is aggregated as part of total petroleum products. 
Therefore, to model the decrease in demand for gasoline we have to calculate the 
percentage decrease in total petroleum products according to the share of gasoline 
in this aggregated commodity. 
This means that the percentage decrease in EU petroleum products demand as a 
result of a decrease in gasoline demand can be calculated as  follows: 
5.75%(8.6% in energy equivalent) reduction of 17% = 1.46%  
10% (15% in energy equivalent) reduction of 17% = 2.55% 
These percentage reductions are the changes that will be transmitted to the GTAP 
model to simulate a change in output of total petroleum products due to the blend 
mandate. The required percentage changes on petroleum products are summarised 
in Table 6.9 below: 
Table 6.9: Elasticity and % change in quantity and price for petroleum products in 
the EU27 due to the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
 
Blend Mandate Elasticity *qo (i,r) *pm (i,r) 
5.75% -0.692 1.46% 2.11% 
10% -0.692 2.55% 3.68% 
*Where qo (i,r)= % change in quantity; pm (i,r)= % change in price due to the blend 
mandate  
Table 6.9 shows that the effect a 5.75% and 10% blend mandate will be to reduce 
the demand for manufactured petroleum products in the EU27 by 2.11% and 3.68% 
respectively. These percentage price increases are simply to model the effect of the 
displaced gasoline by bioethanol. The price of gasoline and the gasoline mixture 
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demanded will however stay the same because of the assumption of the existence 
of a subdisy in the production of bioethanol as discussed in details in Chapter 3.  
Finally, the alterations that are transmitted into the GTAP model to simulate the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy in the EU27 are shown in the Table 6.10 below. 
Table 6.10: Alterations of the exogenous tax variable ʏ to simulate the effect of 
the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
 
Ethanol 
crop 
share (%) 
Blend 
mandate 
Commodity Elasticity qo (i,r) pm 
(i,r) 
Target 
tax rate   
Ssb=31.1  
Sb=22.57 
Sc=10.24  
Sr=10.24 
Sw=25.85 
 
5.75% 
Sugar -0.631 15.3 28.8 22.2 
Barley -0.036 17.9 312 282.4 
Corn -0.036 3.7 69 58.6 
Rye -0.036 23.2 410 321.4 
Average  218.1 
Wheat -0.027 4.4 113 83.4 
Petroleum 
Products -0.692 1.46 2.11 2.2 
10% 
Sugar -0.631 26.3 39.6 24.5 
Barley -0.036 25.2 457 291 
Corn -0.036 5.2 102 68 
Rye -0.036 23.2 582 371.2 
Average  248.4 
Wheat -0.027 4.4 152 98.8 
Petroleum 
Products -0.692 2.55 3.68 4.23 
Ssb=100 
5.75% 
Sugar -0.631 49.1 77 62.3 
Petroleum 
Products -0.692 1.46 2.11 2.2 
10% 
Sugar -0.631 85.9 136 89.4 
Petroleum 
Products -0.692 2.55 3.68 4.23 
 
We now have all the information needed to be transferred into the GTAP model to 
simulate the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, which we do in the next section. 
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6.4 EC bioethanol  blend mandate policy simulation 
In this section, we run the actual simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy and analyse the results. To run this simulation we use the GTAP model and 
GTAP 7 database. As has been mentioned, the simulation of the EC bioethanol 
blend mandate policy is done through an artificial reduction in the reference 2004 
EU biethanol crop commodities production by the percentages as will be demanded 
by a binding mandate. This depression of bieothanol crops commodities output will 
be simulated by increasing their output tax, which artificially decreases their 
demand. The same concept is used to artificially decrease the demand for gasoline 
in the region. This demand decrease is by an equivalent percentage as will be 
displaced by bioethanol at the stipulated 5.75% and 10% blend mixture. 
Table 6.10 shows the tax changes that are transmitted into the GTAP model.  This 
means that four simulations will be run differentiated by the blend mandates 
percentages and the sugar beet shares. The different sugar beet shares act as a 
sensitivity analysis brought about by varying it from 31.1% to 100%. The interest is 
to determine the effect of these different EU bioethanol sugar beet shares on 
international bioethanol crops commodities markets.  
The solution method applied in the analysis to determine the changes as a result of 
the mandate is the Johansen method as discussed in Chapter 5. The GTAP 7 
database consists of 57 commodities and 113 regions. The 113 regions are defined 
as aggregates of 226 countries using the GTAP standard country list. The Alpha-3 
codes defined by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) are used 
as country codes for the GTAP primary regions.  
In the sectoral definitions used in the GTAP 7 database, GTAP agricultural and food 
processing sectors are defined by reference to the Central Product Classification 
(CPC). The other GTAP sectors are defined by reference to the International 
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Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) since this is the reference classification point 
for I-O statistics tables where the GTAP data is sourced. The CPC was developed by 
the statistical office of the United Nations (UN) and serves as a bridge between the 
ISIC and other sectoral classifications (Narayanan et al 2008). 
The aggregation of the database for the study use the complete GTAPAgg software 
licensed to the author. Simulation experiments are done using RunGTAP, which is a 
graphical user environment developed by Mark Horridge of the Centre of Policy 
Studies at Monash University. 
6.4.1 Country aggregation 
The countries are aggregated into the following 3 categories: 
 
ACP Countries  W African and Caribbean Countries  
EU27  W The 27 countries of the European Union  
ROW  W Rest of the World 
 
The GTAP database is aggregated into 113 regions some of which cannot be 
disaggregated meaning that some countries have been misclassified. 
The following countries have been classified as ACP countries but are not: 
French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, Tokelau and Wallis and 
Futuma (Aggregated into  Rest of Oceania), Falkland Islands, French Guiana 
(Aggregated into Rest of South America), Dominican Republic, Grenada, Puerto 
Rico, Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Aruba, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles (Aggregated into Caribbean). Another 
case is that of South Africa which has been intentionally classified as an ACP 
country. It is reasonable to classify this country as such since it part of Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) and Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and most members of these regions are ACP countries.  
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The countries which could not be disaggregated from their GTAP aggregation and 
appropriately classified and which have therefore been classified as ACP countries 
when they are not are mainly those from the Rest of Oceania region and the 
Caribbean. Most of them are not large economies and as such, their 
misclassification is not expected to affect the result much. Besides, since they are 
located in the same region as most of the ACP member countries their economies 
are expected to be linked to those of these ACP member states. The effects of an 
international trade policy that affects some countries of a regional bloc are 
expected to have spill-overs to the other member countries of that bloc.  
 
It is with such reasoning that South Africa in Southern Africa has been classified as 
an ACP county when it is not. Because South Africa is part of SADC, it is therefore 
also affected by policies that affect the SADC region. As such, it makes sense to 
classify it as part of ACP when the aim is to study international policies that affect 
the SADC region. Besides, global models especially static ones like the GTAP model 
are not exact due to problems of data, aggregations and changes in country and 
regional status. 
 
6.4.2 Sectoral aggregation 
For the purposes of the experiment related to an EC bioethanol blend mandate, the 
original 57 GTAP sectors are aggregated as follows: 
 The standard GTAP7 commodities i.e. 
1. MeatLstk  W Livestock and meat products 
2. Extraction  W Mining and Extraction 
3. ProcFood  W Processed Food 
4. TextWapp  W Textile and Clothing 
5. LightMnfc  W Light Manufacturing 
6. HeavyMnfc  W Heavy Manufacturing 
7. Util_Cons  W Utilities and Construction 
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8. TransComm  W Transport and Communication 
9. OtherServices  W Other Services 
 and the following  new disaggregated sectors: 
10. WheatFS  W Wheat  
11. Sugar 
12. SugarFS  W Sugar Cane and Sugar Beet 
13. GrainFS  W Grain crops that can be used as ethanol feed stocks 
i.e. Maize, Barley, Rye, Oats, Other cereals  
14. GrainsCrops  W Other crops other than those that can be used 
to produce bioethanol 
15. Petroleum Products  W manufacture of refined petroleum 
products (which is a sector that is part of manufacture of coke 
oven products, refined petroleum products and processing of 
nuclear fuel) 
It has not been possible to isolate out petrol and diesel from the petroleum product 
sector but this does not affect the analysis much since their respective percentage 
shares in the sector is used in our analysis as calculate earlier.  
 
It has not been possible in the database to separate the bioethanol grain crops i.e. 
maize, barley and rye into their respective component commodities. Only wheat is 
disaggregated in the model database and the rest of the bioethanol crops 
commodities are aggregated into grain crops sector which include maize, barley, 
rye, oats and other cereals in the original GTAP7 sector aggregation. For this reason, 
these commodities are analysed as an aggregated commodity that is disaggregated 
according to their respective percentage shares in bioethanol production as 
calculated earlier. Only wheat, sugar beet, sugar cane and sugar have therefore 
been disaggregated. 
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6.4.3 Closure 
We apply the Standard GTAP closure rules for this simulation experiment as 
discussed in chapter 5.  In this closure rule, psave (the price of composite capital 
good supplied to savers by global bank) varies by region; pfactwld (World price 
index of primary factors) is the numeraire variable.  
 
The results and analysis of the effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on 
ACP/EU regions will focus on welfare changes as a direct result of the application of 
this policy in the EU region. Analysis will also focus on bioethanol crops 
commodities output in the various regions and changes in their trade balance. 
These parameters under analysis are important economic developmental indicators 
and will form important policy conclusion to the potential economic effects the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy on ACP countries ? economies. Emphasis on the 
sugar industry in our analysis is because of the importance of this sector to many 
ACP ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? economies as has been discussed before.  
 
It is expected that the increased demand for bioethanol crops in the EU region 
because of a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will result in increased 
export sales of bioethanol crops commodities from ACP countries to the EU. In this 
way, we expect that ACP countries will expand their production of bioethanol crops. 
However, the need to increase bioethanol crops prices in the EU region in order to 
encourage their supply to meet the demand created by the mandate will result in 
overall global welfare loss. The aim of our analysis therefore is to explore these 
dynamics empirically in order to make informative policy conclusions on the 
potential economic effects the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on ACP 
countries, especially its effect on ACP sugar industries.  
 
The results reported will therefore be at the two levels of blend mandate 
percentages i.e at 5.75% and 10% blend mandate. They will also be on the two sets 
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of bioethanol crops shares (in percentages), these being i.e (1) Ssb=31.1, Sc=10.24, 
Sw=25.85, Sb=22.57 and Sr=10.24 and (2) Ssb=100.  
 
Section 6.5 below presents and discusses the results of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy simulation.  
 
6.5 Results and discussion  
 
To discuss the effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on ACP/EU 
bioethanol crops commodities we first analyse its welfare outcomes. The results of 
the simulation show that the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will result in 
global welfare loss31. The welfare outcomes in the different regions are shown in 
Table 6.11 below. 
 
Table 6.11:  Welfare loss as a percentage of GDP of a 5.75%  and 10% EC 
bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of ssb=31.1 (100%) 
5.75% Blend 10% Blend 
 ACP countries 0.25 (0.13) 0.32 (0.15) 
EU 27 0.38 (0.32) 0.48 (0.39) 
 
The absolute welfare losses are shown in Table A6.1 in the appendix section. At a 
bioethanol blend mandate of 5.75% and a sugar beet share of 31.1% there is an 
overall global welfare loss of US$53 billion. The EU27 region accounts for 80% of the 
global welfare loss. ACP countries and ROW account for 2.3% and 13.7% of this 
welfare loss respectively. At 10% blend mandate and a sugar beet share of 31.1%, 
the global welfare loss increases to US$60 billion. Again, the EU accounts for a 
                                                          
31
 This welfare loss is measured in equivalent variation (EV) in the GTAP model and its theoretical 
foundations are discussed in chapter 5. 
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larger share of this welfare loss. Generally, a higher blend mandate percentage 
translates to a higher welfare loss as expected.  
 
As a percentage of GDP, the welfare loss is again higher in the EU region that ACP 
countries at all levels of sugar beet share and blend mandate percentages. For 
example, at a sugar beet share of 31.1% and blend mandate of 5.75%, the welfare 
loss experienced by ACP countries is 0.25% of their total GDP while that 
experienced by EU27 region is higher at 0.38% of their GDP. Of note however is that 
increasing the sugar beet share used in EU bioethanol production result in lower 
global welfare loss. For example, increasing the sugar beet share from 31.1% to 
100% result in 28% percent drop in global welfare loss from US$53 billion to US$37 
billion at 5.75% blend mandate. Again, these results are seen in the appendix in 
Table A6-1. 
 
 However, the EU still accounts for a higher welfare loss both in absolute terms and 
as a percentage of GDP at this higher sugar beet share. For example, at 100% sugar 
beet share and 10% blend mandate, the welfare loss experienced by the EU27 
region is 0.39% of their GDP while it is 0.15% of GDP for ACP countries. The lower 
welfare loss at a higher sugar beet share for the EU bioethanol production 
programme is expected. This is because sugar is not a main food source compared 
to the other bioethanol crops commodities as has been noted earlier. In other 
words, household spend less of their income on sugar based food commodities in 
comparison with the other bioethanol crops commodities. For this reason, it is 
expected that households will not be as adversely affected if the share of sugar 
used in bioethanol production is increased.  
 
ACP welfare loss is much lower compared to that of the EU27 region as the sugar 
beet share used in EU bioethanol production is increased. For example, at a blend 
mandate of 5.75%, as the sugar beet share is increased from 31.1% to 100%, ACP 
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welfare loss drops by 48% from 0.25% of GDP to only 0.13% of GDP. For the EU 
region, the corresponding fall in welfare loss is about 16%, from 0.38% to 0.32% of 
GDP. This could be a competitive advantage indicator in that the EU is a high cost 
sugar producer.  Increasing sugar use in the EU promotes sugar production and 
trade from ACP countries to the EU region. This is turn improves ACP terms of trade 
and income and ultimately a higher welfare gain relative to the EU region.  
 
Another possible reason for the lower ACP welfare loss at higher sugar beet share 
can be explained by the fact that sugar is not a main food source in many ACP 
countries. This means therefore that the other bioethanol crops commodities, most 
of which are used as food sources and therefore take a large portion of household 
budgets, are spared when the sugar beet share for EU bioethanol production goes 
up. 
 Policies that increase staple food prices generally have a more significant negative 
impact on household income and welfare. This is the reason why a higher sugar 
beet share for bioethanol production in the EU region results in lower impact on 
ACP household incomes and welfare. The welfare effect of important food 
commodities has a more significant impact on ACP countries since most of these 
countries households are poor. Poor households spend a larger portion of their 
income on food meaning policies that increase basic food prices will have more 
impact on their welfare. 
The global bioethanol crop commodities price increases is the cause for the 
observed global welfare loss through reduction in household income and utility as 
mentioned. Indeed the much higher prices of bioethanol crop commodities in the 
EU region compared to other regions is the reason why the EU region accounts for 
the majority of the welfare loss. The price changes as a result of the EC bioethanol 
blend mandate policy are shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 below: 
 
Ch.6 - Simulating  the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on ACP 
countries 
 
6-29 
 
Table 6.12: Selected results of % change in market prices due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of Ssb=31.1 
  
                                            Regions 
  
Commodities ACP Countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops 2.49 (2.82)  3.84 (4.47) 5.06 (6.10) 
WheatFS 9.60 (9.94) 86.61 (92.43)  13.30 (15.41) 
GrainFS 13.80 (14.23) 88.38 (94.36) 9.20 (10.23) 
Sugar 2.10 (2.76) 11.12 (12.34) 3.56 (3.92)  
MeatLstk 2.35 (2.78) 15.21 (16.65) 4.43 (5.21) 
ProcFood 2.14 (2.67) 6.31 (6.82) 3.05 (3.67) 
PetroleumPro 0.96 (1.43) 1.27 (1.83) 1.00 (1.12) 
 
Table 6.13: Selected results of % change in market prices due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of Ssb=100% 
                                    Regions 
Commodities ACP Countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops 1.21 (1.61) 2.13 (3.72) 4.12 (5.02) 
WheatFS 3.12 (3.83) 7.32 (10.4)  8.11 (9.27) 
GrainFS 2.02 (3.32) 10.9 (11.5) 6.23 (8.31) 
Sugar 12.91 (14.62) 96.12 (109.13) 13.62 (15.22)  
MeatLstk 2.15 (2.21) 11.54 (11.84) 3.91 (4.15) 
ProcFood 2.01 (2.13) 4.12 (5.21) 2.95 (3.02) 
PetroleumPro 0.92 (1.41) 1.22 (1.81) 1.09 (1.11) 
 
Rosegrant et al. (2006) have also reported a rise in global bioethanol crops 
commodities prices due to increased biofuel production. Using the International 
Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT), their 
study concluded that global biofuel production will increase world market prices by 
26% for sugar cane, 11% for wheat and 20% for maize in 2010. These percentage 
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price increases will be 66% for sugar cane, 30% for wheat and 41% for maize by 
2020. The Rosegrant et al model contains three categories of commodity demand 
namely food, feed and other use demand. Their study manipulated ƚŚĞ “ŽƚŚĞƌƵƐĞ ?
demand for the bioethanol crops commodities namely maize, sugarcane, sugar 
beet, wheat, and cassava. This means that their analysis of bioethanol production 
effect on global food markets was similar to ours although they did not report any 
changes in outputs as a result of their simulations.  
 
For a sugar beet share of 31.1%, our analysis shows that there is a higher price 
increase in bioethanol crops commodities in the EU region than those reported by 
Rosegrant et al. The reason could be that our study assumes a binding EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy and that the EU region produces all bioethanol 
from local bioethanol crops commodities. Increasing the sugar beet share in 
bioethanol production increases global prices of sugar relative to those of the 
bioethanol crops commodities as seen in the Table 6.12 and 6.13. This corresponds 
to the expected lower welfare loss as the sugar beet share used in bioethanol 
production is increased. This is because sugar is not an important household food 
commodity as has already been mentioned. Even at this high sugar beet share of 
100% the price increases as a result of the EC bioethanol blend mandate are bigger 
in the EU region compared to ACP and ROW regions. The price increases of the rest 
of the bioethanol crops commodities at a sugar beet share of 100% could be due to 
a domino effect.  
Welfare decomposition has shown that allocative efficiency accounts for most of 
the welfare loss experience by the regions. However, ACP countries experience a 
positive terms of trade welfare outcome. This is mainly because the mandate has 
the effect of increasing prices of bioethanol crops commodities in the EU region; 
promote bioethanol crop commodities output in ACP countries and increase ACP 
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bioethanol crop commodities export to the EU market. Results of the welfare 
decomposition are shown in Table A6.2 in the appendix section. 
In CGE modelling, industry output response because of a policy change is one of the 
indicators of the competitiveness of that given industry. Industry output response 
can be an indicator of which sectors will potentially benefit from a change in policy. 
For this reason, analysis of this variable has important economic and policy 
implications for ACP and EU countries. The results of bioethanol crops commodities 
industry output as a result of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy are shown in 
Table 6.14 and 6.15 below.  
Table 6.14: Selected results of % change in industry output due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of Ssb=31.1 
                                Regions 
Commodities ACP Countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops -1.21 (-1.52) 2.24 (2.72)       -0.72 (-0.77) 
WheatFS 47.62 (52.74) -14.12(-18.22) 28.89 (34.32) 
GrainFS 15.81 (16.77) -48.42 (-56.22) 16.20 (18.58) 
Sugar 64.21 (68.81) -25.32 (-27.32) 30.17 (44.72) 
MeatLstk 2.12 (2.62) -5.89 (-6.91) 0.81 (0.74) 
ProcFood 0.74 (0.85) -2.32 (-2.46) 0.15 (0.19) 
PetroleumPro 3.39 (3.77) -1.62 (-3.22) 1.11 (1.35) 
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Table 6.15: Selected results of % change in industry output due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of Ssb=100 
                            Regions 
Commodities ACP Countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops -0.11 (-0.22) 0.32 (0.41)       -0.11 (-0.26) 
WheatFS -0.32 (-0.34) -0.11(-0.22) 0.50 (0.53) 
GrainFS 0.78 (0.82) -0.42 (-0.44) 0.20 (0.42) 
Sugar 206.21 (235.52) -86.12 (-92.19) 120.14 (140.23) 
MeatLstk 0.91 (1.06) -1.72 (-1.94) 0.40 (0.62) 
ProcFood -2.77 (-5.83) -45.39 (-52.19) -10.85 (-12.92) 
PetroleumPro 2.43 (3.39) -2.62 (-3.82) 2.23 (2.98) 
 
As mentioned before, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy has the effect of 
increasing global demand for bioethanol crops commodities. This increase in 
demand has the effect of raising their output in ACP countries and ROW. For 
example, Table 6.14 shows that sugar output increases by 64.21% in ACP countries 
at a blend mandate of 5.75% and sugar beet share of 31.1% and this output 
increases to 68.81% at 10% blend mandate. When the sugar beet share used in EU 
bioethanol production is increased to 100%, sugar output in ACP countries 
increases by 206.21% at 5.75% blend mandate and 235.52% at 10% blend mandate 
as shown in Table 6.15 and this is as expected. Sugar output response is higher for 
ACP countries than the ROW region at all levels of sugar beet share and blend 
mandate percentage. This could be an indicator of the competitiveness of ACP 
sugar industries. Of note is the decrease in processed food products as the sugar 
beet share used in bioethanol production increases. This is because a variety of 
processed food products uses sugar. In this way, if more sugar is diverted to 
bioethanol production, output of such processed foods decreases.  
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The ACP output response for wheat, like that for sugar, is higher than the ROW at 
31.1% sugar beet share and both levels of blend mandate as shown in Table 6.14 
above. However, for the other bioethanol grain crops commodities i.e. corn, barley 
and rye, the ROW output response is higher than that for ACP countries at a sugar 
beet share of 31.1% and at both 5.75% and 10% blend mandate. 
Output response for the rest of the bioethanol crops commodities besides sugar is 
low in all regions as the sugar beet share for EU bioethanol production is increased 
to 100%. This observation signifies that a higher sugar beet share for the EU 
bioethanol programme will have less impact on global bioethanol crops 
commodities (with the exception of sugar) as expected.  
Besides industry output, trade balance outcome of a policy is also an important 
variable to analyse since it affect income or revenue of a given region. In this way, it 
has welfare consequences. Trade balance analysis may also be an indicator of 
industry competitiveness following a policy change. Trade balance analysis of the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy show that all the regions other that the EU27 
experience a positive terms of trade for all bioethanol crops commodities as shown 
in Tables 6.16 and 6.17 below. 
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Table 6.16:  Selected results of changes in trade balance (in US$ million) as a result 
of  the EC 5.75% (10%) bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of Ssb=31.1% 
                  Regions 
Commodities ACP Countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops -101.61 (-122.1) 222.21 (424.56) -4008.64 (-4222.22) 
WheatFS 72.31 (83.34) -1492 (-1712.3) 10527.13 (11192.31) 
GrainFS 228.2 (354.24) -872 (-901.6) 7537.14(8151.62) 
Sugar 832.33 (935.92) -1118.62 (-1253.73) 1372.96 (1292.34) 
MeatLstk 192.34 (213.24) -4238.62 (-4823.14) 4134.21 (4313.12) 
ProcFood 232.12 (318.31) -3026.22 (-3212.86) 2431.52 (2521.39) 
PetroleumPro 122.4 (169.83) -5022.7 (-5512.8) 4623.23 (4892.13) 
 
Table 6.17:  Selected results of changes in trade balance (in US$ Million) due to 
the  EC 5.75% (10%) bioethanol blend mandate at Sugar beet Share of Ssb=100% 
Regions 
Commodities ACP Countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops -10.15 (-12.72) 426.8 (433.56) -372.62 (-392.18) 
WheatFS 12.32 (15.54) -136.2 (-142.6) 450.66 (540.34) 
GrainFS 16.43 (18.23) -26.7 (-83.8) 462.41 (676.13) 
Sugar 1232.21 (1412.45) -1916.56 (-2077.34) 1421.23 (1662.36) 
MeatLstk 13.52 (14.62) -41.8 (-45.81) 28.22 (30.29) 
ProcFood 172.03 (188.19) -1942.82 (-1986.41) 1541.73 (1498.72) 
PetroleumPro 122.31 (161.18) -5184.2 (-6124.4) 4774.40 (6122.23) 
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For example, at a sugar beet share of 31.1 %, ACP countries experience a positive 
sugar trade balance of about US$832 million at 5.75% blend mandate and US$936 
million at 10% blend mandate. On the other hand, the EU27 experience a 
corresponding negative trade balance of US$1.1 billion and US$1.3 billion at 5.75% 
and 10% blend mandate respectively. The ROW also experience a positive sugar 
trade balance of US$1.4 billion at 5.75% blend mandate and US$1.3 billion at 10% 
blend mandate. These are rather surprising results for the ROW region since one 
would expect that a higher sugar demand in the EU region would increase the trade 
balance for the ROW regions as has been observed for ACP countries. This 
highlights the positive competitive response of ACP sugar industries compared to 
those of the ROW regions, a trend that has also been supported by the industry 
output. 
An increase in the sugar beet share from 31.1% to 100% results in ACP countries 
experiencing a positive trade balance in sugar of US$1.2 billion at 5.75% blend 
mandate and US$1.4 billion at 10% blend mandate. The EU negative trade balance 
for sugar worsens as the sugar beet share for bioethanol production increases as 
expected. This trend means that a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will 
promote sugar industries in ACP countries and improve their foreign revenue when 
the sugar beet share used in EU bioethanol production is increased.  
Trade balance analysis of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy also shows a 
trade deficit for wheat and the other bioethanol grain crops in the EU region at a 
sugar beet share of 31.1%. This wheat trade deficit is about US$1.5 billion at 5.75% 
blend mandate. As the sugar beet share is increased to 100%, the EU27 wheat trade 
balance become modest at only US$136 million at 5.75% blend mandate. This 
signifies the impact of producing EU bioethanol from sugar beet, in which case 
there is less adverse effect on the market for the rest of the bioethanol crops 
commodities.   
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At the lower sugar beet share of 31.1%, the EU27 becomes a net importer of 
livestock and meat products with the rest of the regions being net exporters. This 
could be due to the reduction in EU27 grain produce, which is used as animal feed. 
It is likely that this adverse effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on the 
livestock industries could have been less significant or reversed had the model been 
able to include the effects of DDGs.  
An increase of the sugar beet share in the EU bioethanol production programme to 
100% result in a modest trade balance impact for meat and livestock products. This 
is as expected since the grain crops that are used as livestock feed are spared as the 
sugar beet share for bioethanol production is increased.  
An anomaly is that of petroleum products which include gasoline and diesel. The 
blend mandate has been modelled as decreasing demand for gasoline due to the 
displacement of some of the it by bioethanol. However, the model results show 
that the EU27 becomes a net importer of petroleum products as shown by the 
EU27 negative trade balance reported in Tables 6.16 and 6.17.  
This outcome is counter intuitive and could be due to that the increase in the size of 
the EU region to 27 countries possibly results in an overall high trade deficit in 
petroleum products for the enlarged region. The petroleum trade deficit as a result 
of the increase in size of the EU region could be what the model is picking up, with 
this trade deficit overwhelming the fall in demand brought about by the bioethanol 
blend mandate. Besides, in the GTAP 7 database, petroleum products not only 
include gasoline and diesel but also coke oven products and nuclear fuel. It is thus 
possible that the high aggregation of this sector makes its policy simulation 
outcomes less accurate.  
The bioethanol crops commodities trade balance trend discussed above is 
supported by the changes in ACP bioethanol crops commodities export to the EU as 
reported in Tables 6.18 and 6.19 below.  
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Table 6.18: Selected results of  % change in ACP export sales due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of Ssb=31.1% 
                                                      Destination Regions 
Commodities EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops -6.43 (-7.22) 2.34 (2.83) 
WheatFS 72.32 (76.01) 34.23 (36.23) 
GrainFS 77.42 (82.34) 15.14 (15.83) 
Sugar 78.34 (83.84) 8.12 (8.23) 
MeatLstk 32.34 (36.45) 10.34 (12.48) 
ProcFood 5.12 (6.13) 4.11 (5.34) 
PetroleumPro 9.13 (9.48) 1.63 (1.92) 
 
 
Table 6.19: Selected results of  % change in ACP export sales due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of  Ssb=100% 
                                                     Destination Regions 
Commodities EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops -6.23 (-7.25) 1.62 (2.17) 
WheatFS 8.21 (9.52) 4.12 (5.66) 
GrainFS 4.51 (6.31) 12.34 (14.11) 
Sugar 178.22 (185.45) 17.23 (18.26) 
MeatLstk 10.62 (12.56) 5.42 (6.56) 
ProcFood 23.38 (26.56) 2.34 (2.78) 
PetroleumPro 8.12 (8.23) 1.34 (1.26) 
 
 
As can be seen from the Tables above, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
results in increase in ACP export of bioethanol crops commodities to the EU region. 
For example, at a 5.75% blend mandate and a sugar beet share of 31.1% there is an 
increase in ACP export of wheat to the EU27 of 72.32%. This export is higher at 10% 
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blend mandate, being 76.01% and this trend is followed by all the other bioethanol 
crops commodities. Also, the higher the sugar beet share used in EU bioethanol 
production, the higher the sugar export to the EU from ACP countries.  
 
At a sugar beet share of 31.1% sugar export from ACP countries to EU27 increases 
by 78.34% at a blend mandate of 5.75% and 83.84% at 10% blend mandate. When 
the sugar beet share for the EU bioethanol production programme increases to 
100%, there is a corresponding increase in sugar exports from ACP countries to the 
EU27. At this sugar beet share, ACP sugar export to the EU increases by 178.22% at 
5.75% blend mandate and 185.48% at 10% blend mandate. This is according to 
intuition since a higher sugar beet share in EU bioethanol production increases EU 
sugar demand and this expands sugar import from ACP countries.  
 
Sugar export from ACP countries to ROW markets (which represent the world 
market) increases by 8.12% at 5.75% blend mandate and by 8.23% at 10% blend 
mandate and a sugar beet share of 31.1%. This export share increases to 17.23% at 
5.75% blend mandate and 18.26% at 10% blend mandate when the EU27 
bioethanol sugar beet share is increased to 100%. This shows that the EU27 sugar 
market has an impact on world sugar markets. The increased ACP sugar export to 
the world markets is because less EU sugar is exported to the world market as a 
result of the blend mandate policy. Therefore, the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
will promote ACP sugar industries by promoting sugar export both into the EU27 
and the world market, with ACP export expansion to the EU27 market being higher 
that to the world market. This is as expected since the increase sugar export to 
world markets by ACP countries is an indirect effect. 
 
Generally, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy effect of decreasing EU 
bioethanol crops commodities exports and increasing their prices is not unique to 
our study. For example, our result compare favourably with those by Koizumi and 
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Yanagishima (2005) who examined the impact in 2010 of Brazil blending 8% 
bioethanol in gasoline fuel in 2006. Their study found that Brazilian sugar exports 
fell by 2.9 percent and sugar prices rose by 5.5 percent as a result of this policy. 
 
The export performance of ACP sugar to the EU27 shows that ACP sugar is more 
competitive than sugar from the ROW as is summarised in the Table 6.20 below. 
 
Table 6.20: Sugar export % change to the EU27 from various regions at the 
different sugar beet shares and blend mandate 
                                                                  Origin Region 
Blend Mandate, Sugar beet share  ACP Countries ROW 
5.75% Blend, Ssb=31.1 78.34 42.23 
10% Blend, Ssb=31.1 83.84 45.47 
5.75% Blend, Ssb=100 178.22 76.38 
10% Blend, Ssb=100 185.45 78.62 
 
Table 6.20 above shows that in terms of export performance, ACP sugar 
outperforms ROW sugar for the EU market at all levels of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate percentage and sugar beet share. The better performance of ACP sugar 
compared to that from the ROW could be a competitive advantage outcome. It 
could also be because of internal EU policies that discriminate between ACP sugar 
and that from the ROW. This highlights the importance of performing this analysis 
under different policy scenarios like the EPA policies that liberates trade between 
the EU27 and ACP countries. The blend mandate also increases export of petroleum 
products and meat and livestock commodities from ACP countries to EU27. Export 
of petroleum products is less affected by changes in bioethanol crops commodities 
share used in EU bioethanol production as expected.  
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For the meat and livestock commodities however, as the EU bioethanol sugar beet 
share increases ACP export of these commodities to the EU27 falls. This outcome is 
according to expectations since the EU bioethanol grain crops commodities are also 
used as animal feed. This means therefore that reducing their share in EU 
bioethanol production promote livestock industries in the EU region.   
  
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has motivated the modelling of a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy into the GTAP model in order to analyse its potential global spill over effects. 
Analysis of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy was based on its welfare 
outcomes, effects on bioethanol crops commodities output and trade changes 
mainly in ACP countries and the EU region. Special emphasis of the discussion and 
analysis was on ACP sugar industries because of the importance of this sector to 
many ACP countries. The simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate followed 
from the equilibrium bioethanol quantities derived from the model developed in 
Chapter 3.  
Overall, it has been shown that a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will 
result in global welfare loss. This welfare loss is higher for the EU region than for the 
rest of the regions, which are namely ACP countries and the ROW. However, the 
welfare loss is lower as the sugar beet share used in EU bieothanol production is 
increased. Welfare decomposition has shown that allocative efficiency accounts for 
most of the welfare loss experience by the regions. However, ACP countries 
experience a positive terms of trade welfare outcome. Increase in demand for 
bioethanol crops commodities in the EU result in increased imports of these 
commodities from other regions. The increase in demand for bioethanol crops 
commodities in the EU region also result increase in ACP industry output. These 
outcomes are further supported by trade balance analysis. Trade balance analysis 
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generally shows that the EU region will experience a negative terms of trade in 
bioethanol crops commodities while the other regions including ACP countries 
show a positive trade balance.  
 Undesirable welfare outcomes of bioethanol production have also been a 
conclusion of several studies. For example, de Gorter and Just (2009) estimated the 
annual deadweight cost of the combination of USA biofuel mandate and tax credit 
to be about US$11 billion by 2022. Oladosu and Kline (2010), using the GTAP-E 
model, concluded that USA ethanol use between 2001-2006 as an output mandate 
with adjusting household ethanol and petroleum tax rates resulted in a welfare loss 
of US$ 4304 million in the USA and US$335 million in the EU27. The lower EU 
welfare loss compared to our result is likely due to the fact that their study analyses 
the USA biofuel program with the EU being affected indirectly. Further, the USA 
only uses corn for bioethanol production meaning their bioethanol programme will 
have lesser impact on the other food commodities like wheat that compete with 
bioethanol production in the EU region. Khanna et al (2011) estimated the welfare 
cost of USA biofuel subsidy policies to be around US$122 billion over the 2007 W
2022 period. 
However, the welfare outcomes notwithstanding, the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
ƉŽůŝĐǇǁŝůůďĞďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůƚŽWĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ƐƵŐĂƌƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?dŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚ
depends on the amount of EU sugar that is diverted to bioethanol production. The 
lower welfare loss because of the increasing the sugar beet share in EU bioethanol 
production means such a move will also appeal to EU sugar beet farmers. These will 
benefit from higher EU sugar beet prices and increase in demand for sugar beet in 
the region. 
Our results therefore are not different from those in other studies but our analysis 
has used a unique approach of first designing an EU bioethanol model in order to 
simulate the effect of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. The global 
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simulation of the mandate has used the GTAP model, a widely used modelling 
framework to simulate trade policies. In this way, our results can be applicable and 
comparable to other studies given our model selection and method of investigation. 
The assumptions made in our study are extreme but are useful in analysing the full 
extent of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on global food markets. The 
modelling assumptions have been clearly stated and in line with economic 
principles and in this way, our findings are valid.  
However, shortcomings of the GTAP model include the low price elasticities of 
demand for bioethanol crops commodities. For this reason, in our simulation of the 
blend mandate (simulated as an artificial decrease in EU27 bioethanol crops 
demand) we had to increase the prices of bioethanol crops commodities by a huge 
margin. However, despite the shortfall of the GTAP model, our study approach and 
the results obtained have been informative. 
In the next chapter, we analyse the potential effects of the EPA policies to ACP/EU 
regions and their potential interaction with the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy.  
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Chapter 7  
 
EPA/EC bioethanol blend mandate policy simulation on EU/ACP countries 
7.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the potential effects of the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA) policies and their potential interaction outcomes 
with the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. Analysis will focus on ACP/EU welfare 
effects, production and terms of trade changes in bioethanol crops commodities 
because of these policies. This analysis is motivated by the fact that policies do not 
act in isolation. Besides, both policy measures have significant potential trade 
impacts and they are likely to run concurrently. It is therefore important to take 
into account the interaction between these policies so as to make more informative 
conclusions on their potential effect on global trade and welfare.  
In an effort to comply with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU and ACP 
countries have been engaged in EPA trade negotiations. These EPAs are aimed at 
bilateral ůŝďĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇ ? Ăůů ƚƌĂĚĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ hĂŶĚ W ŵĞŵďĞƌ
states. In this way, they have potential benefits to ACP countries in that increased 
trade with the EU will enhance their export earnings, promote their industrialisation 
and encourage diversification of their economies. As noted by Perez and Karingi 
(2007) cuts in domestic tariffs will also benefit ACP consumers, who will enjoy lower 
prices as imported goods become cheaper, as well as promote the most efficient 
ACP firms, which may improve their integration into the global supply chain.  
 
Beneficial effects of the EPAs to ACP countries have also been found by Morrissey 
and Zgovu (2009). Their study concluded that eǀĞŶĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐ ‘ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ?ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ
elimination of all tariffs on agriculture imports from the EU, and when excluding up 
to 20% of imports as sensitive products, over half of ACP countries are likely to 
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experience welfare gains. Perez and Karingi (2007) found an ACP welfare gain of 
US$270 million with deeper regional integration. Without regional integration 
however, ACP countries experience a welfare loss of US$584 million while the EU 
had a welfare gain of US$2.7 billion.  
 
Milner, Morrissey and Mckay (2005), using a partial equilibrium model, estimated 
the welfare gain from a full EPA for 34 ACP countries to be 0.004 % of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). A study by Keck and Piermartini (2008), using the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 6 model and database concluded that an EPA with 
the EU is welfare enhancing for Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
ACP countries leading to increase in their real GDP. They estimated gains for the 
region as a whole to be of the order of US$1.5 billion (in constant 2001 dollars) but 
found some evidence of trade diversion from the rest of developing countries. 
 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models show that with price flexibility, trade 
liberilisation improves welfare by promoting economic efficiency (Choudhri et al, 
2006). Opening up to trade improves the terms of trade for trading regions in that it 
promotes competitive industries to develop and export more. Indeed, the reduction 
of import tariffs has the effect of reducing domestic prices, increasing household 
income and improving welfare. Welfare gains also arise from improvements in the 
ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ ŽĨ ŐŽŽĚƐ ŽŶ ƐĂůĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ  ‘ůŽǀĞ ĨŽƌ ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ
aspect is difficult to measure empirically. The theory of the welfare effects of a 
reduction in import tariff has been discussed in Chapter 5. It is envisaged however 
that this welfare gain arising from the EPAs will be undermined by the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy, which has been shown in the previous chapter to 
result in global welfare loss. 
Again, in analysing these policies emphasis will be placed on ACP/EU sugar 
production and trade changes. It is expected that since many ACP countries have a 
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competitive advantage in sugar production, accession to EPA policies, ceteris 
paribus, will increase the amount of sugar that is exported by these states to the 
EU27 region. This is because the EPAs do not place a quota limit to the amount of 
sugar that can be exported by the ACP member states to the EU. It is also expected 
a priori that the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy together with the EPA policies 
will result in an overall increase in ACP sugar production and export to the EU 
region than is the case when these policies act in isolation. In this way, these policy 
interactions are expected to benefit ACP sugar producing member states. 
However, the possible trade changes in bioethanol crop commodities, other than 
sugar, as a result of the EPAs is unpredictable. It is part of the aim of this chapter to 
analyse these trade changes in an attempt to answer the following questions:  
1. Can the EPA policies result in the EU region importing enough bioethanol crops 
commodities to meet the EU27 demand as will be created by a binding bioethanol 
blend mandate? 2. What will be the effects on output of bioethanol crops 
commodities in the EU27/ACP regions as a result of these policies? and lastly, 3. 
What will be the global welfare effects of these policies? 
Given these objectives, the chapter is therefore organised as follows; section 7.1 
simulates the EPA policies on EU/ACP countries and presents and discusses the 
outcome of these policies. The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy/EPA policy 
interactions simulation is undertaken in section 7.2, which also presents and 
discusses the results while section 7.3 is the general conclusion to the chapter. 
7.1 Modelling the EPA policies on EU/ACP countries 
 
7.1.1 Policy simulation   
To model the effects of the EPAs on EU/ACP regions, the countries and sectors are 
aggregated as described in chapter 6. To simulate the full EPA policies using the 
GTAP model, the exogenous variable {tms (i,r,s)}, which is the tax on imports of 
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tradable commodity i from source r to destination s (levied in region s) is reduced to 
zero percent between the EU27 and ACP countries and vice versa because of 
reciprocity.  
  
This is the extreme case situation since it does not consider sensitive products that 
need to be protected and not liberalised and it takes the EPA clause of substantial 
liberalisation as full liberalisation. Although this is an extreme case it does offer a 
useful insight into the potential regional comparative outcomes of these policies as 
an upper bound scenario.  
 
7.1.2 Results and discussion 
 
To analyse the effects of the EPA policies, welfare outcomes of these policies, as 
shown by the changes in equivalent variations are first analysed: The results of the 
equivalent variation are shown in Table 7.1: 
 
Table 7.1:  Welfare gain of the EPA policies in million US$ (and as % of GDP) 
ACP Countries 723 (0.14) 
EU_27 6059 (0.047) 
ROW -2419 
 
Table 7.1 shows that the EPA policies will result in overall welfare gains for all the 
regions involved in these trade agreements. Welfare increase by US$732 million in 
ACP countries and about US$6 billion for EU27 member states while the Rest of the 
World (ROW) experience an overall welfare loss of US$2.4 billion. Expressed as a 
percentage of GDP, ACP countries are the winners from these policies compared to 
the EU27 region. As seen in Table 7.1 above, the  EU27 welfare gain from the EPA 
policies is only 0.047% of their GDP while that of ACP countries is 0.14%. The high 
EU27 GDP compared to the other regions could be the reason why the EU27 
welfare gain is lower than that for the ACP region.  This ACP welfare gain is much 
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higher than that found by Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2005), which was 0.004% of 
ACP GDP.  
 
However, overall, these policies will be beneficial to the regions that engage in 
them based on welfare outcomes. Welfare decomposition (Table 7.2) shows that 
allocative efficiency forms the major source of welfare gain in all the regions. 
 
Table 7.2: Welfare decomposition outcomes (in US$ million) of an EPA policies   
Region 
 
Allocative Efficiency Terms of Trade Investment/Savings  
 
ACP 
Countries 472 164 87 
EU27 4244 1453 362 
ROW -362 -1949 -108 
 
 
For example, allocative efficiency welfare gain accounts for 65% of welfare gain in 
ACP countries and 70% for the EU region. This is because of the re-direction of 
resources to sectors that are more productive and competitive. Bilateral abolition 
of import duties between the EU and ACP countries also results in terms of trade 
welfare gain for these regions. This is a result of reduction in the cost of imports for 
both trading partners as theory predicts. There is also a welfare gain as a result of 
investment/savings gains. Again, this welfare gain is expected since opening up to 
trade results in import of cheaper commodities. In this case, household income 
improves and so do savings and investments.  
 
In analysing the trade changes in bioethanol crops commodities due to the EPAs 
policies between the EU and ACP countries, we first analyse their import and export 
changes due to the effects of these policies. To undertake this analysis we first 
consider the baseline situation of exports and imports of commodities of bioethanol 
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significance by the EU27 from ACP countries and the ROW and this is shown in 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
 
Table 7.3: Bilateral export values -VXMD (i,r,s) at world prices from EU27 to other 
regions  ? Baseline Data 
                                                    Destination Region 
 
Commodities ACP Countries ROW 
 GrainsCrops 168.7 6829.3 
 WheatFS 75.6 1438.2 
 GrainFS 7.6 582.2 
 Sugar 54.3 983.6 
 MeatLstk 227.2 8838.2 
 ProcFood 2478.1 49831 
 
Source: GTAP7 Data Base 
 
Where: 
VXMD (i,r,s) = PFOB (i,r,s) * QXS (i,r,s) and is given in millions of US$. In this formula 
PFOB (i,r,s) is the Free on Board Price of commodity i exported from region r to 
region s. QXS is the quantity of commodity i exported from region r to region s. 
 
Table 7.4: Bilateral import values (VIWS i,r,s) at world prices from all other regions 
to EU27- Baseline Data 
                                               Source Region   
Commodities ACP Countries ROW 
GrainsCrops 3164.3 31772.3 
WheatFS 14.2 1682.2 
GrainFS 21.4 1231.3 
Sugar 955.1 783.8 
MeatLstk 448.8 8933.2 
ProcFood 3323.6 37382.4 
 
Source: GTAP7 Data Base 
 
Where: 
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VIWS (i,r,s) = PCIF (i,r,s) * QXS (i,r,s) and is also in millions of US$. In this formula, 
PCIF (i,r,s) is the Cost Insurance and Freight Price of commodity i imported from 
region r to region s. QXS (i,r,s) is the quantity of commodity i imported from region r 
to region s. 
The Tables show that the EU27 is both an exporter and importer of sugar. It is a net 
exporter to the world market and a net importer from ACP countries. For wheat, 
the EU27 is a net exporter to ACP countries. It is a net importer from the rest of the 
world. For the other grain crops commodities, these including maize, oats, barley, 
rye and other cereals the EU27 is a net importer from all the regions. To convert 
these values to quantities we divide them by a common price, which is the world 
market price for the commodity at the time. For sugar, converting the values to 
quantities is done by dividing the values with the average world market price of 
sugar in 2004, which was US$231.70/tonne.  
 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 below show the percentage changes in exports from the EU27 to 
the other regions and vice versa due to the application of the EPA policies. 
 
Table 7.5: Export sales of commodity i (% changes ) from  other regions  to the 
EU27 after EPA policies 
                                       Source Region 
Commodities ACP ROW 
GrainsCrops 17.38 -18.52 
WheatFS 26.81 -0.71 
GrainFS 6.43 -3.0 
Sugar 242.84 -78.42 
MeatLstk 138.55 -1.23 
ProcFood 20.03 -0.8 
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Table 7.6: Export sales of commodity i (% changes ) from EU27 to other regions  
after  EPA  policies  
                                                 Destination Region 
Commodities ACP Countries ROW 
GrainsCrops 58.22 1.92 
WheatFS 31.98 0.63 
GrainFS 5.73 1.13 
Sugar 95.16 2.63 
MeatLstk 86.9 3.42 
ProcFood 62.06 -0.02 
 
The results in Table 7.5 and 7.6 above show that full application of the EPA policies 
will increase sugar exports from ACP countries to the EU by of 242.84% while 
exports from EU27 to ACP countries increase by 95.16%. This direct effect of the 
EPAs highlights the competitiveness of ACP sugar industries as compared to the 
EU27.  
Sugar exports from the EU27 to the ROW increase by 1.53% while exports from the 
ROW to the EU27 shrink by 78.42%, possibly due to the displacement of the Rest of 
World sugar by duty free sugar from ACP countries.  Quantitative analysis of the 
sugar trade balance in the EU27 shows that the EPA policies will result in an overall 
increase in sugar in the EU27 of 7.36 million tonnes. 
The question then is what is the implication of this change with respect to the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy? The amounts of sugar demanded by the EU27 
after an application of the EC bioethanol blend mandate were calculated to be as 
follows: 
25.7 million tonnes of sugar beet =3.3 million tonnes of white sugar (15.3% of total 
2004 EU sugar production)- 5.75% Blend, Ssb=31.1% 
44.4 million tonnes of sugar beet = 5.7 million tonnes of white sugar (26.3% of total 
2004 EU sugar production)- 10% Blend, Ssb=31.1% 
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81.5 million tonnes of sugar beet =10.6 million tonnes of white sugar (49.1% of total 
2004 EU sugar production)- 5.75% Blend, Ssb=100% 
143 million tonnes of sugar beet = 18.6 million tonnes of white sugar (85.9% of total 
2004 EU sugar production)- 10% Blend, Ssb=100% 
 
This means that the full application of the EPA policies will result in an overall 
increase in sugar imports into the EU27 that can meet the demand created by a 
binding bioethanol blend mandate at a sugar beet share of Ssb=31.1%.  However, 
this is not the complete story since it is expected that the EPA trade policies will 
depress the price of sugar in the EU27 due to increased imports. For this reason, it 
is expected that sugar production in the EU region will go down. This is confirmed 
by the results of industry output after the full application of the EPA policies as 
shown in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7: Industry output of commodity i in region r (% change) due to an EPA 
policies 
 Region 
 
 
  Commodities ACP Countries EU27 ROW
GrainsCrops 2.23 -0.52 0.21 
WheatFS -1.7 0.12 0.10 
GrainFS -0.23 -0.14 0.93 
SugarFS 26.43 -6.76 -0.74 
Sugar 48.93 -18.82 -0.83 
MeatLstk 2.62 -0.34 -0.14 
ProcFood -0.88 0.12 -0.19 
 
The results in the Table 7.7 show that the industry output for sugar in the EU27 
shrink by 18.82% while it goes up by 48.93% in ACP countries. This is because the 
EU does not have a competitive advantage in sugar production and will therefore 
lose out to more efficient sugar producers from tropical nations in the ACP groups 
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of countries. In terms of EU sugar output, El Obeid and Beghin (2005) predicted a 
substantial decrease of 61% under multilateral liberalization.  
According to USDA data, the EU produced 21.65 million tonnes of sugar in 2004. A 
reduction of 18.82% equates to an output decrease of 4.1 million tonne from the 
overall 2004 production data. The difference between this output decrease and the 
increase from imports result in a total of 3.16 million tonnes of sugar. This amount 
of sugar is not enough to cover its upper demand at a blend mandate of 10% and 
sugar beet share of 31.1% (as calculated to be 5.7 million tonnes). 
Similar analysis is also undertaken for the other bioethanol crops commodities after 
the application of the EPA policies. From Table 7.6, wheat exports from EU27 to 
ACP countries increase by 32% while imports from ACP countries increase by 26.8%. 
This means there was a net outflow of wheat from EU27 to ACP countries, a 
situation that will worsen the demand for wheat in the EU when these policies are 
interacted with the bioethanol blend mandate policy. For wheat trade between the 
EU27 and ROW regions, the trade effects of the two policies are not significant 
since both EU27 imports and exports of wheat change by less than 1%.  
The import structure of the ACP-EU region due to the EPAs is comparable to that 
from a study by Morrissey and Zgovu (2009) who found an increase in EU import of 
18.03% of total agricultural products (including sensitive products) as a result of the 
EPAs. Milner et al (2009) concluded that the EPAs will result in ACP import increase 
of all products of 0.08%, which is much lower compared to the changes observed 
for bioethanol crops commodities from our study.  
For the other grain crops, there is an increase in EU27 exports to ACP countries of 
5.73% while their imports increase by 6.43%. There is thus not much overall change 
from the baseline scenario. Considering the grain crops trade between the EU27 
and ROW there is an increase in EU27exports of 1.13% while imports decrease by 
3%. This means there is an overall outflow of grain crops from the EU27 to the 
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ROW. Again, there is no significant change from the baseline scenario since the 
difference between the percentage changes in export and import is small.  
The overall conclusion of this analysis is that the EPA policies will result in overall 
increase in sugar imports from ACP to the EU27. These ACP sugar imports would be 
enough to meet the demand as would be created by a binding bioethanol blend 
mandate at a lower blend mandate of 5.75% and sugar beet share of 31.1%. For the 
other bioethanol crops commodities, such policies will not bring much change from 
the baseline scenario. This means therefore that the EU27 region will have to 
increase internal production of bioethanol crops in order to meet demand as will be 
created by a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. This observation is also 
supported by insignificant changes in industry output of these commodities in the 
EU27. The EPA policies only result in EU output changes of less than 1% for wheat 
and the other bioethanol grain crops commodities. 
The results in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show the changes in prices of commodities after 
the application of the EPA policies between the EU27 and ACP countries.  
Table 7.8: Market price of composite import of commodity i in EU27 after EPA 
policies 
 
Commodity % Price Changes 
GrainsCrops -0.65 
WheatFS -0.07 
GrainFS -0.12 
Sugar -23.72 
MeatLstk -0.4 
Extraction -0.01 
ProcFood -0.24 
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Table 7.9: Market price of commodity i in EU27 after EPA policies  
 
Commodity % Price Changes 
GrainsCrops -0.14 
WheatFS -0.07 
GrainFS -0.12 
Sugar -0.31 
MeatLstk -0.05 
Extraction 0.01 
ProcFood -0.02 
 
The results above show that the price movement of significance is basically that of 
sugar imports into the EU27 whereby the import price goes down by 23.72%. The 
import prices of the other bioethanol crops commodities (as well as market prices 
of all the bioethanol crop commodities) also go down as expected due to the 
removal of import duties but the percentage changes are not large. The small price 
changes of import prices of bioethanol crops commodities into the EU is basically 
due to the fact that EPA policies liberate commodities from ACP countries. These 
countries are generally higher cost producers of these commodities possibly 
because of lack of technology and/or producer subsidies. In this way, the prices of 
EU imports of these commodities reflect the production costs in these regions.  
Sugar is an exception since most ACP countries are efficient producers of this 
commodity, thus low costs of production imply low import prices for the EU region. 
The market price in the EU region for the bioethanol crops commodities also goes 
down by a small amount after the EPA policies. These market prices reflect 
production cost differences between ACP countries and the EU region once markets 
return to equilibrium after trade liberalisation. High production costs of bioethanol 
crops commodities in ACP countries and high cost of sugar production in the EU 
means trade liberilisation will not reduce prices of these commodities. 
dŚĞ W ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? price effects on bioethanol crops commodities outcomes are in 
contrast to those of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, which result in 
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significant price increases in these bioethanol crops commodities in the EU region 
as we have seen.  
Given the results above we now investigate the potential interaction outcomes 
between the EPA policies and the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on trade in 
bioethanol crops commodities between the EU and ACP countries and on overall 
welfare changes in these regions.  
7.2 Simulation of the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policy interactions on 
ACP countries 
 
7.2.1 Policy simulation 
 
In this section, we will determine the effect of the interplay between the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy and the EPA policies between the EU27 and ACP 
countries. In this analysis, the simulations of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy as discussed in Chapter 6 is undertaken together with the simulation of the 
EPA policies as discussed above.  
 
As mentioned before, analysis will focus on ACP/EU welfare effects, production and 
trade changes in bioethanol crops commodities because of these policies. The 
countries and sectors are aggregated as in the simulation of the EC bioethanol 
blend mandate discussed in Chapter 6 and the model closures are again the 
standard GTAP 7 closures. 
 
7.2.2 Results and discussion 
To analyse the outcomes of the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policy 
interactions, we first discuss their welfare outcomes. Results (Table 7.10) show that 
the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will overwhelm the positive welfare gain 
due to EPA policies. For this reason, this policy is undesirable especially for the EU 
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region where prices of bioethanol crops commodities increase much more than is 
the case for the other regions resulting in the observed welfare loss. 
 
Table 7.10:  The welfare loss as a percentage of GDP of a 5.75%  and 10% EC 
bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies  at Ssb=31.1 (100) % 
  EV (5.75%) EV (10%) 
 
 ACP countries 0.21 (0.11) 0.28 (0.12) 
 
  EU27  0.32 (0.29) 0.44 (0.35) 
 
   
Again, as in the case with the blend mandate policy alone, the higher the blend 
mandate percentage the higher the global welfare loss. For all the regions, the 
higher, the sugar beet share used in the production of bioethanol in the EU27 the 
lower the welfare loss. Still, for all the regions, welfare loss is higher when the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate is applied on its own than when combined with the EPA 
policies. The absolute welfare effects and welfare decomposition are shown in 
Table A7.1  and A7.2 respectively in the appendix section. 
 
These welfare outcomes compared to previous results show the importance of the 
analysis of policy interactions. It can be seen that while trade liberalisation has the 
effect of improving global welfare in terms of improved terms of trade, better 
allocation of resources and lower prices, there are other policies that have a 
potential to undermine such welfare gains. The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
is one of such policies. Positive welfare outcomes of trade liberalisation are one of 
the key benefits of these endeavors as promoted by the WTO. For this reason, it is 
important that negotiations of trade liberalisation agreements consider other 
policies that have a potential to negatively affect the welfare gains of free trade.  
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Again, the welfare loss is as result of the increase in bioethanol crops commodities 
prices mainly as an adverse outcome of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. 
The prices changes as a result to these policy combinations are shown in Tables 
7.11 and 7.12 below. 
 
Table 7.11: Selected results of the % change in market price due to an EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies at Ssb=31.1 % 
Regions 
Commodity ACP countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops 2.32 (2.78) 1.21 (1.42) 1.82(2.23) 
WheatFS 10.24(11.76) 54.12 (59.32) 4.11(5.31) 
GrainFS 14.14 (14.86) 74.4 (76.23) 4.42(3.82) 
Sugar 3.34 (3.83) 21.23 (22.78) 1.28 (1.63) 
MeatLstk 1.13 (1.18) 4.73 (5.84) 1.63 (2.49) 
ProcFood 0.86 (1.21) 2.72 (2.84) 1.67 (1.83) 
PetroleumPro 0.45 (0.74) 1.21 (1.34) 0.44 (0.56) 
 
Table 7.12: Selected results of the % change in market price due to an EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies at Ssb=100% 
                      Regions 
Commodity ACP countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops 1.21 (1.62) 1.32 (1.53) 2 .22(2.52) 
WheatFS 3.13 (2.76) 6.42 (9.23) 4.11 (4.62) 
GrainFS 1.23 (1.86) 8.2 (8.9) 3.43 (3.92) 
Sugar 10.87 (12.07) 93.96 (94.43) 41.47 (43.66) 
MeatLstk 1.83 (1.12) 3.34 (4.23) 1.61 (1.82) 
ProcFood 0.78 (0.83) 1.32 (2.42) 1.13 (1.24) 
PetroleumPro 0.23 (0.42) 3.12 (4.27) 0.3 4(0.41) 
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The results above show that for example, at an EC bioethanol blend mandate of 
10% and a sugar beet share of 31.1% the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policy 
combinations result in increase in wheat prices of about 59% in the EU region. The 
prices for the other bioethanol grain crops commodities and sugar increase by 
about 76% and 23% respectively. For ACP countries, the corresponding price 
increases are only almost 12% for wheat, 15% for the other bioethanol grain crops 
commodities and 4% for sugar.  
 
However, a possible ambiguity of our simulation is observed in the prices of 
bioethanol crops commodities. Results show that ACP prices of bioethanol crops 
commodities are much higher with the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies 
than is the case with the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy alone. For example, at 
a blend mandate of 5.75% and sugar beet share of 31.1% the price of wheat 
increase by 9.6% for the EC bioethanol blend mandate. The price increase for the 
combination policies for wheat is 10.24%. These results are shown in Table 6.12 and 
Table 7.11. All the bioethanol crops commodities including sugar show this trend. 
This is an ambiguous finding in that one would expect that opening up trade 
barriers would result in efficient production and lowering of prices in ACP countries. 
In this way, the price increases will be lower for the combination of the policies 
than for the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on its own.  
 
The EPA policies, as has been observed in the previous section, do not significantly 
reduce the prices of bioethanol crops commodities in the EU and ACP regions. In 
our simulation, we have modelled the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy as a tax 
on bioethanol crops commodities output or demand. In this way, resources shift 
away from bioethanol crops commodities sectors to sectors that are more efficient. 
This result in high production costs for bioethanol crops commodities which is made 
worse by trade liberalisation and further shifting of resources to other more 
efficient sectors. This could in part explain the abnormal observation of higher 
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bioethanol crop commodities prices in the ACP regions for the combination of the 
EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies.   
 
Welfare decomposition shows that ACP countries experience a positive terms of 
trade welfare outcome after the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policy 
interactions. However, this positive terms of trade welfare gain is lower than when 
the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is applied on its own. These results are 
shown in Table 7.13  below; 
 
Table 7.13: Welfare decomposition (in US$ million) of a 5.75%  and 10% EC 
bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies  at Ssb=31.1 (100) % 
 
Region *BM% Allocative Efficiency Terms of Trade Investment/Savings 
  
   ACP 
Countries 
5.75% -705(-562) 126 (64) -23 (-27) 
10% -1090 (-1002) 202 (154) -57 (-64) 
  
  
EU-27 
5.75% -30420 (-29494) -4020 (-5002) -292(-471) 
10% -47234(-43480) -4983 (-3680) -617(-862) 
  
   
ROW 
5.75% -5328 (-5490) -554 (-285) -83 (-73) 
10% -6388 (-5780) -612 (-662) -213 (-281) 
 
*BM = Blend Mandate 
 
Table 7.13 above shows that ACP ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?terms of trade welfare gain for the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policy interaction is US$ 126 million at a blend 
mandate of 5.75% and sugar beet share of 31.1%. This terms of trade welfare gain is 
higher at US$ 412 million for the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy alone as 
shown in the appendix A6.2 
 
It is therefore likely that bilateral reduction of trade barriers of the EPAs between 
the EU and ACP countries increases EU export of other commodities to ACP 
countries. This therefore reduces ACP overall terms of trade.  
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After the welfare analysis of these policy combinations, we now turn to industry 
output and changes in trade profiles of bioethanol crops commodities in ACP 
countries because of these policies. Again, our analysis will place emphasis on sugar 
production and trade in ACP countries. 
Table 7.14: Selected results of % change in industry output due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies at sugar beet share of Ssb=31.1 
                                Regions 
Commodities ACP countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops 2.13 (2.83) 1.41 (1.65)       1.72 (1.86) 
WheatFS 42.26 (45.34) -15.23(-17.31) 26.42 (28.45) 
GrainFS 4.32 (5.62) -50.23 (-58.31) 14.02 (16.21) 
Sugar 78.31 (88.72) -10.22 (-16.15) 49.28 (55.18) 
MeatLstk 2.23 (2.53) -4.35 (-5.28) 1.24 (1.82) 
ProcFood 1.35 (1.96) -3.13 (-4.23) 1.12 (1.23) 
PetroleumPro 2.23 (2.68) -1.31 (-1.84) 1.35 (1.48) 
 
 
Table 7.15: Selected results of % change in industry output due to the EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies at sugar beet share of Ssb=100 
                            Regions 
Commodities ACP countries EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops 1.23 (1.34) 1.45 (1.82)       -3.33 (-3.78) 
WheatFS 4.24 (5.67) -2.45(-3.24) 5.52 (6.32) 
GrainFS 1.25 (1.72) -1.51 (-1.83) 1.31 (1.63) 
Sugar 266.45 (288.34) -89.43 (-95.92) 128.43 (142.32) 
MeatLstk 1.01 (2.11) -2.24 (-2.39) 1.38 (1.84) 
ProcFood -2.60 (-3.23) -46.21 (-54.21) -11.52 (-13.28) 
PetroleumPro 2.41 (3.14) -2.13 (-2.78) 1.24 (1.78) 
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Industry output show that at a sugar beet share of 31.1% and a blend mandate of 
5.75% the other bioethanol crops commodities output is 15.81% for the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate while it is 4.32% for the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate/EPA policies as shown in Tables 6.14 and 7.14 respectively. The same 
trend is shown by wheat but not sugar. ACP sugar output is higher with the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies than is the case when these policies act 
independently.  
 
Tables 7.16 summarises the ACP sugar industry output as a result of various policy 
combinations.  
 
Table 7.16: Summary % changes in sugar output at various policy combinations for 
ACP countries 
 
Region Industry 
output 
Policy 
instrument 
Sugar  beet 
% share 
Blend 
mandate % 
ACP 78.31 *EBBM/EPA 31.1 5.75 
88.72 31.1 10 
266.45 100 5.75 
288.34 100 10 
ACP 64.21 EBBM 31.1 5.75 
68.87 31.1 10 
206.21 100 5.75 
235.52 100 10 
ACP 48.93 EPAs   
*EBBM=EC Bioethanol Blend Mandate; EPA=Economic Partnership Agreement 
 
These outcomes suggest that the combination of the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
with the EPA policies will promote sugar production in ACP countries much more 
than the EC bioethanol blend mandate or EPA policies alone. This shows that ACP 
countries are relatively competitive in sugar. Policies that liberate trade and 
increase demand for bioethanol crops commodities result in re-allocation of 
resources to sectors that are more efficient. This is the reason therefore why the 
ACP sugar industry expands relatively more than the other bioethanol crops 
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commodities sectors. As a result, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy promotes 
sugar production in ACP countries despite its negative welfare effects.  
The relative competitiveness of ACP sugar industries is also supported by higher 
trade balance when policies that increase bioethanol crop commodities are 
combined with those that reduce trade barriers. These results are presented in 
Tables 7.17 and Tables 7.18 below. 
 
Table 7.17: Selected results of change in trade balance (in US$ million) due to an 
EC 5.75% (10%) bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies at Ssb=31.1 % 
                                Regions 
Commodity ACP countries EU27 
 GrainsCrops 122.22 (113.34) 2633.24 (3213.24) 
 WheatFS 48.34 (53.23) -1321.7  (-1623.7) 
 GrainFS 94.23 (101.35) -6469.13 (-7451.45) 
 Sugar 2622.34 (2718.98) -3456.23 (-3688.30) 
 MeatLstk 578.13 (614.34) -3819.73 (-4261.87) 
 ProcFood -151.6 (-123.67) -1724.33(1753.31) 
 PetroleumPro 665.34 (734.34) -49823.42 (-64949.32) 
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Table 7.18 Selected results of change in trade balance (in US$ million) due 
to an EC 5.75% (10%) bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies  at Ssb=100% 
                                                                                 Regions 
Commodity ACP countries EU27 
  GrainsCrops 123.23(114.25) 3424.72(4241.34) 
  WheatFS 22.32(28.23) -16.6(-19.23) 
  GrainFS 26.62(28.56) -12.56(-10.83) 
  Sugar 3193.82(3298.24) -2172.5(-2172.45) 
  MeatLstk 649.2(678.33) -5182.32(-5843.78) 
  ProcFood -63.23(-67.23) -2832.54(-3073.23) 
  PetroleumPro 661.6(713.34) -49541.7(-64032.8) 
   
For example, the EC bioethanol blend mandate /EPA policies result in an increase in 
ACP sugar trade balance of US$2.6 billion at a blend mandate of 5.75% and sugar 
beet share of 31.1%. The wheat trade balance at the same blend mandate and 
sugar beet share is US$48 million as shown in Table 7.17. In comparison, the trade 
balance for the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy without the EPA policies is 
US$823 million for sugar and US$72 million for wheat as seen in Table 6.16 in the 
previous chapter. Sugar trade balance trend follows that of industry output for ACP 
countries and these results are summarised in Table 7.19 below. 
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Table 7.19: Summary of changes in sugar trade balance (in US$ millions) at 
different policy instruments for ACP countries 
 
Region Trade 
Balance 
Change 
Policy Initiative Sugar Beet % 
Share 
Blend 
Mandate % 
ACP 2622.34 *EBBM/EPA 31.1 5.75 
2718.98 31.1 10 
3193.82 100 5.75 
3298.24 100 10 
ACP 832.33 EBBM 31.1 5.75 
935.92 31.1 10 
1232.12 100 5.75 
1412.45 100 10 
ACP 2077.24 EPA   
*EBBM=EC Bioethanol Blend Mandate; EPA=Economic Partnership Agreement 
 
The ACP export performance of bioethanol crops commodities is better for the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate /EPA policy combinations than is the case when the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy is applied on its own as expected. ACP export 
changes as a result of the EC bioethanol blend mandate /EPA policy combinations 
are shown in Table 7.20 and 7.21  below; 
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Table 7.20: Selected results of the % change in ACP export due to an EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies at Ssb=3.11% 
 
                                               Destination regions 
 
Commodities EU27 ROW 
GrainsCrops 9.56(10.22) -1.32(-0.61) 
WheatFS 76.23(86.45) 42.32(44.21) 
GrainFS 82.12(87.31) 20.12(22.24) 
Sugar 193.22 (212.89) 48.23(56.65) 
MeatLstk 13.45(16.45) 4.81(5.63) 
ProcFood 6.34(7.47) 2.41(3.08) 
PetroleumPro 9.62(9.83) 1.10(1.72) 
 
Table 7.21: Selected results of the % change in ACP export due to an EC 5.75% 
(10%) bioethanol blend mandate policies  at Ssb=100 % 
 
Destination regions 
 Commodites EU27 ROW
GrainsCrops 10.06 (8.8) -2.47 (-3.52) 
WheatFS 9.34 (9.86) 4.73 (5.52) 
GrainFS 4.91 (6.62) 2.23(2.84) 
Sugar 252.3 (288.21) 75.29 (84.32) 
MeatLstk 5.22 (6.27) 3.45 (3.91) 
ProcFood 22.72(23.67) 3.52 (4.37) 
PetroleumPro 7.21 (7.42) 1.08 (1.56) 
 
Table 7.21 shows for example that the combination of these policies results in ACP 
export increase of the other bioethanol grain crops commodities to the EU of 
82.12% at 5.75% blend mandate and sugar beet share of 31.1%. This export 
increase percentage is lower at 72.32% for the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
as shown in Table 6.18 of the previous chapter. These rather large export increases 
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are purely the full effect of the application a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy in the EU region and are mainly due to our basic assumption that the EU 
produces bioethanol from their  ‘ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ?ďŝŽethanol crops commodities production. 
As such, these Figures show the full impact the mandate. 
 
ACP bioethanol crop commodities exports to the EU are much lower for the EPA 
policies than for the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. This is as per expectations 
since EPAs only eliminate trade barriers while the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
creates demand for bioethanol crops commodities in the EU. This EU demand must 
be associated with increase imports from ACP countries. 
 
Tables 7.22 summarises the ACP export changes for sugar at the various policy 
combinations.  
 
Table 7.22: Summary of % changes in sugar export to EU27 at different policy 
instruments for ACP countries 
 
Region % Change in 
Export 
Policy Initiative Sugar Beet % 
Share 
Blend 
Mandate % 
ACP 193.22 *EBBM/EPA 31.1 5.75 
212.89 31.1 10 
252.3 100 5.75 
288.21 100 10 
ACP 78.34 EBBM 31.1 5.75 
83.84 31.1 10 
178.22 100 5.75 
185.45 100 10 
ACP 242.84 EPA   
*EBBM= EC Bioethanol Blend Mandate; EPA=Economic Partnership Agreement 
 
In summary, therefore, the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies will promote 
ACP sugar industries relatively more than the other bioethanol crops commodities. 
The export performance of ACP bioethanol crops commodities is generally higher 
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with the policy combinations that when the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is 
applied on its own.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that policy interactions result in trade and welfare 
outcomes that are different from the case when such interacting policies act in 
isolation. In this chapter, we have analysed the effects of the EPA policies on EU and 
ACP countries and their potential interaction with the EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy. It has been shown empirically that the EPA policies tend to reduce the global 
welfare loss as a result of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. This is because 
the EPA policies result in overall welfare gain for regions engaged in them while the 
EC  bioethanol blend mandate policy results in global welfare loss.  
The chapter has also shown that ACP countries stand to benefit from the 
combination of the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies in that these policies 
increase ACP export of bioethanol crops commodities to the EU. This increase in 
export of bioethanol crops commodities because of these policies is also supported 
by an increase in industry output of these bioethanol crops commodities in ACP 
countries and their positive trade balance. The analysis has also revealed that ACP 
countries have a relative comparative advantage in sugar production. This is 
because the sugar sector expands relatively more that the other bioethanol crops 
commodities sectors because of these policies. The combination of the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate and the EPA policies generally has the effect of creating 
demand for bioethanol crops commodities in the EU region while abolishing duty 
and quota restrictions for commodities from ACP countries to the EU region. 
Therefore, bioethanol crops commodities sectors where ACP countries have a 
relative competitive advantage expand relatively more. These policy combinations 
therefore could be pro-developmental for ACP countries. However, because of the 
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EC bioethanol blend mandate effect of increasing bioethanol crops commodities 
prices, some of which are important food sources, such policy combinations result 
in overall negative welfare outcomes that are undesirable. 
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Chapter 8  
Summary, conclusion and extension 
8.1 Summary and conclusion 
The research has reviewed the international economic implications of an EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy as per the EC biofuel directive of 2003. Biofuels 
generally refers to bioethanol and biodiesel. Biofuels are being promoted around 
the globe due to growing concern about energy security and as a need to reduce 
GHG emissions associated with traditional fossil fuels. However, biofuels promotion 
remain a controversial issue given their competition with food production in a 
world that is still not food secure. 
The EU is one of the regions that has enacted policies and directives aimed at 
promoting the uptake and use of biofuels as an alternative to traditional fossil fuels, 
the EC directive of 2003 being one example. This directive aims to mandate the 
blending of traditional transport fuels with 5.75% biofuel component, with the aim 
to increase it to 10% by 2020. First generation biofuels are those produced mainly 
from crops. Our interest in this research therefore has been on bioethanol 
production because it competes directly with the production of bioethanol crops 
commodities. The EU produces bioethanol mainly from rye, sugar beet, wheat, 
barley and corn. This means that the EC biofuel directive or specifically the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate will have an impact on the market for these 
commodities. Such commodities are important food sources meaning that their use 
to produce bioethanol will have global effects on food markets and welfare, given 
the fact that most households especially in developing countries use a substantial 
amount of their income for the purchase of food. Increased demand for these 
bioethanol crops commodities around the globe because of diversion of some of 
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them to the production of bioethanol is therefore expected to result in global 
welfare loss. 
One important bioethanol crop commodity especially for ACP countries is sugar. For 
many of these countries, sugar is an important foreign revenue earner. The EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy is expected to have an impact on the markets for 
this commodity as well.  
It is interesting therefore, to analyse such impacts in terms of their global welfare 
outcomes and effects on trade balance, production and export performance of 
bioethanol crops commodities in EU and ACP countries. This is especially so for the 
sugar industries, which remain vital in the economies of most ACP countries in the 
light of ƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƐƵŐĂƌƚƌĂĚĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƐƵĐŚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŚĂǀĞŚĂĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
EU. These trade arrangements between the EU and ACP countries were discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Studies on the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy and indeed on the economics of 
a blend mandate for the EU region are scant. There is therefore no model that 
attempts to analyse the implication of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on 
EU and global bioethanol crops commodities markets. This is despite the fact that 
such a policy will have significant trade implication for ACP countries that trade with 
the EU region especially in sugar. Of note also is that the EU is an important sugar 
producer and trader despite the fact that the region is a high cost sugar producer. 
To promote local sugar production the EU region uses support policies (also 
discussed in Chapter 4) that are aimed at protecting the region ?s sugar markets. A 
binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is expected to have an impact on the 
EU sugar and global markets with important trade implication for ACP countries.  
Lack of a suitable model on the EC biofuel blend mandate economics means that 
our study has had to design such a model under certain assumptions. In Chapter 3, 
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we therefore designed an EU bioethanol partial equilibrium model under the 
assumption that the EU region produces all bioethanol requirements locally by 
diverting some bioethanol crops commodities to bioethanol production. Another 
key assumption was that the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is binding. In 
order for bioethanol not to have a price effect on transport fuel, a subsidy that 
promotes its production was assumed to exist.  
The equilibrium conditions of the EU bioethanol partial equilibrium model has been 
used to analyse its implication or impact on ACP bioethanol crops commodities 
markets using the GTAP model, a global computable general equilibrium model 
which we motivated in Chapter 5. As mentioned, focus of our analysis has been on 
EU/ACP countries sugar productivity, changes in trade balance and on general 
welfare outcomes. 
Simulation of the global effects of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy using the 
GTAP model was then undertaken in Chapter 6. Key findings of this analysis were 
that an EC bioethanol blend mandate policy would result in significant global 
welfare loss. This welfare loss will be highest in the EU region in absolute terms and 
even when expressed as a percentage of GDP. Such global welfare loss is as 
expected since increase in bioethanol crops commodities demand due to the 
mandate exerts an upward pressure on their prices. The EC bioethanol blend 
mandate policy effect of increasing bioethanol crops commodities prices has the 
opposite effect to the EU policy that aims to cut the intervention prices of sugar. 
The cuts in intervention prices will decrease sugar output in the region, increase 
consumption and further worsen the demand for sugar. As noted by Elbehri et al 
(2008), the combined effect of cuts in the sugar intervention prices and production 
quotas will lead to lower EU sugar production, lower prices for consumers and 
increase consumption.  
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Another important finding was that the higher the sugar beet share used in 
bioethanol production in the EU region, the lower the global welfare loss. A possible 
reason for this trend is that sugar is generally not a main food source. This means 
therefore that the other bioethanol crops commodities, most of which are used as 
food sources and therefore take a large portion of household budgets, are saved 
when the sugar beet share for EU bioethanol production goes up. 
The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will also increase production of bioethanol 
crops commodities in ACP countries. This increase in bioethanol crops commodities 
productivity is positively correlated with the share of that bioethanol crop used in 
EU bioethanol production in the EU. The EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is 
therefore also associated with a positive trade balance for bioethanol crops 
commodities in ACP countries due to the demand created in the EU for these 
commodities.  
However, the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy is not a policy in isolation. There 
are other important policies that will form the future trade framework between the 
EU and ACP countries. These policies include the EPA policies (also discussed in 
Chapter 4). The aim of the EPAs is to abolish quota and tariff restrictions on trade 
between the EU and ACP countries. It is therefore interesting to analyse the 
potential interaction outcomes between the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy 
and the EPA policies. This policy interaction simulation was undertaken in Chapter 
7. For this analysis, we first simulated the EPA policies on their own and then on 
their interaction with the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy.  
 
Key findings are that the EPA policies will result in global welfare gains for all 
regions involved in these policies, including ACP regions. There is also an increase in 
sugar output and export from ACP countries because of these policies. This finding 
is an indicator that many ACP countries are low cost sugar producers and have well 
developed sugar industries. Further analysis of trade changes due to the EPA 
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policies found that these policies will result in overall increase in sugar exports from 
ACP to the EU27. EU sugar imports will be enough to meet the demand that will be 
created by the EC bioethanol binding blend mandate at a lower EU bioethanol sugar 
beet share. For the rest of the bioethanol crops commodities, the EPA policies will 
not bring much trade changes from the baseline scenario. This means therefore 
that the EU27 region will have to increase internal production of bioethanol crops in 
order to meet demand as will be created by a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate 
policy.  
 
The EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policy interactions however will result in 
overall global welfare loss, despite the welfare gains due to the EPA policies alone. 
This signifies the adverse effects the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy will have 
on global food markets. The welfare loss is again highest in the EU region. 
 
A combination of the EC bioethanol blend mandate/EPA policies also result in ACP 
bioethanol crops commodities output expanding more than is the case when these 
policies are simulated in isolation. There is a notable increase in sugar and other 
bioethanol crops commodities export to EU markets supported by a positive trade 
balance in these commodities for ACP countries. This means that, the welfare 
outcomes notwithstanding, the combination of the EC bioethanol blend 
mandate/EPA policies will be pro-developmental for ACP countries. However, 
questions remain on their sustainability given the finding that they will result in 
welfare loss in most of the regions.  
 
The negative welfare outcomes experienced by the EU region as a result of the EC 
bioethanol blend mandate policy means that it is not in the regions interest to 
attempt to produce bioethanol to meet the blend mandate demand locally. It 
would therefore be helpful for the region to consider moving bioethanol production 
plants to low cost producers like ACP countries where bioethanol can be produced 
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from sugar cane more cost effectively. Another possibility is for the EU region to use 
policies that promote biethanol importation from low cost producers like Brazil. 
Investing in bioethanol plants in low cost ACP sugar cane producers will be 
beneficial for both the EU and ACP countries. The EU will benefit from low cost 
bioethanol production while ACP countries will benefit from diversification of their 
sugar industries and improvements in their export base. 
 
8.2 Shortfall of the research and possible extensions 
One possible extension of the research is to try making a dynanimc model in the 
analysis of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. CGE models have the shortfall 
in that they are static and therefore policy impacts cannot be simulated with time 
frame outcomes. In this way, the policy impact is only analysed at a single point in 
time and the model does not clearly state the time adjustment process of the policy 
outcomes. A dynamic CGE model has been used for example by Arndt et al (2008) in 
their analysis of biofuels, povery and growth in Mozambique.  
 
The CGE model used has also assumed perfect competition. This is not true in 
reality given for example the various market distorting policies and non-tariff 
barriers that exist in global trade. Of note about the GTAP model is also that the 
demand elasticities for grain crops reported are rather low. Therefore, our method 
used to simulate the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy, given the low demand 
elasticities, required very large price effects, which overestimated our findings. A 
possible remedy for this shortfall of the GTAP model is to develop a trade model 
similar to that by Milner et al. (2005) in their analysis of the trade and welfare 
effects of the Economic Partnership Agreements.  
For our anlaylsis of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy we have not taken into 
consideration the effect of this policy on land use. This is because we have assumed 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐĂůůƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛbioethanol ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵ “ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ? local 
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production of bioethanol crops commodities. This is a strong assumption, which 
needs to be relaxed to include the potential for the EU to use idle land to produce 
more bioethanol crops.  
Another aspect that could be pursued in this study is the environmental 
consequences of a binding EC bioethanol blend mandate policy. The use of a certain 
percentage of renewable fuel as transport fuel is envisaged to reduce GHG 
emission. The amount of carbon units saved and their impacts on carbon tax  and 
tax credits schemes could be analysed. For reasons of the scope of our analysis, we 
did not elaborate on the outcomes of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on 
transport fuel and GHG emissions.  
Our analysis of the EC bioethanol blend mandate policy and its potential 
interactions with the EPA policies has been illuminating despite the shortcomings of 
the GTAP model. These shortcomings are mainly to do with the level of aggregation 
of the energy sector. This has made it difficult to similate the possible effect of the 
EC bioethanol blend mandate policy on energy markets. This is because this policy 
basically affect gasoline, which is not isolated as a stand alone commodity in the 
model. Biofuels have also not been isolated out as stand alone sector in the GTAP 7 
model and database. A new version of the GTAP model called GTAP-E does isolate 
out bioefuls but this version is again limited in that gasoline is still aggregated as 
petroleum products.  
The level of regional aggregation in the model has resulted in the misclassification 
of some countries. It is recommended therefore that extension work of this study 
and intepretation of results take into account the shortcomings of the model. 
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Figure A3-1: The world Bioethanol model 
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Figure A3-2: Brazilian bioethanol model 
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Figure A3-3: USA Bioethanol Model 
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Figure A3-4: Proposed EU-27 Bioethanol Model 
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Table A6.1:  Welfare effects or Equivalent Variation-EV (in US$ million) of a 5.75%  
and 10% EC bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of ssb=31.1  (ssb=100) 
Equivalent Variation (5.75%) Equivalent Variation (10%) 
ACP Countries -1235 (-807) -1388(-901) 
EU-27 -44208 (-32817) -55292 (-41012) 
ROW -7119 (-4256) -3632 (-3540) 
 Total -5256 2(-37880) -60312 (-45453) 
 
 
Table A6.2: Welfare decomposition (in US$ million) of a 5.75%  and 10% EC 
bioethanol blend mandate at sugar beet share of ssb=31.1  (ssb=100) 
  
Regions *BM% Allocative Efficiency Terms of Trade  Investment/Savings  
     
ACP  
Countries 
5.75 -1321(-1161) 412 (202) -326 (-152) 
10 -1482 (-1222) 625 (512) -531 (-191) 
 
EU-27 
 
    
   5.75 -40112 (-28820) -1317 (-1785) -3413(-2212) 
ROW 
 
10 -52202(-42312) -858 (-2618) -2232 (-1318) 
 
   
 
   5.75 -6014 (-3825) -651 (-231) -454 (-200) 
 10 -2620 (-2682) -882 (-632) -130 (-226) 
 
*BM= Blend Mandate 
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Table A7.1:  The welfare effects (in US$ million) of a 5.75%  and 10% EC bioethanol 
blend mandate/EPA policies  at Ssb=31.1(100) % 
 
 Equivalent Variation (5.75%) Equivalent Variation (10%)
 
 ACPCountries -524(-451) -654(-312)
 
  EU_27 -34632(-32147) -43463(-40134)
 
  
   ROW -5621(-5012) -6234(-5614)
 
 
Table A7.2: Welfare decomposition (in US$ million) of a 5.75%  and 10% EC bioethanol 
blend mandate/EPA policies  at Ssb=31.1 (100) % 
 
Region *BM% Allocative Efficiency Terms of Trade Investment/Savings 
  
   ACP 
Countries 
5.75% -605(-462) 106 (33) -25 (-22) 
10% -820 (-413) 212 (135) -46 (-34) 
  
  
EU-27 
5.75% -30220 (-29284) -4120 (-2731) -292(-132) 
10% -37332(-33480) -5658 (-6530) -473(-124) 
  
   
ROW 
5.75% -5212 (-4490) -126 (-359) -283 (-163) 
10% -5868 (-5283) -156 (-128) -210 (-203) 
 
*BM = Blend Mandate 
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